With Handke to the Balkans

2019-10-21 21.45.30.jpgTwenty-three years ago, I sat with anticipation in the Vienna Akademie Theater to hear the reading of Peter Handke’s “Eine winterliche Reise zu den Flüssen Donau, Sava, Morawa und Drina oder Gerechtigkeit für Serbien”. The theater was packed. Having read Handke and admired his writing, it was hard not be excited. I was also anxious. I had begun to travel to Croatia and Serbia three years earlier, made friends, read, studied the Yugoslavia and sought to learn what had happened. The refugees and debates in Vienna were a steady reminder of the wars. My travels had made me weary of the same lazy and stereotypical reports prevalent in the media that provoked Handke to write his essay, published earlier in the Süddeutsche Zeitung. However, when I read the text in a book before the reading, I was disspointed and disturbed. He responded with sometimes simplistic explanaitions of the wars with his own version, no better and often much worse. For him, Serbia under sanctions, isolated and inward looking became a fantasy of the anti-West, how world could be. His unreflected nostaligia toward the old Yugoslavia made him  fall for Milošević’s false claim to be the true heir to the country. Even modest curiosity would prove that claim to be a sham. But this was not just the trap into which many unreflexives leftists fell, the trap anybody who claims the anti-imperialist label is good, anybody demonised by the West must be a hero. Instead, he visited Serbia and saw a false idyll of rural calm where people could not drive a car because gas was scarce and that was reduced the basics. He transformed the hardship into one that was both only caused by the West and that was at the same time transforming Serbia into an antithesis of the West. This was not the Serbia I had seen, a country humiliated by its leaders, isolated and drive to crime, full of people who could not effort to indulge in the Western phantasies of an authentic people, but who wanted to live.

If Alain Finkielkraut  found his pet nation among Croats, Handke found his among Serbs. However, these were not real Serbs, but a mythical people, as defined by the nationalist visions of Karadžić, Milošević and their intellectual forefathers. Handke accepted the claim of the ‘leaders’ to represent the nation and indulged in collectivities, in a way no self-respective intellecutal would have talke about ‘the Germans’ or ‘the French’.

Following his reading, any critical question he was asked he responded with an insult (“Stecken Sie sich Ihre Betroffenheit in den Arsch!”) so that I walked away from the performance as a second installment of Publikumsbeschimpfung,  Offending the Audience, his 1966 play. His insults gave insight into a person who did not want to understand, but rather to mis- or rather un-understand. He was provoked by the wars and the reporting in the West, but his response was not to understand or respond with emphathy, to challenge the Western view that too easily accepted the national lense. Instead, he response was to endorse the logic of the nationalism and orientialism, he liked the orient that did not exist and was convinient for war mongers and western commentators alike. He liked to provoke, but with it dehumanized those who suffered and sought to understand.

Few events have helped me more to contiune traveling, understanding and learning in and about Yugoslavia than that reading in March 1996, not for the insight, but for the deliberate willfull ignorance I experienced that night.

(Much of what makes Handke a shamful winner of the Nobel Prize for Literature has been written by writers with greater witt and skill than myself, such as Aleksandar Hemon, Saša Stanišić or Jagoda Marinić. )

 

Drawing Borders

The following text was first published in the Serbian weekly NIN in the 23 May edition.

When the Serbian Minister of Defense (former ally of Mira Marković, Slobodan Miloševićs recently deceased wife) Aleksandar Vulin asks for an “as urgently as possible and secure creation of a border with Albanians” (using the derogatory term for Albanians: „za što hitnije i što sigurnije razgraničenje sa Šiptarima,“) he is just the most offensive of many regional politicians who like to talk about ethnic bounderies. From the beginning of discussing border changes between Serbia and Kosovo, as launched by Vučić and Thaçi to the world last year, it was not just about changing borders, but the entire framework of borders in the region. The terminology used by its proponents in Serbia has been to describe a border not between Serbia and Kosovo, but between Serbs and Albanians. For all the denial that these borders would not be ethnic or create homogenous territories, the language of “razgraničenje” between Serbs and Albanians is clear. On the other side, both Albanian and Serb politicians have been downplaying existing borders that separate nations. This includes talk by Vučić of some “sprski etnički prostor” and Rama’s Albanian nationalism and policy of abolishing the border with Kosovo.

 

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Serbian-Russian co-production Balkan Line

 

This idea of “Balkanska Medja“ or line is just like the Russian-Serbian propaganda film an alternative reality or rather a dangerous phantasy. The main premise of the agreements that ended the wars in the 1990s was to promote refugee return and preserving minority and other collective rights. This has not always worked, but to abandon the idea in favor of ethnic territories is a dangerous phantasy. It is also the logic of Europe’s far right. For example, the Austrian Freedom Party in its handbook for members talks about the ‘failure of dreams of multicultural phantasies” and demand for ‘self-determination of Balkan people’.  The problem of “self-determination” has been with us for a century when Woodrow Wilson made it a key pillar of his vision for Europe after World War One. Already back then, skeptics were wondering where to draw the ‘lines’ and indeed many of the lines drawn after the war left people on the wrong side. To create ethnic spaces and divided them by borders is a phantasy that can only be realized through expulsion or oppression. The creation of homogenous nation-states has included the forced assimilation or expulsion of those who do not fit the nation. The war criminals and ‘ethnic cleansers’ of the 1990s sought to conduct a violent and quick creation of new nation states. They partly succeeded, as most regions are more homogenous and territories are more linked to the dominance of one nation than before the wars. However, they also failed, as the new states were not clear nation states and these states have to offer extensive minority rights. Europe’s far right and nationalists, including in the Balkans, are still obsessed with homogeneity and territory. This fixation dangerous, especially for minorities who don’t have ‘territory’. Just like Milošević never cared much about Serbs in Croatia who lived in the big cities (and later not for any Serbs in Croatia), today they don’t care about Serbs in Štrpce or Gračanica or Albanians in Medvedja or where they don’t offer territory as a dowry for the pure nation-state.

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former FPÖ official Johann Gudenus explaining the word Glock (an Austrian gun manufacturer) in Russian

Those border phantasies also care little about what happens within the “ethnic spaces”. Just like the Austrian Freedom Party dreams about ending multinational states, its (former) leader HC Strache also dreams about controlling the media Orban style, giving deals to (fake) Russian oligarchs, taking illegal money for his party in exchange for deals, as everybody could hear in the secret tapes revealed last week. His ambitions fit well to the reality of his Balkan partners. The imagination of ethnic spaces thus is not really about self-determination. Of course, populists from Trump to Strache and Salvini, but also Vučić and Dodik like to claim to speak in the name of the “people”. A defining feature of populists is that they claim to be the only legitimate representative of the people against a bad elite, be they inside the country or outside. At the same time, this very idea that only they are legitimate, whereas all other parties are speaking for foreign interests, makes them anti-pluralistic. Their understanding of politics is Manichean, good versus evil, with them being the only force of good. Of course, such a view denies the very idea of legitimate political pluralism. The election results in Northern Kosovo thus are the best reflection of such a worldview. When Srpska Lista wins elections with over 90 percent of the vote, there is no pluralism and it is telling that the only potential political opponent, Oliver Ivanović, was murdered a year ago and still no arrests have been made.

The deeply anti-democratic understanding of politics that dreamers of ethnic boundaries have, means that they suggestions will not “solve” problems (which mostly don’t exist), but create new problems they can then offer to resolve to impatient outsiders and their own population.

The tragic consequence of this talk is that it does not only distract from the real problems, but also that it sucks up the oxygen for those political actors who want to confront these issues and instead encourage those who offer bigger and better ethnic spaces. The attempt by Germany with the help of France to put the genie of ethnic borders back in the bottle a couple of weeks ago has only been partly successful. While negotiating border changes might be off the table, for now, the alternative continues to be weak. As long as Kosovo citizens don’t get visa free travel, if North Macedonia (and Albania) don’t get to negotiation their EU accession and as long as the EU does not clearly reprimand serious problems with rule of law and democracy in the ‘front runners’ Montenegro and Serbia, the feeling of being stuck will remain. The regional stabilocrats will like this, as the talented and motivated leave, others are tied to them in bondage that is only visible when they need as ‘vox populi’ to vote for those in power to keep their jobs or to show their loyalty, with sandwich and bus ride included.

 

 

 

Now is the time for Serbia to accept the Kosovo reality

 

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After eight years of talks between Serbia and Kosovo, the EU, Serbia and Kosovo seem to be gearing up for finding a comprehensive settlement. This is good news, neither can Serbia join the EU without clarifying its relations with its neighbor, nor can Kosovo move forward to the EU without an agreement that would also pave the way for recognition by the EU’s non-recognizers. The Brussels dialogue has lost a lot of its initial dynamism from earlier years, and it is a good time to be more ambitious. It is also a risky moment, as the stakes are higher and the risk of tensions and spoilers increases. In Kosovo, any compromise with Serbia will be strongly challenged by the opposition, most of all Vetevendojse. In Serbia, the opposition is too weak to mount a challenge; the risk is more that some in the government hope to drive a hard bargain and make a good “deal” with Kosovo.

