Die Aleksandar Vučić Show in der Krise

Vucic inauguration Photo by Anadolu

Man würde glauben, so sieht ein Sieger aus: Aleksander Vučić hat seit 2012 vier Wahlen gewonnen. 2012 wurde seine Fortschrittspartei stärkste Kraft er tritt in die Regierung ein, zwei Jahre später wird er Ministerpräsident, dann 2016 erneut wiedergewählt und nun am 2. April in der ersten Runde zum Präsidenten Serbiens gewählt. Sein überwältigenden Sieg mit 55,02 Prozent der Stimme machte eine 2. Runde überflüssig. Einen solchen klaren Sieg gelang das letzte Mal vor 25 Jahren, Mitten im Bosnienkrieg 1992, damals siegte Slobodan Milošević gegen den gemäßigten Oppositionskandidaten Milan Panić. Der größte Wahlerfolg Vučićs stellt sich jedoch als seine größte Krise heraus. Seit Tagen ziehen Tausende durch Serbiens Städte um gegen den Wahlsieg zu protestieren. Die Zahl ist noch nicht groß, doch die Demonstranten zeigen ein Beharrungsvermögen, obwohl sie in den regierungsnahen Medien todgeschwiegen werden.  Es gab im letzten Jahr bereits Proteste gegen den illegalen Abriss von Häusern im Belgrader Savamala Bezirk, doch die jüngsten Demonstrationen sind die Ersten, die spontan und durch Serbien gegen die Dominanz Vučićs protestieren und seinen Rücktritt fordern. Als Ministerpräsident, zukünftiger Präsident und Vorsitzender der größten Partei des Landes, laufen alle Fäden bei ihm zusammen. Sein Kontrollwahn ist legendär und innerhalb seiner Partei und Regierung hat er systematisch alle Konkurrenten ausgeschaltet. Sein größter innerparteilicher Widersacher war Tomislav Nikolić, der bisherige Präsident, der unter Druck Vučićs nicht nochmals antrat. Sein größter Konkurrent in der Regierung ist Außenminister Ivica Dačić, Vorsitzender der Sozialisten (SPS), der unerwartet und wohl auch auf Vučićs Druck hin nicht bei den Wahlen antrat.

Die Dominanz Vučićs ist auch Ausdruck seiner Schwäche: Er wurde weniger Präsidentschaftskandidat, weil er Erdoğan oder Putin nacheifert ein Präsidialregime zu etablieren, sondern da ihm eine Alternative fehlte. In seiner Partei kann niemand so souverän die Wahlen gewinnen wie er. Seine Partei hat nun etwa so viele Mitglieder für die Kommunisten in ihren besten Zeiten und 2016 errang sie einen Sieg, von dem selbst Slobodan Miloševićs Partei nur träumen konnte. Doch alles häng von ihm ab. Seine Parteigänger sind loyal, aber selten kompetent und noch seltener beliebt. Keiner von ihnen hätte die Präsidentenwahl so klar gewinnen können. Staat, Regierung und Partei werden somit zu einer Vučić-Einmannshow.

Seine Übermacht wurde wenige Tage vor den Wahlen überdeutlich, als die Titelseiten aller Tageszeitungen von einer ANzeige für Vučić überdeckt wurden. So zeigt man Macht. Nur die liberale und kleine Qualitätszeitung Danas blieb ohne Vučić–und findet sich nun unter starkem finanziellen Druck nachdem viele Anzeigenkunden unerwartet gekündigt haben. Im heutigen Serbien ist es schwer Vučić zum umgehen, er blickt nicht nur von den Titelseiten der Zeitungen, er ist im Fernsehen, Radio und Internet omnipräsent und mit der Ausnahme von kleinen unabhängigen Internet-Portalen immer nur im besten Licht präsentiert. In den wichtigsten Fernsehsendern bekam er mehr Aufmerksamkeit als alle Oppositionskandidaten zusammen.

