Why the European Commission was right

July 21, 2009 3 Comments

The decision of the EU to lift visa requirements for Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia, but not Albania, Bosnia and Kosovo last week caused quite a stir.

The Greens in the European Parliament, as well as some observers called the decision unfair, “hypocritical and morally abject”, suggesting that it is penalizing Bosnian Muslims victims of war crimes. While such talk might be tempting, it is simply wrong and does little to help either the reforms or the coming to terms with the past in Serbia or elsewhere.

Anybody who is working on and in the region has for a long time felt that the visa regime of the EU is counterproductive and certainly has hurt reforms. Thus any lifting of the visa regime should be welcome.

Second, the EU has always set out clear technical requirements to be fulfilled for the visa obligations to be lifted. This is conditionality at its best, clear technical requirements which can be fulfilled with sufficient political will. Most governments in the region have been insincere in their claim to help their citizens to travel freely over the years. Efforts to introduce new passports and the necessary legislation and other measures have been far too slow, considering the interest of many citizens to travel without the humiliation in front of EU embassies.  The EU has to insist on countries fulfilling the requirements it sets. It has been weak for some (which were arguably bad conditions), but if it relents just to be ‘nice’ to a country or to not leave anybody behind, why would any politician pass any necessary law anymore? Lowering conditions and requirements would hurt citizens across the region, not least in BiH–not in regard to visa free travel, but in regard to other reforms. Not including all countries at the same time does not mean leaving them behind. If Slovakia had not been lagging behind in the 1990s, there would have been no pressure to get rid of Vladimir Meciar and to begin serious reforms. Had been Slovakia given an easy ride early on, it probably would have been left behind at the end.

One argument put forth in the debate has been that it is mostly Bosniaks who would be left out from visa free travel and Croats already have Croatian passports and Serbs can or have Serbian passports. This is, however, as demagogic argument. First, Croatian passport holders are uneffected, so there is no change there. Second, there is little evidence that Bosnian Serbs have easy access to Serbian passports. According to a report in Danas, only 2,557 Bosnian citizens also have a Serbian passport. While this might be underestimating the real number of double citizens, there is little evidence to suggest that Bosnian Serbs have easy access to Serbian passports. Finally, if Serbia were to provide easy access to Bosnian Serbs, the EC could easily impose similar limitations to Serbian passport holders from Bosnia as there will be for Serbian passport holders from Kosovo.

Finally, I thus share my skepticism of the moral argument with ESI. Most importantly, I think it is important to move away from the talk of whether a country (or nation) should be ‘rewarded’ or ‘penalized’ for the war in the context of EU integration. This logic is not helpful for EU integration and runs counter the entire logic of the process. Germany was not an early participant of the integration process as a reward nor because France, Italy or Benelux were happy to integrate with a country which had barely come to terms with the past, but the logic of the integration process is to induce change through integration. Thus integration is not a ‘reward’ for having been good, but a mechanisms to prevent the reoccurred of war crimes and to reform a society so that it can come to terms with the crimes committed in its name. Translating past injustices into currency in the integration process is not only demeaning to the victims of the crimes, it also runs against the logic of EU integration. When President Kaczyński of Poland sought to increase the votes for Poland, arguing that the Poles lost in WW2 should be counted, this position was quickly criticized by all key European players as tasteless and inappropriate. What is the fundamental difference between Kaczyński‘s linking visa liberalization with war crimes? This should not be misunderstood to be a call for forgetting or ignoring the past and the crimes. However, they should not be linked to reforms and the process of EU integration.

Now it is up to Bosnian politicians to deliver, if they don’t the citizens will have an opportunity to change them in 2010…

Filed under Bosnia, European Union, Serbia, Western Balkans

Biden’s Unfinished Balkan Business

May 28, 2009 1 Comment

Gülnur Aybet and I just published an op-ed commentary with the Washington Post Newsweek’s PostGlobal website on Joen Biden’s visit to the Balkans.

Filed under USA, Western Balkans

The Wages of Fear: Western Balkans and the EU

May 11, 2009 Leave a comment

In the 1953 classic Le salaire de la peur two trucks race towards a burning oil filed with nytroglycerine to extinguish the fire by explosion. During the journey the drivers of the trucks have to navigate a stretch of the road (the washboard) where going slower than a certain speed means the bumps get to be too intense for the cargo and the trucks risk blowing up. Thus, the trick to navigate the road is to continue at a steady speed and not to slow down.