While President Aleksandar Vučić has been hinting that any normalization would require some unnamed benefits for Serbia, his coalition partner and Foreign Minister Ivica Dačić has been suggesting for years that border changes would be the best solution. However, such a solution would be dangerous and irresponsible. The only form of border changes that would be imaginable would be consensual, if both Kosovo and Serbia agree, as unilateral border changes would not be acceptable and close the door to EU integration and other forms of partnership. However, even an agreed border change would be a source of problems. First, it is hard to image that any government in Kosovo would agree to a border change without compensation, such as Preshevo. However, drawing new borders in Serbia would be a major problem and certainly that most Serbs in Preshevo would not want to join Kosovo. If there was no compensation, opposition in Kosovo to any compromise would be strong, with negative consequences. Most Serbs in Kosovo live South of the Ibar and would not live in Serbia, no matter how the border is redrawn. These Serbs are mostly horrified of border changes: They would become a smaller minority in Kosovo and one that might be easily more resented again if borders are changed. The Kosovo government agreed to the far reaching minority rights, because it was able to declare independence and it included the entire territory. It would be hard to maintain this level of minority rights, if the size of the Serb minority would be reduced by more than a third. This will put Serbs in the South in a more vulnerable position and would in effect be Serbia trading territory for supporting its minority. In a partitioned Kosovo, voices calling for unification with Albania will be strengthened. While it seems currently difficult to imagine a merger of the two, the constitutional guarantee that Kosovo gave at independence not to join Albania would be more easily abandoned in the case of border changes. It is needless to say that a small Serb minority in Gračanica, Štrpce and other towns and villages in Central Kosovo would become completely marginal in such a scenario. Thus changing the borders might be what benefits the Serbs in the North of Kosovo, but not most Serbs of Kosovo. Furthermore, Serbia would emerge with a few more square kilometers and a few more thousand Serbs living in it, but it would jeopardize its ability to be a constructive and partner for other countries in region, as it would be seen as a bully seeking to gain territories from its neighbors, if they are (eventually) coerced to consent.

It is the worry for broader regional repercussions that the EU and the governments have excluded such as an option. Redrawing borders, even if agreed, would encourage others to redraw borders, from Macedonia to Bosnia and this would be destabilizing for the region. The idea launched by Milorad Dodik that Serbia should support his cause in exchange for a deal on Kosovo is even more ridiculous. The territorial integrity is guaranteed by the Dayton Peace Agreement and the only reason the RS exists is because of Dayton. Abandoning Dayton effectively challenges the existence of the RS. A change of borders in Bosnia will trigger a conflict and the 200,000 Croats and Bosniak in the RS will overwhelmingly reject leaving Bosnia. Thus, changing Bosnian borders is a recipe for deasaster. Not least, the district of Brčko is a separate unit of Bosnia, recognized in the constitution (with the support of the RS) and thus, the RS is divided in two parts. No change of the borders could take place here in a peaceful and legal manner.

Thus, opening the question of borders is one of great risks, major moral problems, offering not more, but less stability, including for Serbs. Only the reckless would take this road.

So what “compensation” is possible for Serbia? The idea that Serbia should be rewarded for normalization is already a flawed premise. Serbia rejected Kosovo independence more than a decade ago, yet the far reaching autonomy and minority rights protection of Serbs that was offered in the Ahtisaari Plan was still implemented. Then in the Brussels agreement, Serbia gained additional influence in Kosovo and Serbs achieved additional protection. Thus, Serbs in Kosovo gained extensive rights, especially considering their small size, despite Serbian intransigence. Now it is time for Serbia to embrace the reality of Kosovo. At the end of the day, the live of Serbs in Kosovo will improve most, if Kosovo and Serbia co-exist as two friendly states where they are not forced to choose loyalty or hedge their bets. As the murder of Oliver Ivanović showed, it is also the best interest of Serbs in the North, if the lawlessness of North disappears and rule of law emerges that protects citizens from criminals. All of this can only happen through normalization–meaning Serbia living with an independent Kosovo, not trying to stop its effort to join international organizations and making petty and rather silly celebrations out of stopping Kosovo were it could. This has been the biggest flaw of the Brussels dialogue: despite the agreements, there has been no rapprochement. Of course, the responsibility lies with both, but Serbia would do well to accept that Kosovo as a country is an irreversible reality and that a prosperous and successful Kosovo is in Serbia’s best interest. What an agreement can achieve is to formalize the main agreements set between the countries over the past decade and also to establish links between the countries and formalize cross-border relations, like the bodies established between Northern Ireland and Ireland after the Good Friday Agreement in 1998, when the Republic of Ireland in exchange removed its claim to the entire island from the constitution. The only way real normalization will emerge in a way that opens the door to EU accession is to move beyond the zero-sum game, where every loss for Kosovo is gain for Serbia. Only if both governments start seeing their future relations in these terms, is there room for a genuine agreement.

This article was first published in NIN, 8.3.2018

 

Serbian version of top secret Star Wars synopsis leaked: Waiting for Rey’s return?

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Since the release of the latest instalment of Star Wars, The Last Jedi, has been released, an early draft for the final episode has leaked in Serbia. It is unclear it origin or veracity. It might be just the intro for the for the next film.

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Kylo Ren took over the First Order and is increasingly managing his temper by a forcing the tips of his both hands together in an ancient Jedi gesture. Rey has disappeared and the resistance is leaderless. The resistance remains at the margins of the galaxy and while many planets are suffering, it has little success in attracting more members.  The resistance has fragmented into several wings, unable to draw on broader popular support. Most inhabitants of the galaxy are discouraged and passive:

The dominant resistance is known as the democratic resistance, although others are frustrated with its corrupt leaders and would like to see a clean break from the old authoritarian resistance ways. This includes the movement of free resistance, and the people’s resistance. They are often shaped by infighting and the challenge to form a united resistance.

In addition, there is the Enough of the First Order! which keeps its distance from other resistance groups and mostly criticizes the intransparent financing of the armaments of the First Order. There is also the Knights of the Resistance which is a marginal resistance group mostly obsessing with the “white plague” of people not having enough children, claiming to defend some ancient traditions.

In addition, there have been a number of groups allied to the First Order emerging. These include old elements of the Empire, which are now junior partners. There is also the small radical resistance that pretends to be a resistance group, but is in effect led by Jabba the Hut and is siding with the Empire and now the First Order.

With Kylo Ren firmly in control and the resistance divided, Rey is nowhere to be seen. Few inhabitants of the universe even know about the resistance and those who do are shaped by the First Order Department of Propaganda. Both Kylo Ren and various resistance groups all claim to represent the legacy of Luke Skywalker.  There are meetings of different resistance groups, but they are not met by success. It is unclear whether to wait for Rey or to cooperate together to bring down the First Order. Will they wait for the return or find a way to confront Kylo Ren?

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Star Wars Intro courtesy of Star Wars Intro Creator

Naming and Shaming Airports

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Flying from the recently opened Dr. Franjo Tudjman Airport in Zagreb, a building with considerable grace, so different from the dour narrow-mindedness of its name giver, to Alexander the Great airport in Skopje, I am reminded of the deliberate provocative nature airport-naming in the post-Yugoslav space.

Rather than innocent names of places, like Surčin or Petrovec, the name givers over the past decade have opted for a more confrontational style. First, there is the “heroes at home, war criminals-terrorists abroad” category of name givers, like Franjo Tudjman or Adem Jashari in Prishtina. Then there are the “provoke thy neighbor” names, like the Alexander the Great Airport in Skopje, which got its name from the previous government in 2008–conveniently located on the Alexander the Great highway. Finally, there are the more subtle nationalist names, like the airport in Belgrade named after Nikola Tesla and Mother Teresa in Tirana. Both might be accused of much, in particular the latter, but not nationalism. The names are instead rather examples of “banal nationalism.” Nikola Tesla spent a total of 31 hours (1892) of his life in Belgrade. It is only his Serb ethnic background that made him eligible. Mother Teresa visited Tirana twice and both times a bit longer than Tesla, but both visits in 1989 and 1991 are hardly enough to get an airport named after yourself. Being born in Skopje and having lived most of her life in India, here connections to Albania were rather marginal . Again, it is her national background that made her the name giver.

The only  capital city airports in the region that avoided a similar fate are Sarajevo and Podgorica. An attempt to call the airport in Sarajevo after Alija Izetbegović was only stopped by Paddy Ashdown, the High Representative at the time. And Podgorica might have to wait a while before it can carry the name of the father of the nation.

The tragedy of name giving is that these new, nationalist names were given not in the 1990s, but over the last decade, including the naming of the new Zagreb airport by the previous Social-democratic government. Instead of emphasizing national “heroes”, provoking neighbors and promoting the idea of an ethnic nations, airports would be much more aptly named after artists, scientists or just some small suburb of the regions capitals.