Diese Dominanz Vučić wird von der EU gerne übersehen. Bereits am 3. April schickten Kommissionspräsident Juncker und EU Präsident Tusk eine öffentliche Gratulation an Vučić und nannten seinen Sieg ein Vetrauensvotum für den europäischen Weg. Kritik an dem Abbau demokratischer Rechte, die eingeschränkte Meinungsfreiheit und Dominanz Vučićs konnte man bestenfalls zwischen den Zeilen lesen. Nur wenige Tage vor den Wahlen wurde Vučić in Berlin und Moskau empfangen und so konnte er sich mit Bildern mit Merkel und Putin im Wahlkampf schmücken. Auch wenn er sich von Merkel sicher Kritik hinter verschlossenen Türen anhören musste, so konnte er sich an der Öffentlichkeit weiter als Garant für Stabilität und Reformen präsentieren.

Nicht nur Serbien entwickelt sich Zunehmens zum autoritären System. Neben dem EU Staat Ungarn, herrschen in anderen Balkanstaaten starke Männer, die sich nur wenig um demokratische Prinzipen scheren: Von Nikola Gruevski in Makedonien, bis zu Milo Djukanović in Montenegro–beide nicht mehr Ministerpräsidenten–versuchen jedoch weiterhin die Geschicke der Länder zu lenken. Von Milorad Dodik in der serbischen Teilrepublik Bosniens zu Hashim Thaçi, dem Präsidenten des Kosovo, die Region ist bestimmt von starken Männern, die wenig Interesse an demokratischen Institutionen, Medienfreiheit und Reformen haben, sondern in erster Linie um die eigene Macht. Anders als Orban oder  Erdoğan haben sie sich keiner Ideologie verschrieben, sondern nur Machtwillen. Somit können sie sich jederzeit als EU-willige Reformer präsentieren, und gleichzeitig diese Reformen durch informelle Machtstrukturen untergraben.  Die EU hat somit auf dem Balkan unsichere Schönwetter-Partner, je schwächer die Perspektive auf Mitgliedschaft ist,  desto mehr werden Vučić und co. von Reformen abrücken.

Als vor 20 Jahren Zehntausende monatelang in Serbien gegen Milošević demonstrierten, so war seine Macht noch nicht gebrochen, noch sollte drei Jahre Serbien in den Kosovo Krieg und weiteres Leid führen, doch sein Bann war gebrochen und er konnte seine Macht nur mit zunehmend autoritären Mitteln erhalten. Die Proteste seit den Wahlen in Serbien, zeigen, dass Vučić trotz seiner Übermacht in Medien und Parlament, und Unterstützung durch die EU, nicht allmächtig ist. Die größte Gefahr besteht nun darin, dass die EU sich dem falschen Partner verschrieben hat und die Demonstranten die Union als Teil des Problems, nicht der Lösung für die Demokratisierung des Balkans sehen.

Another unnecessary election in Serbia

 

VUCIC MIHAJOVIC STEFANOVIC GASIC MIROVIC

One man show (source N1)

Serbia has held parliamentary elections in 1990, 1992, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2003, 2007, 2008, 2012, 2014 and will hold early elections in  2016. This is not to mention the elections of the parliament of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1992, 1992/3, 1996 and 2000.

A citizen who turned 18 in 1990 thus could vote 15 times for parliament in two and a half decades, not to mention the ten presidential elections since 1990. If the frequency of elections where a standard of the quality of democracy,  Serbia would be a great democracy–it is not. Of the 11 Serbian parliamentary elections in the 26 years since the introduction of a multiparty system, 7 were early elections. Some where held because the governing coalition broke apart (i.e. 2008), but most were the result of the ruling party trying to secure an advantage by calling early elections.None of these elections is as gratuitous as the one called just now by Prime Minister Vučić. In the 2014 elections the Serbian Progressive Party secured a majority with 48.35%, greater than any party before it, including the Socialist Party under Milošević at its most successful poll in 1990. It could have ruled alone with a majority of 158 seats of 250, but decided to form a coalition with the Socialists. Its grip on power is strong and there is no conceivable reason why early elections would be necessary (I made a similar argument in 2012, sorry for being repetitive, but it ain’t me calling early elections).

