Europe’s Silence

Much attention has been devoted to the difficulty of the US administration to deal with rapidly changing events in Tunisia and Egypt. However, the European Union has been equally struggling in endorsing the popular demand for reform and democracy in Tunisia, Egypt and elsewhere in the region. While Europe might have less of a military investment in the region, the repercussions of instability in the Middle East might be more direct–beginning with potential refugee flows. At the same time, more than half of the EU experienced democratic revolutions in during the past generation: Not only the countries of Central Europe, but also Southern Europe (Portugal, Spain, Greece) saw the ouster of dictatorships governing in the name of stability in the past 35 years. The countries can be a model for the Middle East and while overthrowing tested and tried dictators always brings with it uncertainty, the European Union at its core should understand the demands of citizens in the Middle East for greater rights and democracy.

It is thus a great pity, that the EU has not seized the moment to support the pro-democracy movements in the region more vocally. Sharing the know how and the advantage of democracy and the rule of law are after all the greatest export the EU can offer.

5 October = 1 February? Or how the regime will end in Egypt

The mass protests called for today remind of the demonstrations organized by the Serbian opposition against the Milosevic regime on 5 October 2000. A make or break confrontation which will force the hand of those sitting on the fence. So what are the possible scenarios now?

1. The protests peter out: Revolution aborted

This is what the regime hopes. The demonstrations will exhaust themselves, increasingly disunited over what to do will just fade away. Afterward the regime cracks down on opposition. While this might be plausible which much smaller demonstrations, the number of people on the street just seems to large for this scenario.

2. The protesters will take over: A Revolution

The protesters will take over institutions and push Mubarak out. Mubarak has to flee if he does not want to risk his life. Such a fully fledged revolution seems equally unlikely as there are too many actors who have in the past supported the regime and will have an interest in preventing a total collapse of the old system. In particular the army has retained sufficient legitimacy to remain a relevant institution.

3. Protesters are attacked: Tiananmen scenario

Security forces suppress mass protests violently, considering the number of protesters the violence against the demonstrators has to be substantial to have any chance of success. Considering the army declaring its support for the grievances of the demonstrators, such a scenario would suggest that those using force would be themselves coming under attack, probably by the army. Thus, this would be more like the Romania 1989 scenario than China 1989. The use of force would also prevent those committing it to have some part in the new regime. In effect, at this point only those with nothing to lose would be candidates.

4. Protestors succeed: 5 October

The protesters show by their numbers that the old regime has lost all legitimacy, they take over crucial symbols of the old regime (TV?) and force the hand of those hedging their bets. As they change sides, the old regime crumbles.

What happens today does not depend on Mubarak, and maybe not so much on protesters either (as long as they show in large numbers), but on those members of the old regime who will have to decide which way to go today. If they decide that Mubarak has no future (which seems pretty obvious), there will be little space for Mubarak to continue.

The challenge might be of what happens on 2 February. In Serbia, 6 October has become the metaphor of the incomplete revolution–the unsavory deals made to secure the end of the Milosevic regime. While such a  Pacted Transition (as in Spain) has greater chances of leading to stable new government and prospects for democracy are better, there is a risk that many Egyptian might feel like the protests did not bring the change they hoped for. This, however, is a topic for another day.

The Otpor connection in Egypt


When I was following some tweets on Egypt, I was struck when I came across the symbol of Otpor. Subsequently I noticed that a number of protesters also using the Otpor symbol. The obvious question is whether this use of symbols was coincidental and some movements or protesters in Egypt were just inspired by Otpor or whether there are stronger links. A number of Serbian news sources of varying quality (Alo, Vesti Online) have now published articles suggesting that former Otpor activists have been training some opposition groups, including interviews with anonymous former Otpor members and the Serbian embassy. The main group in question seems to be April 6, launched first as a facebook group. The group has currently over 87,000 members and has been active for nearly three years already. According to recently released wikileaks documents, the group appears to have enjoyed some support from the US government, but the assessment of the US state department interloctutor in late 2008 is telling: The 6 April representative “offered no roadmap of concrete steps toward April 6’s highly unrealistic goal of replacing the current regime with a parliamentary democracy prior to the 2011 presidential elections. Most opposition parties and independent NGOs work toward achieving tangible, incremental reform within the current political context, even if they may be pessimistic about their chances of success. xxx wholesale rejection of such an approach places him outside this mainstream of opposition politicians and activists.” It seems like recent events have shown that the assessment of the group was more astute than the US state department.