 

 

 

 

From Yugoslavia to Catalonia and back: Some thoughts on parallels and differences

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A few days ago, I wrote a few lines for Radio Free Europe (and a few other media, including AFP, N1 and UOL noticias) on the similarities and differences and the uses of the referendum in Catalonia and in the Balkans, which caused some lively debates. Here are these notes with a few points expanded.

 

Parallels and Differences

First, neither is Spain Yugoslavia, nor is Catalonia Slovenia or Croatia. Just like Istria, Vojvodina or Republika Srpska are not Catalonia. The reasoning, the dynamics and political process leading to any independence movement is specific, but each success is claimed by independence groups and each failure by states. One key difference between Kosovo and Catalonia is the violence. Despite the heavy-handed police response on Sunday, the independence movement in Catalonia cannot claim a recent history of repression as Kosovo did. Catalonia did experience a brutal repression in the context of the Spanish civil war, yet this is more than half a century past and four decades of democratic, decentralized rule in Spain are the reality and have been for a long time. In Kosovo, even before the war 1998-9, the revocation of autonomy in 1989 suggested that Kosovo could not rely on any autonomy arrangement with Serbia.

This is a key difference with Catalonia, which enjoys far-reaching self-government. Despite the stubborn and inflexible policies of the Rajoy government the difference are stark: Spain is a democracy, Yugoslavia and Serbia in the 1990s were not. There is a parallel in the fact that the more intransigent and heavy handed the centre is, the more likely people turn their support to independence. The pictures of the police violence during the referendum is the best advertisement for the independence movement. This stands in contrast with the approach taken by the UK or Canada, allowing for a referendum to be held unrestricted. Allowing for referenda to happen does reduce the all or nothing/now or never environment of referenda.

Only a few years before the respective referenda in Slovenia and Croatia in 1990, only a minority favored independence, but the heavy-handed policies of Milošević catapulted nationalists to power and secured support for putting a distance to Belgrade. Thus, independence movements are always the product of the relationship between the region or people seeking independence and the center. The Yugoslav cases suggest that repression and centralization efforts backfire.

Repercussions and Echoes in the Balkans

There are repercussions of the referendum in Catalonia for the region: The tensions between the Spanish government and the region are part of the key reasons that Spain has not recognized Kosovo. Thus, the first risk is that any confrontation in Spain over Catalonia will make Spain and arguably other non-recognizers more reluctant to consider recognizing Kosovo. Thus, we need to not only consider the effect of the crisis on independence movements, but also on state policies.

The Balkan cases, as most other independence movements live off their own internal dynamics, not based on what goes on elsewhere. However, success and failure elsewhere shape debates. There are only two real potential cases in the region at the moment, the north of Kosovo and the Republika Srpska. More historical regions, Vojvodina or Istria, have a sense of identity distinct from the Croatian and Serbian nation-state and a multi-ethnic, rather than mono-ethnic narrative of difference. Both lack strong movements for independence and lack a clear cultural distinction from the rest of the country as is the case in Catalonia (see an excellent new book by Dejan Štjepanović on this). Both the political leaders in the Republika Srpska and the North of Kosovo have articulated their policies separate from Catalonia. In the North of Kosovo, the discourse is not about independence, but rather about remaining with Serbia (echoing similar arguments made by Serb secessionists in Croatia Bosnia in the early 1990).

In the case Catalonia were successful in achieving independence, it would encourage the president of the Republika Srpska, Milorad Dodik to pursue his goal. The Parliament of the Republika Srpska already stated when Kosovo declared its independence in 2008 that it reserved the right to pursue independence for the RS if Kosovo would achieve international recognition. Already Dodik has been continuously hinting at organizing a referendum. He has recently held back from pursuing a referendum on independence, largely due to international pressure, including from Serbia and Russia.

Catalonia will not cause new independence movements, just as Kosovo’s declaration of independence did not trigger a new wave of independence movements. It will serve as argument of both states and independence movement to make old claims or to counter them. A large factor is the international environment. There is generally little support for recognizing states. This is usually done only in extraordinary circumstances, either when there is an agreement with the central government, as happened in South Sudan, or if there was massive repression and a strong, violent independence movement, as in Kosovo or when the state had already disintegrated and there was no clear path to keeping it together, as it was in Yugoslavia. When Aleksander Vučić accused the international community of hypocrisy for not recognizing Catalonia, but supporting Kosovo, he is ignoring the specificity of Kosovo, which were underlined in the submissions and arguments brought to the ICJ in preparation of the 2010 advisory opinion on Kosovo’s declaration of independence. Thus, neither Catalonia not fit any of these categories of potential countries that can make a plausible claim for independence, neither can Republika Srpska nor the North of Kosovo.

 

Montenegrin Parties and the Gemino Curse. Through Balkan Politics with Harry Potter, Part 1

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In Harry Potter and the Deathly Hallows (Part 1), Harry, Hermine and Ron enter the vault of the vault of Bellatrix Lestrange to find a Horcrux, the Cup of Helga Hufflepuff. The vault was, however, protected by the Gemino spell, which duplicates objects when touched, in this case the treasures multiplied so frequently that they became mountains that nearly crushed the heroes.

The Gemino spell has been a curse for opposition political parties in some countries of the Balkan. Nowhere is this more visible than in Montenegro, which is holding parliamentary election on 16 October. The elections are being contested by 17 electoral lists. The two main opposition lists are in fact coalitions: The Democratic Front includes a baffling 10 parties, the Coalition Key 3 parties. In addition, there  are 8(!) Albanian parties competing (on three lists composed of 1, 3 and 4 parties respectively), 8 other parties, plus 3 appealing to Bosniak and Croat voters.Here is the list of your choices, if you are a Montenegro voters:

  • Democratic Party of Socialists
  • Social Democratic Party
  • Democrats
  • Socialdemocrats
  • Alternative Montenegro
  • Positive Montenegro
  • Coalition Key:
    • Democratic Alliance
    • Socialist People’s Party
    • United Reform Action
  • Serb Party
  • Party of Pensioners, Invalids and Social Justice
  • Party of Serb Radicals
  • Croatian Civic Initiative
  • Bosniak Democratic Community
  • Bosniak Party
  • Democratic Front
    • New Serb Democracy
    • Movement for Changes
    • Democratic People’s Party
    • Workers Party
    • Democratic Serb Party
    • Movement for Pljevlja
    • Serb Radical Party
    • Yugoslav Communist Party
    • Party of United Pensioners and Invalids
    • Resistance to Hopelessness
  • Democratic Alliance of Albanians
  • Decisive Albanians:
    • Democratic Union of Albanians
    • Albanian Alternative
    • New Democratic Power-Forca
  • Albanian Coalition
    • Democratic Party
    • Civic Initiative
    • Democratic Alliance
    • Civil Movement Perspective

Some are opposition groups, some might be either opposition or join forces with the ruling DPS, depending on the outcome of the elections. Altogether 32 parties and groups are competing for power (or one party per 16,525 voters). There is nothing new to having many parties contending, it seems likely that more than 20 parties will be represented in the next parliament. This is a long way from the early 2000s, when the number of parliamentary parties was a third of that.

The dominance of the ruling DPS has been the reason for the Gemino spell to create dozens of parties which are indistinguishable copies of one another. After every failed effort to break the dominance of Djukanović and his DPS, the opposition parties multiply. The extreme fragmentation helps the ruling party to stay in power, as it not only undermines the credibility of the alternative, but also creates a large pool of potential partners that can be co-opted  in a future government. This time, the fragmentation might have also some positive side-effects. It is clear to even the most optimistic opposition party leaders that they will not win a sufficiently large majority alone. Thus, not only have two large opposition blocks crystallized, but it also led to an agreement on post-election cooperation among the large opposition groups.

The Gemino spell is not unique to Montenegro, but rather a broader phenomena when the main function of parties is less about program and more about access to power, leadership of a party is central to power and exclusion from power is denying parties their main raison d’etre. The best example is the Democratic Party in Serbia which has fragmented or rather duplicated into dozens of copies. Of the 17 parliamentary clubs in the current Serbian parliament, 5 are off-springs of the original Democratic Party, Democratic Party of Serbia, Liberal Democratic Party, New Party, and the Socialdemocratic Party, not to mention some extra-parliamentary off-shoots (Left of Serbia), and currently ongoing processes of the Gemino spell inside the DSS and to a lesser degree the DS. So, while it is certainly not true that the Balkans produces more history that it can consume, some countries produce more parties than they can consume and Gemino spell will remain a curse as long as power is centralized in the state and the parties where every intra-party conflict and lost election triggers a new iteration of the curse.

(This is the first post with Harry Potter through Balkan politics. More to follow. If you have a favorite curse, character or scene from Harry Potter that might fit nicely, let me know)

 

The Biggest Success of the Croatian government was its fall. Interview for Lupiga

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Below is the English version of an interview I had the pleasure to give to the independent Croatian website Lupiga on the fall of the Croatian government, the state of authoritarianism in the Balkans and the consequences of the Brexit.