Calling early elections is in the toolbox of populist rulers with an authoritarian streak. Tudjman used a similar tactic in 1995 after the military victory over the rebel Serbs and Gruevski has been calling early elections in Macedonia in the past (even the ones in April are forced by him against the oppositions will).

But why hold elections when you hold a majority in parliament? Such a step might seem risky for an incumbent. After all, one might loose power (and indeed this was the case for Milošević in 2000 and Tadić in 2012).

For Vučić, there are first strategic calculations. Using a high level of popularity and a disunited weak opposition is a good opportunity to put some more year in power “in the bank”–who knows what will be when the next regular elections are due? Furthermore, frequent elections campaigns prevent the opposition from recovering from previous defeats and perpetuates a weak opposition.

There are also more systemic reasons for early elections: As a populist incumbent, Vučić can use elections to mobilize voters and rule as a campaigner. A populist in power is always caught between speaking in the name of the people against the elite–whatever it may be–while actually establishing a new elite. This balancing act is facilitated by elections which pit us vs. them and distract from governing. Second, the current government is based on a one-man-show, Vučić. The dominance of one person of the government and country functions in the context of campaigning, but displays its weaknesses in governing, as the cadres of the party are weak and often incompetent and lack the popularity of the party leader.

It is an election year in the Balkans, besides Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia will also go to the polls in the coming months. However, so far these elections promise little progress in terms of democracy or reforms, but threaten to reaffirm semi-authoritarian rule in the region.

 

 

 

 

What the elections mean for Serbian democracy

I am re-blogging my analysis of the Serbian elections written for the new Balkans in Europe Policy Blog.

When Aleksandar Vučić gave his victory speech on Sunday, after the resounding victory of his Progressive Party, his seriousness seemed in no proportion to his success. For the first time, since the second multi-party elections in 1992, can a single party govern the country alone. With 48.34% of the vote and 156 (of 250) seats in parliament, the party does not require a coalition partner, unless it wants a majority to the change the constitution.  There are dangers in this victory, both for the victor and for the Serbian democracy. First, Vučić and his party might have won a Pyrrhic victory. The elections were triggered by Vučić to diminish the rule of the prime minister Dačić and his socialist party. While he achieved this (although the SPS remains as strong as before in terms of votes), he cannot blame bad decisions on a coalition partner if he is to govern alone. It is thus unsurprising that despite the large majority, SNS seems to want to include some other parties in government. However, even if this were to be the case, the SNS will have a hard time bringing about early elections, as it did this time around. This technique, a favorite among incumbents in the region, (esp. in Macedonia and Montenegro) of getting re-elected when opinion polls are favorable, will not be easily available to the new government. Finally, the weaknesses of the party will become even more apparent. It failed to run a visible candidate for the mayor of Belgrade, as it lacked convincing and popular politicians, besides Vučić. If the party is to govern effectively, it will quickly need to increase its capacity, since cloning Vučić, as some satirical photomontages suggest, is not an option.

The risks for the Serbian democracy are equally apparent. A large majority, in a political system that is used to coalitions, bears its risks in the best of circumstances. However, Serbia lacks checks and balances to hold their governments under control. To some degree, coalition governments have been (flawed) alternatives to checks and balances. With few independent institutions, many loyal media outlets and two of the three opposition parties more eager to work with the Progressives than to criticize them, there is a risk that there will be too few critical voices in these institutions. The focus of outsiders on the Serbian government delivering on Kosovo has also muted external scrutiny of un-democratic practices. Not least, the elections themselves are a reflection of a problematic understanding of democratic processes. As a result, the elections do raise serious questions about the future of democracy in Serbia. It seems unlikely that the new government will become authoritarian, or step back into Miloševićs shoes, but Serbia might move away from democratic consolidation and towards a hybrid system that we can observe in other countries of the region.

In addition to this development, the elections have also highlighted the decline of the right and a general decrease of ideological differentiation in the party landscape.