The countries of the Western Balkans have entered the washboard. Slowing down EU integration comes at a high risk, as much of what has driven reforms over the years is predicated on progress towards the EU. Reducing the (already slow) speed of integration removes incentives for governments to pursue reforms and will simply compound the sense of being left out by citizens.

However, it seems like the EU is signalling the countries of the region to reduce their speed. The lack of progress regarding the beginning of membership negotations with Macedonia, the lack of clear strategy in Bosnia all suggest that the speed is slowing. None of the volitile materials in the trucks have exploded yet, but there is a real risk that if the slow down continues, the dangers might be greater than just a delay in EU integration.

Filed under European Union, Western Balkans

Notes on Eurovision

May 11, 2009 Leave a comment

eurovision

It will come as pleasant surprise that Terry Wogan will no longer comment the Eurovision song contest on BBC, but instead Graham Norton will be his replacement. After having to hear about the Eastern Block, block voting (which one of my more gifted students at Kent used in his/her final essay as evidence of the continued divided between East and West) and the need to reinstate the Berlin Wall, things can get only better. Rather than ranting about the laziness and colonial arragoance displayed towards the small peoples of the east, I have decide this year to write a few notes for Graham Norton so that they can guide his commentary–not be accused of being an academic who only criticises after it is too late:

Fact 1

42 countries participate, 22 are former Communist countires, plus Greece, Cyprus, Turkey and Israel: Western Europe is in a minority. Thus, odds of a West European country winning are just not that that good (or to be precise: 38%)

Fact 2

There is little political voting during the Eurovision (except the ethnic voting between Cyprus and Greece). And no, Armenia and Turkey are not countries who always vote in the same ‘block,’ neither are Romania and Russia, Albania and Serbia. Studies of voting patterns indicate that there are cultural patterns, which create voting regions. If a song from Armenia sounds familiar to a listener in Greece who then votes for the song, this is not block voting.

Fact 3

Performers are trying to please their potential audiances–just that the voters are not in their own country and this leads to some very entertaining ways in which some acts think they can garner votes: Montenegro this year tries to appeal to the gay community with the George Michael cum Village People dancing background in the video. Romania’s Elena on the other hand is appealing to the Balkan ‘block’ by praising the virtues of Balkan girls with lyrics written by a true poet: ‘The Balkan girls they like to party like nobody, like nobody, For crowd delight, we’ll shine all night.’

Fact 4

Some acts are useful lessons in counterfactual history: Moldova this year shows us what Eurovision would have been like, if Communism had not fallen 20 years ago and still the countries east of the Iron Curtain were participating. According to an official bio, “Despite her youth [she is one of the oldest participant in the Eurovision song contest], Nelly is the most authoritative singer in Moldova confirmed by the VIP award, offered every six years.” This winner of the morning star award and many other honors tries to convince the world that they have never seens a dance like the hora from Moldova (which looks surprisingly familar to certain dances in Romania, Bulgaria, Serbia, Albania, Macedonia, Ukraine etc.)…

Fact 5

Eurovision is the most successful form of Euroatlantic Integration. Forget NATO and EU, where is Belrus voting for the UK? In no organization in Europe are all countries of the continent included (except the sore loosers who no longer participate like Italy and Luxembourg) and can vote like equals. Maybe this is what might make many West Europeans unconforatble, being outvoted by these ungrateful Easterners who are all of a sudden equals. And some, like the Ukraine this year, are beating Western pop divas easily. On the other hand, the ‘Eastern’ hand in Norways song surely contributes to his frontrunner status.

Fact 6

Eurovision is silly, fun and thus to be taken seriously (or the other way around). It is rare to find such a mixture of genuine fun and playfulness with true camp and musical horrors. You can love the show and hate the music, that is the beauty of Eurovision. This mix of seriousness, kitch, camp and fun is what makes this continent such a fun place.

Filed under European Union, Eurovision, Western Balkans

Interview for Radio Kosovo

April 30, 2009 Leave a comment

Here’s a short interview for Radio Kosovo I gave today on the prospects for Kosovo (in English).

Filed under Kosovo

Waiting for Godot, Bosnian style

April 21, 2009 Leave a comment

Sometimes when something doesn’t happen, it still matters. A few weeks ago the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council met to decide on the future of the OHR in Bosnia.

However, while this meeting as widely anticipated a few months ago and maybe, possibly somehow bringing an end to the OHR. Instead, the meeting just marked the transition from one last High Rep to the next last High Rep (maybe the office should be renamed on the Office of the Last High Representative).