Clearly, the main inspiration for the protests came from Tunisia, not Serbia, but the Otpor connection is telling for two reasons: First, it demonstrates that pro-democracy movements are linked across continents and lessons are learned. Second, the wikileaks cable shows that the US state department was in communication with opposition to the Mubarak regime already in 2008. It thus seems simplistic to accuse the government of just propping up Mubarak without listening to alternatives. The Otpor connection also suggests that there was at least some level of financial support for opposition groups from the US, even if it wasn’t the administration directly.

 

Tunisia and Egypt: Lessons from 1989 and the Colored Revolutions

Before the demonstrations in Egypt gathered momentum in Egypt, I wrote a short analysis of events in Tunisia, which is published in today’s Presse. In it I argue that the likelihood the fall of the Ben Ali regime will lead to democracy depends on a number factors, including the neighborhood, the larger geopolitical environment and a shared domestic goal. In particular, the regional context matters. Democratization processes are considerably more difficult if the country is surrounded by authoritarian regimes which all hope for the experiment in democracy to fail (see esp. in Kyrgyzstan). If the whole neighborhood goes, not all countries might succeed, but the old model of authoritarianism is clearly no longer acceptable. Thus, I would argue for Tunisia to have a good shot at democratizing, it’s example needs to be emulated in the region.

League of Extraordinary Gentleman


The question now is whether the protests in the region will lead to 1989–the collapse of regimes in a domino across the region–or the colored revolutions of the 2000s when a few countries began democratizing (or rather restarted) but often remained in an undemocratic environment (Ukraine, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan). There are strong reasons to believe that what we witness is more like 1989.

First, the trigger for the protests against the authoritarian regimes is not a rigged election, as was the case in Serbia, Ukraine, Georgia or Kyrgyzstan. Instead, it is general dissatisfaction with the system. Like Communist regimes, the autocrats in the Arab world have been increasingly unable to live up to the “bargain” they had offered. Stability and moderate increases in living standards for accepting authoritarian rule. The regimes have been increasingly unable to deliver.

Second, the age factor. The average age of the leaders of the Communist leaders in Eastern Europe in 1989 was 74. The average age of some of the Arab leaders  (Ben Ali, Mubark, Saleh, Gaddafi, Bouteflika) is close to 73. They represent a petrified a political system with little prospects for internal reform. While some countries have had younger leaders through dynastic succession (Assad, King Mohammed VI, King Abdallah), they represent the failure of the systems to fundamentally change from within.

Third, the demonstration effect suggests close links between the protests in the region. A protest in one country (Tunisia) helped break the fear in others. As it is not rigged elections which triggered the protests, the circumstances have also allowed the protests to spread rapidly. Once demonstrators lose the fear to go to the streets, the options of the regimes are severely limited.

None of these similarities mean that the regime will fall automatically. There is still the Tienanmen scenario for some regimes, while others might hope for protests to fizzle out. As they do not depend on a single backer (save for the US in a number of cases), like the Soviet Union, the links between the regimes are less immediate and the dominoes might not yet fall.

The unbearable lightness of being in power: 20 years multi-party democracy in former Yugoslavia

1990s is not only the last year before the beginning of the wars in former Yugoslavia, it is also the year in which multi-party elections were held in all republics of Yugoslavia. So twenty years later, where do things stand?

What is striking across the region is the endurance of a few parties in power. If we rank the countries by number of years out of 20 a party has been in power, we end up with the following:

1. Montenegro (DPS 20 of 20, 100%)

Montenegro’s DPS clearly wins the competition with not losing power once since 1990. It has only seen genuine threats to its power come from within.Prospects for continued rule of the DPS are good, once more change might only come from within.

2. Kosovo (LDK, 8 of 8, 100%)

Rugova’s LDK has been a member of a coalition government ever since the establishment of elected Kosovo institutions in 2002. However, as a coalition partner, it was never dominant during that period and it’s fortunes have declined steadily, being no longer the largest party. If we add the 1990s, when the LDK dominated until 1997 absolutely among Albanian voters, dominance of the LDK fits the larger regional pattern.

3. Bosnia and Herzegovina (HDZ & SDA, 18 of 20, 90%)

Bosnia is tricky with a political system shaped by three distinct electorates with little cross-ethnic voting. HDZ and SDA have managed to be in power for 18 of the past 20 years, only being out of power less than two years in 2001/2 when the short lived Alliance for Change governed. Among Croat voters, the only real challengers to HDZ came from within, in particular since 2006 with the creation of HDZ1990. The persistence of SDA in power is less due to its unchallenged dominance, but due the coalition building dynamics in Bosnia. It has now a number of challenges, some older (SDP, SBiH), others more recent such as the SBB BiH, the party of the owner of Avaz, Randoncic. The third in the original triumvirate of nationalists, SDS, has been in power considerably less time (13 of 20 years).