The decline of the extreme right

A key feature is the continued decline of the extreme right and conservative parties in Serbia. For the first time since 2000, Vojislav Koštunica’s Democratic Party of Serbia is no longer represented in parliament. After being mocked as a “kombi party” for its ability to fit all members into a van in the 1990s, it is back at its beginnings. The opposition to EU integration and focus on Kosovo has not paid off.  Similarly, other parties, on the nationalist end of the spectrum, fared badly. The Serbian Radical Party continued its decline from 4.62% to 2% and Dveri, a more recent extreme right wing group, dropped from 4.34% to  3.57%. In addition, even smaller right-wing groups split less than one percent. This overall decline of the extreme and conservative right is an important, and easily overlooked, development in Serbian elections. It can be attributed to three factors: First, the populism of the Progressive Party itself, constituted by former radicals, has been able to absorb some of the vote. Second, the fragmentation of these parties—various talks of pre-election coalitions among Radicals, DSS, and Dveri failed—discouraged voters to choose any of them. Thirdly, the trend is part of a regional development. In Croatia, but also in Romania, the extreme right has declined in the context of EU accession. As the EU effectively rejects such parties, they become less attractive as most citizens are (skeptic) supporters of EU accession. Kosovo, and other national issues, also no longer figure into the agenda that voters care about.

Lack of Alternatives

The elections were fought among parties that all formally share the same goals and have no discernable ideological differences. All parliamentary parties want to join the EU, talk of “reforms” and oppose corruption. As a consequence, there is no reason that the incumbent would not win, when there is no alternative that is different. Besides the ideological similarities, most parties also demonstrated a willingness to form pre-election coalitions with parties whom they have few commonalities, and display, even for Serbian standards, a surprising lack of respect for democratic principles. When Boris Tadić made his comeback, after breaking with Djilas and the Democratic Party, he did not form his own party, but the Greens of Serbia were taken over by him (or offered). They changed their name to add «New Democratic Party» and voila, a green party became the election vehicle for Tadić.  The Liberal-democrats of Čedomir Jovanović used to offer a more radical reform program than the Democratic Party. However, its unprincipled coalition with a conservative Bosniak party, close to the mufti of Sandžak Zukorlić, and its continuous flirting with the Progressives discredited this claim. In effect, the only two programmatically consistent electoral lists where those of the Democratic Party of Serbia, which failed to enter parliament ,and the list of the former Minister of the Economy, Saša Radulović, „Dosta je bilo“ (Enough of this), which radically criticised the influence of political parties and the economic policies of Serbian governments in the past decade. While the consistency of the DSS is likely to lead them further into political oblivion, the list of Radulović might become more significant in Serbia. Having led a shoe-string campaign, barely managing the register of the list two weeks before the elections and facing strong attacks in the media, the 2.08 % the list achieved is no small feat.

Antipolitics?

Another way of rejecting the ideological and ethical homogenisation of Serbian party politics was a repeat of the „invalid vote“ campaign of 2012. Several activists called on citizens to go and vote, and then to reject any candidate by invalidating the ballot (see here from some examples). Altogether, some 3.17% of citizens did exactly that. While not all may have invalidated their ballot for the same reason, the high number suggests that most, probably, deliberately invalidated their ballot in protest. These numbers are lower than in 2012, when they were 4.39%, but remain remarkable. Finally, the easiest and most common manner of rejecting the current political offerings has been to simply not vote. Turnout was only 53.12%, or four percent less than 2 years ago, and the lowest for Serbian elections since the introduction of the multiparty system in 1990.

Thus, the Progressives have been able to capture the largest share of the electorate of any party since 1992, but their success is not built on energizing the electorate or changing the perception of politics, but rather as a result of citizens either resigning to the inevitable, or the irrelevant. The broader dissatisfaction with party politics will not be remedied by SNS, and thus some broader opposition, reflected in social movements or new parties, remains a distinct possibility, even as the pluralist political space might be decreasing.

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