Last months we saw in Croatia the hard nationalist, authoritarian campaign from the government – especially from HDZ – focused on suppressing civil society and media freedoms, accompanied by historical revisionism headed by minister of culture Zlatko Hasanbegović, against whom was even a campaign started by prominent european intellectuals. At the same time, even the ambassadors of important EU-countries in Zagreb deemed it necessary to hold a special meeting on the topic of media freedoms. In your opinion, how are the German and Austrian governments seeing the developments of past months in Croatia, and the current instability in Croatia, which will probably produce a snap elections?

The instability of the government and its fall turned out to be its biggest success. The effort to take Croatia towards conservative authoritariansim as in Hungary and Poland failed. In both countries, Poland and Hungary, the ruling parties received strong popular support—even if this was rather a vote against their predecessors rather than their conservative and authoritarian agenda. In Croatia, parts of a weak government sought to do the same and failed. The speed with which the government alienated its neighbors, its partners in the EU and many citizens within the country was striking and eventually proved its undoing. The revisionism and playing on the country’s divisions is a minority obsession, not a majority view.

 Is there disappointment with Croatia’s policy towards the other Balkan states – including the recent blocking of Serbia’s EU admission negotiations? Recently the important Bundestag member Gunther Krichbaum strongly criticised Croatia because of that, but leading Croatia’s politicians derogated these critiques, portraying them as an „isolated opinion“, while foreign minister Miro Kovač stated that in the EU it is not a topic at all.

Croatia’s blockade has been a very short sighted step. There is little it could gain and it seemed to be more to prove the nationalist credentials of the government. Using ones veto power in accession talks is possible, but comes at a political price in the EU, if it is done without broad support. It looks to many EU countries, in particular Germany and Austria, as Croatia is not yet a responsible member state. This is a striking turn around to the previous government that sought to position itself as an advocate of enlargement and a cooperative policy towards the Western Balkans. The veto is both bad for relations to other EU partners and Serbia. Of course, it is particularly striking at the Croatian parliament passed a resolution that it would not obstruct the EU integration of other countries over bilateral issues in 2011, including with HDZ votes. Now this is what Croatia did. There is fateful use of the veto power (or threat), first by Italy against Slovenia, then by Slovenia against Croatia and now Croatia against Serbia. Every time the weaker country promised not to do the same, but it did in the end. Thus, if Serbia is subject to such a veto, it is more likely to also use it down the road against others.

Generally, how does the European Union see the role Croatia has played since its accession to the EU? It seems that recently Croatia is trying to align itself – especially the president Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović is trying in this direction – with the Central European states i.e. Višegrad group – but these countries are not only becoming more and more authoritarian, but often in conflict with the „core EU“-states on the number of issues?

 Croatia has not yet founds it place in the EU. Of course, coalitions are changing and depend not just on geography, but also the view of the government. I would thus expect that whatever government emerges after the next elections would again take a different line. The Visegrad countries are unfortunate partners at the moment. Not only are they moving towards authoritarian and revisionist policies, in particular Hungary, but also Poland. They are also isolated in the EU, their hostile view on migration and hosting refugees might have been popular at home, but gave officials in older EU member states a sense of betrayal. I remember a Dutch official stating that he grew more wary of enlargement after witnessing the lack of solidarity in tackling the refugee challenge in the Central European members. I am not sure that this is good company for Croatia. It certainly would benefit also to look elsewhere, either at other Mediterranean countries like Italy, or towards Austria and Germany. With the Brexit vote, the more Eurosceptic parties in the Visegrad countries on one side might be encouraged, on the other are losing partners. The Law and Justice party in Poland is in a parliamentary group with the British conservatives in the European Parliament. Who will be there partners now?

It often seems that EU is giving support to the authoritarian rule of Aleksandar Vučić in Serbia. EU Commissioner for Enlargement Johannes Hahn, once said that „we need proofs for the suppression of media“ – despite Vučić having strong control of the media, illustrated also by recent purges in the Radio-Television of Vojvodina. In Germany as well there is not much critique of Vučić. Why is that, in your opinion?

I think the EU has gotten to be more aware of these problems in the last year than earlier. The main reason is two-fold. First, much of the control of the media and public space has been indirect and without clear evidence. It is thus easy to dismiss the accusations, especially as Vučić clear does the right talk in Brussels and Berlin. Second, Vučić has delivered on Kosovo and Bosnia and is seen as moderate in the region, which is an image he carefully cultivates. The self-image of the hard-working, honest reformer is something that Western counterparts like to see and thus there is an element of the willing suspension of disbelief. The longer he is in power and as the rhetoric does not match up the deeds, I would imaging that the critique would become stronger. I would expect that Germany in particular would be more critical behind closed doors, but as Vučić plays the Russia card, he is able to scare the EU into treating him with more care than he deserves.

Vučić is often manipulating in order to get EU support, for example, by presenting the situation that, if he loses, the radical right would come to power, what is often accepted in the EU. The recent elections were in the European media commented with titles such are „the elections for Europe“ – although the elections did not have anyhing to do with the pro- or anti-EU choice. One of the reasons for this support is probably because EU officials count that he is the one who can deliver the successful completion of Serbia’s negotiations with Kosovo?

He understands that both citizens want the EU accession, at least enough that politician in power has to promise working on it and second, he has to keep up the rhetoric towards the EU. It is of course in regard to Kosovo, where his pragmatism has helped him. He is also able to present himself as the last defense against pro-Russian forces—while himself playing this role, see the declaration Marko Đurić of SNS signed with United Russia recently. As long as the opposition in Serbia is weak and divided, a comment you will hear in Western capitals is: What or who is the alternative? Of course, this view fatally reminds of Milošević during the 1990s—not to say that Vučić pursuing a disastrous policy like Milošević did, but the willingness of the West to work with an increasing authoritarian leader.

How do you see the process of Serbia’s negotiations with Kosovo and is there going to be a strict condition for Serbia to recognize its independence?

I cannot imagine that Serbia can join the EU without recognizing Kosovo. Germany has made this fairly clear and I would be certain that other EU members would insist, both because they support Kosovo’s independence and because they do not want to important unclear borders into the EU. However, it is likely that this recognition would come at the end of the accession process and thus we are talking about a decision that is still at least 7/8 years away.

 Recent events about the destruction of Savamala neighbourhood triggered strong protests in Belgrade because of its probable strong connection with the Serbia’s power centers. In your opinion, would there be any sincere pressure from the EU to investigate that case?

I am sure that the EU is putting on pressure on this issue, as it touches some key aspects of its priorities, the rule of law. Nowadays, a country cannot join, if this is not addressed appropriately,as enlargement-skeptic countries, such as the Netherlands would block any accession until this is clarified and the rule of law functions. Thus, the EU is likely to put pressure in regard to this particular issue, but on a structural level, it will look carefully during the negotiations to ensure that these are investigated. Of course, EU pressure will be closely tied to society’s reaction in Serbia. The strong protests are certainly going to make it easier for the EU to also put pressure on the Serbian government.

Macedonia is another Balkan state in serious problems. The EU was from the beginning included in an effort to solve the crisis, but its recipe – to achieve mediation somewhere in the middle between deeply corrupt and authoritarian government, opposition and repressed society – was flawed?

Yes, the EU approach has been based on the assumption that this is a problem between government and opposition, but instead it has been a problem fundamentally about a corrupt and authoritarian government. As we can see during the protests, the opposition to the government is wider than just the largest opposition party. There were good moments in the EU engagement, such as the very honest and critical Priebe report last year that identified the weakness of the government in Macedonia. However, there has not been enough pressure for reform by the EU and there is a paradox in requiring reform, while being willing to work with the leadership around Gruevski that has no interest in any reform that would threaten its power. Thus, it is simply naive to believe that rulers who risk going to jail would take such a risk in the name of the EU accession or reform. In particular, the EU leverage is very much limited, as the EU has little to offer with the Greek veto still preventing Macedonian membership, even if reforms took place. Thus, one has to recognize that not only has EU intervention been sometimes naive, its ability to act have been limited.

Interestingly, some Macedonian politicians also enjoyed support in Europe, like Gruevski who had strong links with Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung. In Kosovo, the EU is cooperating with the deeply corrupt and toxic elites. At the same time, these elites are very pro-European – you stated that „paradoxically, you can be dictator in Balkans and also being verbally pro European”. But, it seems to more of a rule than of an exception – and also that it is possible not only to be a dictator and verbally pro-European, but a dictator and an EU-partner as well?