While the declaration lists the progress Bosnia made and thanks Lajcak for “the important contribution made … to peace implementation and Bosnia and Herzegovina’s progress towards integration into Euro-Atlantic structures,” the non-decision speaks louder than words. The OHR remains open, no change and the remaining conditions for the office closure (5+2) have only been fulfilled to a limited degree.

But the fact that it’s business as usual is a display of helpless by international actors. A new person does not mean a new strategy. The problems which the IC has had in Bosnia in recent years are not down to the personality of the High Representative alone. The PIC declaration does not display any new strategy or approach and we still don’t know about the mandate of the EUSR once the OHR will close down. It thus appears as if not only Bosnia is not yet ready for the next step, but also the international community.  So everybody is waiting, dancing around the other without knowing where the dance will take them, but probably nowhere good.

Filed under Bosnia, European Union

And nobody will be satisfied: Thoughts on the arguments at the ICJ over Kosovo

April 20, 2009 Leave a comment

A few days ago was the deadline for Serbia and Kosovo to submit their arguments in the case at the ICJ over whether the declaration of Kosovo’s independence and the subsequent recognition are illegal. Here are some thoughts I shared with Koha Ditore on the argument, published in an article today:
It is likely that Serbia will base its argument on a conventional understanding of international law, which has taken a very restrictive approach to self-determiniation. Self-determiniation in the sense of international independence has only be granted to processes of decolonization and to cases of state dissolution. The ICJ has previously ruled on the principle of uti possidetis, i.e. the ICJ decided in 1986 in a border dispute between Mali and Burkina Faso that the border at the end of the colonial rule as definitive. Thus, this means a)  countries only can achieve independence by decolonization; b) state dissolution or c) mutual agreement. The argument of Serbia would likely rest on this practice with no country newly emerging since 1945 not following this pattern. Thus, Serbia is likely to emphasis that Kosovo has no right to self-determination in international law. There might be arguments about precedent or regional and global implications, but I think that these are less important at the ICJ than the international law.
There are three strategies for Kosovo, a) to argue that the massive human rights violations of Serbia in 1999 in Kosovo changed the status quo and could have given greater arguments for self-determination. This link between the state soverignty and the right to protect has been made by international lawyers, but remains contested. Thus the ICJ would significantly expand the interpretation of self-determiniation if it would follow this argument, which I think would be unlikely. b) Kosovo could argue that at the dissolution of Yugoslavia, Kosovo was one of the Federal units like the republics and had the same right to independence as the other units. While the Badinter Committee rejected this interpretation, this was not legally binding and never tested in court to my knowledge, so the argument could be made and this might be an easier way out, as it would not fundamentallly alter the global terms of self-determination. c) Kosovo could argue to claim that Kosovo’s declaration of independence was not indicating an aspiration, but an existing reality. Serbia has no authority over Kosovo and thus, Kosovo was de-facto independent before it claimed de-jure independence. This argument has its appeal, as it does not enter the question of whether independence or not it is justfied, but whether it exists of not. However, the ICJ might be reluctant to follow this argument, as other de-facto sovereign territory might make similar claims, such as Somaliland, not to mention Abkhazia or S. Ossetia.

I would be surprised if the ICJ would take a clear stance in favor of one argument. I would expect it to take a decision which will make nobody entirely happy, but which will essentially state that international recognition of countries is a matter or fact and a political decision rather than of international law. Of course any unclear decision is de facto in favor of Kosovo, as Serbia could only hope stopping international recognition if it were clearly found illegal. It most likely will emphasise that while Sebria retained formal sovereignty over Kosovo, it had no effective sovereignty over the territory. I would be surprised if countries recognizing Kosovo were found breaking international law, even if the court will most certainly shy away from any decision which would establish a new precedent in the domain of self-determination.

Filed under Kosovo, Serbia

Do we need to worry about the Balkans? Doom, gloom and soccer

April 3, 2009 Leave a comment

In recent weeks a number of seasoned observers have noted the increasing deterioration of the political development in the Balkans. From the Aleksandar the Great statue building government in Macedonia and the presidential elections there to the perpetual crisis in Bosnia, things don’t look up. In his recent article in the Economist, Tim Judah even mentions the risk of violence in Bosnia.