4. Croatia (HDZ 17 of 20, 85%)

The dominance of HDZ is a striking feature of Croatian politics, held in check by a strong opposition, at least over the past decade. The brief SDP interlude 2000-2003 was also transformative in helping to shift Croatian political discourse towards EU integration. The popularity of President Josipovic suggests that HDZ’s days in power might be numbered.

5. Serbia (SPS 12/15 of 20, 60-75%)

SPS is the survivor among the long-lasting parties in power. Having had complete control for a decade, it came back to support the DSS led minority government 2004-2007 and as a junior partner in 2008. It also transformed itself so that now its president Ivica Dacic sometimes seems like one of the most progressive members of government. It’s also the only dominant party which has been in power both as a junior and as a senior partner.

6. Slovenia (LDS 12 of 20, 60%)

After having dominated governments continuously for 12 years, it is now a small party, eclipsed by others. Thus, this dominant party does not look like making a come back.

7. Macedonia (SDSM 10 of 20 and VMRO 8 of 20, 50%)

Macedonia has had the least clear pattern of a dominant party in the region, with the Social Democrats only governing for half the time. VMRO governed for nearly as long and the sometimes authoritarian reflexes of VMRO under Gruevski suggest that they are on their way to eclipse SDSM for the total duration in power.

Looking at the countries of former Yugoslavia, it is remarkable to which degree a few parties have dominated for most of the period since the first multi-party elections. This dominance has overall declined since the 1990s, but is still not broken in parts of the region. Thus, unlike in Central and Eastern Europe, governments were often booted out for either corruption or due painful reforms, parties in former Yugoslavia have overall been more successful in clinging to power, often with not so good results for the country.  What is encouraging is that with a few exceptions, no single party is so firmly in control that it could not lose power at the next elections.

Late thoughts on the 20th anniversary of 1989

Here’s is a text I wrote for the 1989 conference at Cornell in November.

Three Different 1989s

The monumental of events of 1989 and their aftermath were based on a collection of decisions, made or not made by Communist hard-liners, reformers, protesters and Western politicians. Far from inevitable, a number of other ‘1989s’ would have been possible.

Here three imaginary documents will stand for three different paths 1989 could have taken: The Communist crackdown, the Reform Communist take over and unified Europe.

The Crackdown

Except for Romania, no shot was fired during the overthrow of Communist regimes in 1989 in Eastern Europe. These mostly peaceful protests had followed the violent crack down of the student protests on Tiananmen Square in Bejing in June 1989. Many among the ageing guard of Communist leaders across Eastern Europe contemplated following China’s lead in fall of 1989. What if they had succeeded?

From: Der Freie Bote [The Free Messenger], East German samizdat, 3 February 1990.

Ever since the intervention of the army, the Neue Deutsche Volksarmee, during the Monday Protests in Leipzig on 9 October 1989, borders have remained firmly closed and news from out other democratic movements are scarce. [see interview with Egon Krenz, the successor to Erich Honecker in the fall of 1989: http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,959320-2,00.html%5D

From West German news, now only to be viewed in rural Thüringen due to the stronger scrambling signals, we have heard that Poland continues to be in paralysis since the army intervention in December and the dismissal of the Mazowiecki government by General Jaruzelski. While protests have been disbanded by force, wildcat strikes and graffiti over the big cities, especially in Gdansk are a constant reminder of the crisis. In Czechoslovakia, a number of leaders of the demonstrations in November have been recently deported, including Vaclav Havel, who continues to broadcast his weekly speeches to the people of Czechoslovakia on Radio Free Europe.

The still relatively free press in the Soviet Union continues to speculate whether Gorbachev remains in power as he has not been seen in public since December 1989. Some observers note a change in tone of Pravda which has begun a series of unsigned editorials on “A Strong Economy for a Strong Soviet Union”, arguing -for economic reforms to reinforce the strength of the Soviet Union and its links to its allies.

It remains unclear to which degree Western governments are supporting our struggle for greater democracy. German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and the government have apparently frozen all ties with new leadership of the DDR and urged reforms. However, neither the US nor the EC have imposed sanctions and George Bush in a recent speech urged the Soviet leadership ‘to keep perestroika going’.