This paradox is a product of the fact that enlargement is low on the list of EU priorities. I don’t think that many EU governments and the EU institutions would like to have Vučić or Gruevski as partners inside the EU. However, the EU knows that this process will last a long time and thus, the governments in the region might not be in power by the time enlargement comes around. Consequently, they tolerate more problematic behavior than they would have a decade or more ago. Consider Vladimir Meciar in Slovakia. When he was in power during the 1990s, there was no hope for EU accession and this message was clear by the EU. This energized the opposition and swept him from power. In the Western Balkans, there is no such dynamic. This is in part due to the fact that the European Commission is afraid of sending such a clear signal, as this would effectively kill enlargement: the two front runners in enlargement, Montenegro and Serbia have semi-authoritarian leaders, as did Macedonia and Kosovo and Bosnia are deeply dysfunctional. The situation is somewhat better in Albania, but also there the polarization of government and opposition is toxic. As a result, there are no champions of enlargement—open and democratic governments that pursue reforms and EU accession that pull society along and set a role model for the region. On the other hand, few EU governments are eager to see enlargement any time soon and in some countries referenda are looming over enlargement—especially in France and the Netherlands—and thus many EU member states are not unhappy that enlargement is remote and will take years. The reluctant reforms are in a symbiotic relationship with the reluctant enlargers.

 Could we say that, as long as the local leaders are cooperative and / or obedient – in the case of Macedonia, turning the country into Europe’s border guard, stability in the case of Kosovo and Serbia or keeping Russia out in the case of Montenegro – the EU is much less interested in the nature of the Balkan regimes, i.e. that it bases its policy towards the Balkans on its own interests – which are different than the interests of the local populations?

This is another challenge. The refugee ‘crisis’—I am putting quotation marks on the term crisis, as it is a self-made crisis, the influx of refugees was always manageable for the EU—has made the EU and some of its member states put geopolitics above norms. Both the agreement with Turkey and the closure of the Macedonian border were geostrategic decisions made inside the EU that ignored how this benefits local power structures and gives them more legitimacy.

 On one occassion you stated that we can analize Vučić, Gruevski or Đukanović, but that they are „systemic“ i.e. the products of the local system, and not a coincidence. What is the cause of that? How much is the EU reponsible for such a development? Macedonia, Bosnia and Kosovo are three countries with strong EU-involvement, yet all three could maybe at least partially be described as failed states. Can we also speak of the failure of the EU Balkan policies in general?

Of course, Vučić, Gruevski and Djukanović are not coincidences, but expressions of weak institutions and state structures. They rule through informal power structures, based on personal loyalty and party affiliation and these trump abstract rules and laws. First and foremost, this is a domestic failure and not a failure of EU policy. The reasons the EU has not been more effective and failed in part has been based first on neglecting informal politics and focusing too much on formal rules. This suits semi-authoritarian rulers who are happy to have formal rules and subvert them at the same time. Furthermore, the EU did not push enough for strengthening institutions during times when the credibility and ability of the EU to push for reforms was greater. Take Serbia: the dominance of Vucic is product of the Tadic era when a president exercised power well beyond the formal constitutional powers and everybody looked the other way.

When it comes to Kosovo, Bosnia and Macedonia, I would not call them failed states, they are difficult states with considerable challengers. They could have worked better if they had greater prospects of EU membership. The institutions are weak and there are considerable difficulties in all three, although they differ in their challenges. Yet, these are not a product of power-sharing or ethnic tensions, but the same kind of informal power structures we see in Serbia and Montenegro.

 At the moment the enlargement is not a priority at all – you wrote in this context about the implications of the Dutch voters rejection of EU-Ukraine agreement and its consequences on the Balkan states aspirations. How much are the chances of Western Balkan countries of becoming the EU-members realistic at all – in your words, sometimes it seems „like the EU simulates its enlargement aspirations, and the local countries simulate reforms“?

The prospect of joining the EU in the coming 7-8 years seem slim, only if the EU changes will enlargement become possible again. There is a risk, as I noted earlier, that referenda would be held over enlargement in France and the Netherlands and there is no reason to think that it would be positive. Thus, these are high hurdles which might worsen considering the atmosphere in the EU after the Brexit vote. The 27 EU members realize that the EU is currently unpopular and thus will not ‘provoke’ their citizens with an unpopular measure, such as enlargement. However, even if this was not the case, Serbia and Montenegro as the ‘front runners’ would not be ready to join for another 6-7 years. Thus, this is a long time, by which the EU will look very different and certainly popular attitudes will change—for better or for worse. If I were to give advice to governments in the Western Balkans, I would say, reform, pursue EU accession and be ready when the EU is ready. The bottom line is anyhow not the day of membership, but the reforms that the EU requires.

 Some experts proposed that the EU should lower the criteria significantly and accept fast admission of the Western Balkan countries, otherwise they could tire themselves of endless objectives and maybe geopolitically re-orient, while the admission would work beneficially on their societies and politics. How would you comment on that?

 While I am sympathetic to this view, it is first not realistic. Citizens in too many EU countries are skeptical of enlargement towards the Balkans and would oppose quick enlargement. There is thus no realistic chance of such an approach. The Brexit vote will make any such move even less likely. The only scenario under which such a possibility would arise, is if the EU transforms itself into a two-tier EU, with an outer ring for countries like the UK and the Western Balkans with a  lower level of integration and lower critiera. However, talking as an EU citizen, I am deeply troubled with the Hungarian and Polish government in the EU and I would certainly not want to have more governments in the EU which are undermining liberal democratic rule. I doubt that quick accession of countries ruled by Vučić or Djukanović would do the citizens of these countries any favors.

 Is there a chance that these countries will for a longer time remain a kind of impoverished external periphery ruled by local authoritarian and nationalistic leaders – who are also supported by the EU?

The risk is real and largely a function of the degree to which the EU will be rejuvenating itself. If it will stagnate and the crisis of the EU and the crisis of democracy will continue and worsen, this will be, I am afraid, be the consequence. However, if the perpetual EU-crisis will end and it will find renewed energy to focus on its values and project outwards, then this will come to an end. The nationalist and authoritarian leaders are opportunists and follow the larger European atmosphere.

The EU was and is at the same time often pushing for economic policies which do not benefit local populations. Liberal opposition in all local countries was always dreaming for the rule of law, civil liberties, etc., but the EU is willing to tolerate suppression of that even in the range of the member states, Hungary for example. If they make it into the EU, what is the EU offering Balkan nations today at all – in terms of economic and social progress?

The economic progress or the EU convergence narrative has failed in the light of the economic crisis, see Greece. The value narrative has failed in the case of Hungary, thus there is currently little the EU can offer if countries are not able or willing to follow. I don’t see any benefit for any Western Balkan country in the EU, if their politics will look like those of Hungary or their economy like Greece. This requires first and foremost a rethink in the EU how to deal with countries who diverge so fundamentally from the core understanding of the EU.

How would it be possible for the periphery countries to reform themselves in order to achieve economic prosperity? In the context of the current EU-wide economic policies, that seems hardly possible, as their only “competitive advantage” seems to be low labour costs, while – inside the common market – weakness of the domestic industry reduces peripheral countries to the market for products from more developed ones. The convergence would possibly require massive redistribution and investments from the richer countries to the poorer ones, but such a project would require a fundamental change of the principles of the EU economic policies – is that possible to imagine? Could it be said that the weak position of these peripheral economies inside the EU also contributes to the authoritarian movements?

The weakness of some peripheral economies and their lack of economic convergence is not only the result of EU policies, but to a large degree based on the inability to make effective use of EU structural funds and other resources. Thus, countries like Ireland have been effective and others like Greece have not. Of course, it seems clear that the austerity policies of recent years have been locking countries in a difficult position and this requires a more strategic rethinking of the EU policies. The difficult economic position has led to both the rise of far right parties, but also of new leftist parties, like Syriza and Podemos, which seek to offer a different approach. Both clearly highlight that the existing parties in the countries particularly hard hit by the crisis are unable to retain legitimacy. Interestingly, the crisis of established parties has moved from the periphery of the EU to its center, including Germany and France-

How would you explain the huge success of the radical right-wing in Austrian presidential election? Both mainstream candidates did not even made it to the second round, which could speak of population’s estrangement from the established elites. Some comments were pointing out of the strong support for the right in the rural regions, which miss the modernization of the urban centers. Now it seems that the chauvinism and nationalism are not any more reserved for the periphery, but that the liberal democracy is failing in its centers as well?

The success of the far right in Austria is part of the wider European and US (see Trump) rise of populism that draws on xenophobia, anti-elitism and rejection of established parties. In the case of Austria, this was reinforced by the influx of refugees that gave many citizens a fear of the unknown and seeming (not real) state weakness. The weak and changing policies of the governing parties added to the support of populists and far right parties. This is a similar dynamic as the Brexit vote in the UK. With Labor not campaigning energetically for the EU and the Conservatives divided, the defenders of the gave up the fight. In Austria, the established parties were not able to offer inspiring candidates and offer a vision.

Now that the elections have been held again, there will be an interesting question whether or not the Brexit vote will impact the result. If the Brexit discussions continue to reveal that the supporters of leaving the EU had no plan or vision, but just opposed the status quo for their own benefit, risking chaos and uncertainty, this could strengthen the forces against the far right. The message is: populist challengers have no answers and lead to chaos. If Brexit proceeds successfully, after the first ten days of chaos, then this would be a welcome signal to the far right in Austria and elsewhere. The message is: if moderate conservatives in the UK can do it, why can’t we. Austrian presidential elections are formally speaking not very important. Austria is a small country, the president as few powers. However, if the candidate of the far right would make it in Austria, it would be a water shed, encouraging the far right elsewhere. Considering that the FPÖ gathered nearly 50% of the vote here is already a shocking message. Until these elections few thought that a far right candidate could possible get the support of nearly every second voter, especially in a country that is not hit hard by economic crisis and is otherwise not in a difficult situation.