The combination of the economic crisis hitting the region, stagnating political dynamics and an EU reluctant to help out and visibly cooling down towards any rapid enlargement in the region does not bode well. The slow nomination of the new High Rep in Bosnia was a sad spectacle and enhance the already existing vacuum (I know that vacuums cannot be increased, so forgive the metaphor).

Now there are a number of encouraging developments as well: First, Bosnia won two soccer games. All joking aside and considering that the opponent was Belgium, this is a positive development. I have long argued that nothing is as likely to make Bosnia work as success. A good soccer team can go a long way in creating some state-wide cohesion–it is always popular to support winners. On a more immediate note, one chamber of parliament (HoR) has already passed constitutional amendments incorporating the district of Brcko into the constitution. This is significant for two reasons: First, it is the first constitutional revision since the constitution was imposed at Dayton. This demonstrates that the constitution can be reformed and amended. Second, the agreement of Brcko suggests that the RS does not want to secede. The entity cannot leave Bosnia without taking control of Brcko as well, as it divides the entity in two. Thus, leaving the district in legal limbo would help the RS in making claims at some point in the future were it to declare independence. Accepting and constitutionally protecting Brcko can be seen as a sign that despite all the radical talk, there is little appetite for any radical steps. Finally, constitutional talks in Bosnia are continuing and so for they have been difficult, but the experience of Brcko is encouraging.

This development, however, should be no reason for the EU to lean back. While it is understandable for the Union to deal with its internal economic problems, the ratification of the Lisbon treaty and troublesome members first, but let’s not forget that the celebrations over the Maastricht treaty were ruined by the Yugoslav wars some 18 years ago. It is time to focus on the region once more,  but without talking of the threat of violence or war, as talking of it might help the unfolding of a self-fulfilling dynamic.

Filed under Bosnia, European Union, Macedonia, Western Balkans

The more the merrier… parties and elections in Montenegro

March 9, 2009 Leave a comment

It seems like the Montenegrin opposition is giving the governing parties a special gift for the parliamentary elections on 29 March. These early elections were called by the government to ostensibly get a mandate for sustained EU integration. The opposition, however, criticised government for going for quick elections before the economic crisis fully unfolds in Montenegro.

Whatever the reason, it seems like the governing DPS will not have to worry about its 54 year stint in power. Just in time for the elections, the already highly fragmented opposition split once more and two more parties are added to the list of opposition groups. Andreja Mandic, after leading the Serb List to become the leading opposition grouping now formed the more moderate New Serb Democracy, while a wing of the Movement for Changes formed the Democratic Center to joined the Liberals in a pre-election coalition. So, in short, there are now the following ten opposition parties (see report by CDT):

– Coalition for “Za drugačiju Crnu Goru” (For a different Montenegro), composed of the Liberal Party and the Democratic Center

– The People’s Coalition (“Narodnjačku koaliciju”) composed of the Peoples’ Party and the Democratic Serb Party

– The Serb national List (“Srpsku nacionalnu listu”) including the Serbian radicals, the Serb peoples party and a group of citizes.

– New Serb Democracy

-Movement for Changes

-Socialist People’s Party

and this is without the parties of minorities. Thus all possible permutations of Serb Socialist and People are running.  The opposition might not win, but at least it is likely to be represented by 10 parties. But there is always the Dark Horse candidate from the People’s Front of Judea.

Filed under Democratization, Montenegro

Diffusion of Madness

March 8, 2009 Leave a comment

If you think that the suggestion of Igor Panarin, the director of the Russian diplomatic academy, that the United States is going to disintegrate any time now is lunacy, consider the pieces it will disintegrate into: He suggests that the Northeast (which has a  “totally different ethnos and mentality”) will ‘join’ the EU with Kentucky, Tennessee, North and South Carolina (!). And talks about the Indians in the middle of the USA wanting to secede (“May I remind you that five central states where the Indians live had announced their independence.”).  Such analytical brilliance, probably based on considerable field work is reminiscent of other recent brilliant analyses, such as by Mohammed Saïd al-Sahaf (“There is no presence of American infidels in the city of Baghdad”) and Goran Matic (“CIA instructors are working not only with NIN”): I see a pattern of lunacy diffusion emerging (thanks to Holly for this). Madness seems to be the best response of dictators (and their spokespersons) to the threats of democracy. Matic, al-Sahaf and Panarin seem to share some features on their analysis:

a) they ascribe to others what happens to themselves (or they do to others)

b) they confuse wish and reality

c) their governments don’t end well (at least for the first two, the jury is out for the third).

Filed under Russia, USA

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