The Austrian vote, the Brexit referendum do raise fundamental challenges not just for the EU, but also for liberal democracy in Europe. As we are in the midst of this crisis, it is hard to predict which way we will head, yet I am sure that at the end, there will be no business as usual.

Absurd Referenda

After the Brexit vote, Russia has been putting pressure on Serbia to have a vote on EU and NATO membership as early as the presidential elections next year. The notion of such a referendum is clearly intended to sabotage Serbia’s EU accession and seeks to capitalize on the EU crisis after the British vote. I wrote this commentary below for the daily Blic on the absurdities of this referendum and referenda more broadly.

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Referenda are popular tools in the hands of populists and authoritarian leaders and rarely the desired instrument of democrats. They give easy yes-no answers to complicated issues, they allow to mobilize citizens against something, anything and they can ignore values and rights that are other protected. It is thus no surprise that amidst the current democratic crisis on the European continent referenda have been proliferating. However, not just the Brexit vote shows how problematic referenda can be: In Greece last year, the government of Alexis Tsipras organized a vote on the conditions for the bailout plan, campaign against the plan and ignored the Oxi (no) vote the next day. In Britain the Brexit vote only took place because David Cameron promised it his own Eurosceptic party colleagues when he took control of the party and once Brexit one, both he and those who campaigned against the EU fled the scene without a plan. Other referenda have been launched by the opposition to sabotage the government and impose their own agenda, as conservative Janez Janša did in Slovenia or the clerical far right group «U ime obitelj» in Croatia with the vote to introduce a constitutional ban on same sex marriage.

Even in Switzerland, the home of referenda and more experienced to voting on specific policies had two highly problematic referenda in recent years. First, a vote banned the construction of minarets—never mind that this is not only absurd considering that minarets are exceedingly hard to find in Switzerland (only four were built before the ban in 2009), but also because it breaks human rights. The Swiss voted in 2014 to limit immigration, including from the EU, which broke bilateral agreements and resulted in EU countermeasures that hurt Switzerland.

It is populists with strong authoritarian leanings across Europe who argue for referenda, often against elected parliaments as a way to short circuit complicated decisions that require negotiation and compromise. While this sounds more democratic, it is so only at the surface. Referenda are rarely the instrument of citizens, but mostly tools of either governments to ratify what they want or the opposition using them sabotage a parliamentary majority.

The idea of a referendum on EU or NATO membership in Serbia at this point is particularly absurd. No country has ever voted on joining the EU before negotiations are concluded and there was a treaty to vote for or against. Similarly, no country that does not want to join NATO has voted on whether to join. It does make sense—and many countries did—of having a vote to join the EU or NATO once the deal is completed to ensure that the citizens agree with such a big decision. Voting on something that will happen years down the road and is uncertain how it will look like (what the EU will be like, the regional context and Serbia) is akin placing a bet today on the winner of the 2024 European football championship—foolish.

A referendum on NATO would be even more bizarre as neither the government, nor a majority of citizens currently want to join and there is no significant movement to join NATO. Thus, the only purpose of a referendum would appear to be to preempt a future change of heart. However, voting now on a policy in the future is locking yourself into an artificial tight-jacket that might be a convenient excuse until a future government will see it fit to ignore it.

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The idea of such a referendum does recall the famous vote Milošević imposed in 1998 against foreign mediation in Kosovo. A majority of voters followed his suggestion to reject “foreign meddling”, just to see him negotiate (not very successfully) a few months later. JUL at the time plastered the walls of Belgrade with a poster in English (!) and the slogan “We all thing the same!”

The expectation of those arguing for such a referendum now would appear to be sabotaging EU accession and preventing a future NATO membership. A vote against the EU would be easily interpreted as a vote against political and economic reform and as more than just the rejection of membership in the organization, but the values associated with it and ties with the EU. Turning the back to Europe would satisfy dictators to the East, such as Putin and Erdogan, but bring nothing good for Serbia.  The best illustration of the populist trap was a recent cartoon of two sheep standing admiringly in front of the election poster a wolf. They were happily explaining their unlikely support: “This will show the shepherd”.

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Megalomaniac Baroque Decoration. A facade for authoritarian kleptocracy

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A few weeks ago, I had the pleasure to discuss authoritarianism in the Balkans, the far right in Europe and the crisis the EU with Naum Panovski, a Macedonian theater director and intellectual based in New York,  for the Macedonian weekly Fokus. I am posting the discussion we had in Brooklyn here in full.

Naum Panovski: We are witness today to a dangerous rise of fascism, revision of history and mass corruption all over Europe.  And it is apparent that EU is not addressing these issues in a way it should and could. It seems that Europe has not learned from its sordid past. On the occasion of Europe Day, you have pointed out that “Today Europe is weak, willing to trade its values for “security” with dictators, it is divided and it’s opponents are stronger than ever since 1950.” Is this placing EU on the dangerous track of disunity and disintegration? How do you see Europe from here, from Manhattan and from the banks of East River?

Florian Bieber: The irony is that for the past 20 years the rhetoric in Europe was there is no alternative to Europe, there is no alternative to liberal democratic reform, and this is the only way. And this was the message to the countries of Eastern Europe: There is only one way you can do it, and basically it is catching up with the West, and when you do it that way, then eventually you will be a part of the West, in a broader sense, and you will have liberal democratic system, which is stable consolidated democracy and in so doing you are part of the EU and that is the end of the story. And there is no alternative to that. But now we discover that of course there is alternative. It may be worse, but there is alternative. The alternative might be ideologically incoherent, but reality is not based on ideological coherence. And many of the Balkan countries, as well as Austria, Hungary and Poland have challengers to liberal democracy and the EU. They are not outright authoritarian or fascist, yet they threaten the pillars of the liberal democratic consensus. They all claim that they want majoritarian democracy, they talk of human rights, but they define human rights differently. And the question is how do you define human rights and democracy. So it is in a certain way the challengers are interpreting reality in different way. So for example, if you take the right-wing in Croatia, and what HDZ and Hasanbegovic [Croatian minister of culture] is doing, they are eager to rehabilitate or at least relativise the fascist past.  If we look at Orban in Hungary, he rehabilitates the Horthy regime, but he is also eager in developing his own model of rule more coherently than elsewhere. He is actually introducing a model of rule which is majoritarian,  plebiscitary, but  has very strong authoritarian dimension. It is of course still amorphous model but based on coherent  system of thought.  It is similar case with Gruveski’s  authoritarian rule in Macedonia  or Kacyinskis government in Poland, and different from more eclectic authoritarian patterns elsewhere, as in Serbia or Montenegro.

 

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Source: Fokus

Naum Panovski:  Well, when we look at what you articulated as their different interpretation of reality, I think that we have to bring here “something” that I call a their lack of humanist point of view, which is turning upside down what it is good, ethical, what is socially acceptable; what is our concern and care for the “other”, that is the idea of otherness. For example, way back at the beginning of the this century there was editorial in Le Monde, which ended in a genuinely noble and memorable manner. It says: “What menaces us all at the beginning of  the twenty-first century, in France, as in the United States, but also in  Israel, as in Palestine, in India, as in Pakistan, is the isolating of the Other in his identity-national, ethnic, or religious. . . . To  better know the Other in his own language and his own imagination is not to renounce oneself. It is, on the contrary, to accept the plurality of worlds, the  diversity of visions, and, above all, a respect for differences.”

Well keeping this mind, I think we live today in a world which is all about ME. That  is, it is ME the ruler who sets the rules and policies. I think there is a distortion of truth and distortion of reality, and what they, these modern dictators, bring to the table is in fact very distorted way of thinking. It is a fabrication and faking of truth and reality, inspired on one hand, I believe by the aggressive Tea Party ideology in this country and on the other be the revival of religion as a political entity and force.

In that sense I recognize that tested matrix practiced all over fractured Balkans, and as a result we see there today how fascism is openly marching in Croatia, or in Serbia, while in Macedonia Gruevski’s dictatorship and the brutality of his gang has devastated the entire country.  How did we come here? Why? Why we did not say, stop? Why we did not say; that is not right. That is enough!

Florian Bieber:  You have mentioned many points here which I believe  are interconnected. Ironically, the populists have become constructivists. And they are very good at it. You have to create debates which construct meaning, but in their case doing that they also disguise other intentions, other elements which are engaging and relevant.  There a number of these cultural and ideological battles in Europe. In Poland, Hungary and Croatia, the Communist period is still an important point of reference with the government dividing the society in democrats (themselves) and (post-)Communists, in some cases, as mentioned earlier, the historical reinterpretation is about World War Two. The rehabilitation of WWII collaborators with the Nazis in Serbia and Croatia is indicative. It is an irrelevant battle. A battle about which we wonder who cares about it. That is not people’s bread and butter issues. We have other existentially important issues. Yet it is a distraction, very effective  distraction,  sidelining  reality. And what is striking is that it works. It is engaging enough and the people’ discussion is taken away from the reality and more relevant topics.  In Croatia the debates keep coming back to Bleiburg and Jasenovac, how to interpret the role of the partisans and their crimes and the “Independent State of Croatia” (NDH) . This debate is highly politicized and has little to do with serious historical research, but with political score-settling. Instead, it should be historians’ discussion and in serious historical debates, this is not a relative question. There can be no doubt that both the NDH and Serbian puppet regime were collaborators and that the NDH was fascist, and hardly a state. But the fact that this is a subject of a public debate at this particular point of time is striking. In Macedonia, the government’s “antiquisation” campaign has sought to not just reinterpret the recent past, but to impose a whole new narrative of the nation. Such story-telling is of course classic nationalism, but most importantly, it is an effective distraction.

The other element here is what you call humanism, I will call empathy…

 

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Naum Panovski: Yes, we can call it empathy or as Filip David calls it, solidarity…

Florian Bieber:  Yes, yes… solidarity can be the word, but I call it empathy because it means that you are able to imagine yourself as somebody else, and this came into discussion and I thought about this when refugees came to Europe and many people lacked empathy, that is many people lacked to imagine what it is like to be refugee. And many Europeans who have never experienced  war in that way had the least empathy for the refugees because they have no sense of what it means, they have no personal narrative of that experience. And you can say that is selfish or otherwise, but on the other hand I think all of this is part of the social context, it is not individual. You as an individual are making choices based on the environment around you. People around you trigger empathy or trigger hatred, and then they can make it socially acceptable. And that is the other thing which becomes problem. In certain  societies you establish taboos of topic where you cannot say the refugees are dirty Muslims bastards who don’t need to get anything. And they are taboos that are established and they are helpful because they set boundaries in our behavior. You might think in your head but you shouldn’t let this out of your head. That endangers others.

Germany is a prefect example of this. There are of course Germans who have  extreme right and  fascist views but there are very strong social taboos on these fascist views.  These kind of social taboos are less strong in Austria fro example and again less strong in Croatia.

So it matters what the state says.  It matters what the society around you says, what taboos and social consensus exists. And seems that in the last few years in many European countries these taboos eroded. I don’t necessarily think that people changed their views or that they became more right wing, or they have changed their views, but these destructive views have taken more space of the social arena. And that is something that we have to be concerned with.

Naum Panovski: All this is, as well, very clearly visible in Macedonia: the revival of history, the sidetracking of reality and replacing it with fictive reality and phantasms. That kind of social and political environment on my opinion is very much a daily life of Macedonian citizens under Gruevski’s regime and his gang. How do you see Macedonia’s reality today?

Florian Bieber:  I think Macedonia is a prefect example of a system of rule which we see not just in Macedonia but in many countries around the region.  That system essentially is based on informal control and rule of the state by a small group of people hidden behind a party structure. And that informal control is for two purposes: either for personal gain and enrichment or for power. That is the goal. Everything else is decoration.

Naum Panovski: We are talking here about  the megalomaniac Baroque decoration?

Florian Bieber:  Of course.  In that sense I think the whole Skopje 2014 project, the whole antiquation of Macedonia is beautiful examples for such a façade… and we all know, if we knock on them, we can notice that most if it is just plaster. And of course that is what the monuments and buildings are, they are just a stage.  They decorate the stage to distract the people from the actual purpose presenting different reality so they can achieve their purpose, which is power and money, personal enrichment. The ways the regimes do this, their mechanisms, are different. But in Macedonia the government engaged in this elaborate performance which distracted from needed reforms and democratic rule.  And of course they use word reform and they all talk of EU integration and it is just a façade to do something else. In this sense, there is the façade of reform and the façade of Skopje 2014, both cover up them authoritarian kleptocracy. They are all mouthful of Europe while they produce disaster after disaster in reality. Paradoxically you can be dictator in Balkans today and also being verbally pro European.

Naum Panovski: Well, are we talking here of high-level hypocrisy, and abuse of power.

Florian Bieber:  Yes you can say that!

Naum Panovski: Recently you wrote ten rules of a Balkan Prince which are practiced by todays Machiavelli. In that, I would say very ironic and cynical “manifesto for a dictator”, you have laid out, not only the sordid nationalistic, and xenophobic reality on the Balkans, but the mechanisms of destruction of everything which was once ethic, civil, democratic, and liberal.

Do you think that the Balkan dictators with their limited intellectual capacity can take it as a real guide how to rule and remain in power?

Florian Bieber:  Ha, ha, ha, I think they have been doing it for quite while. And they have it done before I wrote it. I am afraid that I can’t take any credit for that. Well I think that they all are intelligent, but they are not coincidence of history. If you reduce it to individual, psychoanalyzing the individual, you can analyze Vucic, you can analyze  Djukanovic,  you can analyze  Gruevski, and they all have their pathologies, but it ignores the fact that they are systemic. They don’t come to power by coincidence, but there was certain precondition, which allowed them to come to power. So the question is why would you have people who have either Napoleon complex, or other pathological flaws to come to power? I think what they show us is the failure of transformation process from the old social and political structure to democracy.  If you look at many people in Macedonia who don’t like Skopje 2014, but they are in the opposition, but rather they say, “At least they did something”  “At least he built something”. Of course that is nonsense, but that shows you that it filled the void which was perceived by people. They copy-paste  the language of reform from before them,  but on the other hand they gave the people something grandiose which had a different purpose… they filled this void   “we are doing something.”  In Serbia they called it “Beograd na Vodi”  in Macedonia it is “Skopje 2014”. They are stealing, they are corrupt, but there is still this idea of “at least they are building something.”  And that is a visible representation of state and its power.  And that is what they are selling: We are powerful.

Naum Panovski: Well, I will just add few little things to this glorious distortion and abuse of power done by the Balkan Princes. As we know, Machiavelli in his well know treatise advises the rulers that in any political battle “the means justify the ends.” However, he also points out and makes reference, that his credo “the means justify the ends” applies only when the Prince is fighting on behalf of the state, not  on his personal behalf and not for personal gain. Balkan greedy and abusive, undereducated politicians, seems to me, have distorted this idea to the upmost and turned out to identify themselves with the state. Their personal well being is traded for the well being of the state. “Oh, the past gives us right to do this” these ignorants say. That attitude of course has left behind a lot of damage to the state.  In that sense their most visible sign of the destructive postmodern transfiguration of the Balkan landscape obviously is the kitch project Skopje 2014. And that is not only reconstruction of reality, it is remodeling reconstruction of the identity, not only a national but urban identity as well. And that issue is not only aesthetic, ethnic or ethic, but that is also I would say ideological.

That ideological rape of the urban aesthetics of the city, has transformed the capital of Macedonia into a place celebrating a fake line of national link to the ancient Macedonians.

And in that way they have destroyed  the very fabric of a certain ethnic group and its certain cultural environment at large.
As a response to tat rape we have today the colorful revolution on the Macedonian streets throwing pant on this fake symbols, on the distortion of identity and demanding change, freedom, and democracy? What is you perspective on this struggle today? How long this protest can last?

Florian Bieber:  I am glad to see that finally all these monuments have become a target. Always when I have visited there I was provoked and irritated by them. They are not just kitschy, they are not only ugly, they are not only wasteful, there are also a visual representation of corruption, abuse of power, terrible taste and all of that. But they are also promoting lies, they are promoting false view of history, a manipulated view of history, they are divisive, and they are deliberately divisive, not only between Macedonians and Albanians, but also among  Macedonians. They deliberately try to interpret and impose one view of the past which is  not universally accepted, with the  goal to marginalize the other. It is in a multiple ways aggressive and intrusive setting not only in the space but in the ideas. And that’s why they have come an appropriate target of the colorful revolution. And in the way it is targeted, it is in way keeping it by mocking them in making them colorful, like pop art. Coloring the monuments reveals them for what they are, not masterpiece of a monumental past, but trash that improves in meaning through color, bringing it from the imaginary past into the present. Thus the color-bombing of the monuments and facades is a sophisticated form irony and culture that the regime obviously doesn’t have.

Naum Panovski: Not only that the regime does not have it, I would say it doesn’t understand it. I think we are talking here of two opposite cultures: a turbo folk, rural one, closed and intolerant on one hand, and urban and open to the world on the other.  We can clearly recognize that in the demands as outlined by the “colorful revolution”.  Among other things in their demands for change, they have asked for the president to step down, for total withdrawal of his pardon/abolition, respect for the rule of law and the SJO, new transitional expert government.

On the other side of the street the four political parties are not working at all in a transparent process of negotiation among themselves. What do they negotiate on behind closed doors? On whose behalf? How do we act in this confusion of  hidden information  and passive  opposition coalition.  How do we deal with this kind of situation paved by hypocrisy?

Florian Bieber:  This is a point, I have been criticizing in the opposition approach since last year. First this was the main strategic mistake of the opposition parties, mostly of the SDSM, who failed to reached out enough to non party structures, the civil society. They have been somehow kind of forced to do that, but it has never been their initiative. They never built a broad coalition. If you are serious of getting rid of regime which is really not democratic, which is authoritarian, and then the only way to do it, is to build a broad coalition. The lesson of Milosevic’s  Serbia of  2000’ and his overthrow, has to be learned. If we want to remove a regime we have to have broad coalition of civil society, not just of one party.  The other problem has been the EU, which has viewed the crisis as a conflict between the opposition and the government, that has to be resolved through negotiations. Of course that is absurd, because the crisis is not between opposition and government, but it is about the lack of democracy and rule of law, and the rest of the oppressed society.

Naum Panovski: Well what is your comment then on the colorful revolution’s’ request for establishing expert government, which is non-party and above party dominance and inclusion? Do you think that that can be a  right and productive solution at his moment? What is a good solution for a peaceful resolution and way out of the crisis in Macedonia?

Florian Bieber:  I think that that the role of the colorful revolution and its activists are very important. What I learned from the earlier protests, particularly  from the protests in Serbia in 1990’s ,  is that at the beginning the protesters had a wrong demands. At first, they were  demanding that the head of the TV had to resign, then the minister of interior haD to resign, but of course it did not matter…. if Milosevic is in power it does not matter.. because he had everything under his control. This lesson also applies to Macedonia as well… the bars should be raised high and the demands should be the top of the government to resign.  So the current government should first resign and the legal process should be completed.

As of the expert government, again, it depends on who is in control and it is difficult to have an independent expert government in such a polarized environment. The suggestion that experts are just professionals is not realistic. Of course, a government of non-party experts can help to reduce the tensions and pave the way for a transition, but I would be careful not to pin too many hopes on such a government

Naum Panovski: Recently we have seen massive protest by the Macedonian Albanians extremely well organized and lead by newly formed party Besa. There were almost 15000 people which is figure which should not be underestimated. They have also publicly expressed their discontent with the current Albanian parties working in coalition with Macedonian parties in ones in Government. However their protest was not colorful at all, but dominated by one color only, that is it was significantly marked by Albanian ethnic color.

However, as a result of that protest, I don’t see them as a part of the civil society.

At the same time some Albanian intellectuals say it is time to consider redesigning the ethnic and governing balance of the state, that revision of social and political contract, which in fact a push for turning Macedonia into a federation.  Where does this kind of unilateral protest, division and exclusive demands take us?

Florian Bieber:  The best strategy for a regime to stay in power is to keep the opposition divided. The best way to divide the opposition in any country which is multi ethnic, multi national is to divide it along ethnic lines. This happened in Bosnia during the 2014 protests and more broadly, this is how it works in the Balkans for the last 30 years. And as long the opposition and the ethnic groups are not together there is no change. Period. And if you are a smart authoritarian ruler, you know that you need to divide the country, and you want to make sure that you get to fight on your terms, your terms are national ethnic religious terms, and if the others play along your way, and you won half of the battle.

In Macedonia of course the best thing which could  happen to Gruevski is to be confronted with separate Macedonian and  Albanian protests, and they have different goals, and in fact Macedonians get scared by Albanians and Albanians get scared by Macedonians, and then of course who wins? the regime. And that is the status quo, there is no change. In that sense no matter the content, any regime can survive.

Naum Panovski:   I agree with you on that issue. Divide et impera is modus operandi in the Balkans. But in this case I would like to point out  that we may agree with the newly formed Albanian party and with some Albanian intellectuals that there is a need for revision of social and political contract Macedonia. The question is on what grounds?  I believe we are just on two opposite sides of the river. Their request seems to be ethnically exclusive. They demand rights only for Albanians and their platform seem to be very nationalistic. I believe that A new political and social/societal contract is possible only if the there is no any party which is organized along the ethnic or religious  lines. But only on the principles of civil society and include ethnic mix of citizens who live in Macedonia. That is, parties which advocate the right of citizens and their communal needs, and not national or ethnic phantasms!

Florian Bieber:  A social contract inherently is social, not ethnic. Of course, the Gruevski regime has made a mockery of the Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA), by transforming it from a viable peace plan to a tool to buy off the Albanian partners and imposed a mononational nationalist narrative on the public space. In this sense, post-Gruevski Macedonia needs to reestablish the equilibrium and bring all citizens back to feel like Macedonia is their state, which includes, but isn’t limited, to Albanians. The failure of Macedonia over the past decade was democratic, not ethnic, thus the social contract would need to be focused on making Macedonia a more inclusionary state in terms of reducing the power of parties and informal power structures in favor of democracy. The failure is thus not with the OFA and there is no reason to open this question and no ethnic re-arrangement could address the challenges Macedonia has now. I would argue that Albanian parties which now make this argument are expressing the same alienation from the Macedonian state that many Macedonians experience, just that the language and means of expressing it looks different. None of this means that there shouldn’t be an honest assessment of OFA at some point in the future, yet,  it seems to be time to focus on a function democracy and institutions which in turn will bring OFA back to life.

Naum Panovski: EU was in the past several years and more engaged in a very direct way in Macedonia. However, Macedonia is a prime example of the consequences of EU sporadic and inconsistent attention. What is needed, how to make EU influence, their European vision work in Macedonia? how to make EU vision of united and democratic, civil free EU work in Macedonia on behalf of Macedonian citizens.

Florian Bieber:  First of all the weakness of the EU weakness is always projected particularly well in its foreign policy.  We see this in Macedonia as well, the fact that Germany named a special envoy to Macedonia, a German diplomat to be a German special envoy in Macedonian crisis I think speaks volumes about EU. The idea that members of EU,  that includes Germany as well, name a special envoy was unthinkable not long ago. Three or four years ago Germany would have lobbied that EU should send a special envoy to deal with the problem. Now the situation has changed. Germany even does not bother, it goes directly and sends its own diplomats to deal with it. That really shows you the weaknesses of EU. That is one of the structural problems. The second one is of course the leverage problem. What can EU offer Macedonia?

Naum Panovski: Or what can Macedonia offer to EU?

Florian Bieber:  Oh, well, you know, it is offering to Austria to be a border guard outside at the border of the EU. This is of course I think one of the dangers when geopolitics dominates the values, then the dictator can  do the job just as well as a democrat, maybe even better.

Naum Panovski: You have touched upon one very sensitive issue. that is the border  for Austria, but border  to protect what? To protect the corrupt deals that some of its citizens have in the gambling industry  in Macedonia, or to protect them form the massive influx of refugees?

Florian Bieber: Currently the refugee crises has reignited the idea of geopolitics and of big geopolitic thinking in Europe, which was very much not a part of European thinking. Now you have Austria building alliance with Balkan countries to stop refugees coming in, pretending to do what Germany is doing on larger scale with Turkey. It is a bad copy of a larger deal by making a deal with a dictator. So you have this idea of stopping European problems at its borders and making a deal with who ever is in power, as long as they are reliable partners.

Naum Panovski: But the Macedonian government is not reliable partners we have seen so far.

Florian Bieber:  Of course it is not. However, they might deliver on short term goals of Austrian or broader EU policy, which is helping to end the influx of refugees. While Turkey is incompatibly bigger and has more resources and thus can disregard EU demands, Macedonia is also less able to act independently. So yes, authoritarian governments are terrible at delivering in the medium and long run, they are have instability built into them and are not based on certain shared norms, but on regime survival. Yet, in the current crisis mode of the EU, the short term might trump long term considerations.

Naum Panovski: But if look for example at the recent outcome of presidential elections in Austria, with a very small margin of votes for the newly elected president, can we say that there is a value crisis and identity crisis in EU? What do you think, what is the message that Austrian citizens have send to Europe and consequently to Macedonia?

Florian Bieber: There is a paradox here. The paradox is that the two countries which have been  the most strongly advocating and care the most about Macedonia are Austria and Germany. They have been most engaged and there is hardly another EU country more in favor of the enlargement than these two countries.

But public opinion is against enlargement it in both countries. And in Austria more so than in Germany. So the foreign ministry in Austria will tell you they are willing to pursue enlargement despite popular opposition, for it is strategic commitment we want EU integration of the Western Balkans. But this commitment is not written in stone. So 48.7% of the Austrians voted for the candidate from extreme right . The fact that nearly almost a half of all Austrian voters support candidate who says that Republika Srpska should have the right of self determination, who said Kosovo should not be independent, who sounds like Tomislav Nikolic on Balkan politics, who does not want enlargement, because it is not popular, is very scary thing.  Even the far right did not win the presidential elections, they still have a good chance to enter government in two year and then Austrian policy may change, and we may hear: yes Macedonia may be the guardian of the border but not inside of the border as a EU member,  but outside of the border as it is now. They can be a guardian and “antemurale christianitatis”—an Christian defense wall—but you are not in, you are out.