Hannes Modrow, a former leading member of the East German Communists has recently fled to Western Germany and been telling his story in a series of interviews on German television. According to him, the party has been deeply divided between reformers and hardliners before the purges in December. According to him, the determination of the politburo to use the army to end protests grew after his visit to China in June 1989. Modrow claims that Chinese advisors arrived in early November to provide guidance on repressing protests, but such accounts have not been confirmed by other sources.

Will it be another 20 years, just like after the Prague Spring in 1968 before we will get another chance?

Reform Communists

When Mikhail Gorbachev initiated his policy of Glasnost and Perestroika, his goal was to rejuvenate and modernize Soviet rule, but not to abandon Communism or dismantle Soviet dominance over Eastern Europe or the Soviet Union itself. What if succeeded?

From: John Smith, Reforms and Glasnost in Eastern Europe since 1989. Reform Communists between Market and Nation from East Berlin to Sofia. 1995.

Günther Schabowski breathed a sigh of relief—another one of these press conferences with increasingly difficult journalist question has been mastered. It was hard getting used to hard questions journalists were asking, especially as decision had to be taken quickly. Had he not checked his papers carefully before the press conference, he would have not been able the question which an Italian correspondent had asked him right at the end of the press conference about the new travel regime. “When does it come into effect?” As Schabowski went to bed, he knew that the 10 November would be a historical day, for the first time since 1961 East Germans could receive their stamp at the border and cross into Western Germany. [see transcript of the original press conference: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/cwihp/documentreaders/eotcw/891109f.pdf%5D

Indeed, as East German citizens formed long lines in Berlin along the border to reach the western half of the city, the wall had lost most of its power. Still, East German border guards remained in control and East Germans not returning back to the DDR risked loosing their property and job until the two German governments signed the agreement on the Freedom of Movement of citizens of the BRD and DDR in 1991, leading to the gradual removal of Berlin wall.

As Schabowski was mastering the press conference on the evening of the 9 November, the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party decided in a clear majority to send Todor Zhivkov into retirement. For all his flaws, the CC decided that his policy towards the Turkish threat against Bulgaria was wise and needed to be maintained. Especially now that 350,000 Turks had left in recent months, their quick return would only destabilize an already highly volatile situation. The thousands of Bulgarians who had the received the former Turkish properties would certainly turn against the government if they would have to hand over the houses and lands once more to their previous owners. If Bulgaria will engage in reforms, it has to make sure not to be vulnerable to the Turkish threat. After all in neighboring Serbia, the reformist Communist Slobodan Milošević had just similarly identified Albanians as a threat to modernization and the Serb majority.

By Christmas 1989, a young reformist guard of the Communist parties from Sofia to East Berlin had come to power, demonstrating a pragmatic approach to the challenges the countries faced. Devoid of a clear commitment to Communism, the new leaders from Modrow in Eastern Germany to Illiescu in Romania gathered in Moscow in late January 1990 to meet with their mentor Gorbachev to reinvigorate the Council for Mutual Cooperation and accelerate talks with the EC about greater cooperation. As had been the case since the early 1980s, Poland remained the odd country out of sync with the rest of Eastern Europe. Its non-Communist government, established after the June election, was oddly out of place at the Moscow summit.

A United Europe?

Nearly 15 years passed between the fall of Communists regimes and the first wave of EU integration of the countries of Eastern and Central Europe. This process was based on the new members the laws, rules and norms of the ever changing European Union, which had re-invited itself with the Maastricht Treaty and Euro during the 1990s. What if the EU had instead opted to offer rapid integration and a broader vision of a unified Europe?

From a European History Textbook for 12th Graders: European Integration and Unification, Brussels, 2010.

The 1993 European unification summit marked the beginning of the European Union. As presidents and prime ministers from 24 countries gathered in Berlin, the conference marked the end of the old European Community and the beginning of the European Union. From 12 members of the old EC, the new Union included the newly independent Baltic states, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Austria, Sweden and Finland. Malta, Cyprus and Albania had begun accession talks, but had failed to conclude talks joining the new European Union. They joined jointly in 1995. [see interview with Jacques Delors, EC president in 1989 http://www.euronews.net/2009/10/30/jacques-delors-former-european-commission-president/%5D

The Berlin summit did not only mark the doubling in size of the EU, but also the signing of the Berlin treaty, which was the result of the draft constitution proposed by the European Constitutional Convention which had been in session in 1991 and 1992 to draft a new framework for European politics. In addition to a president of the European Union, it established the office of the EU’s Foreign minister. Jacques Delors, who had overseen the big bang enlargement of the EC was nominated to be the first EU president, with former Polish Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki as the Foreign Minister of the EU.

Supporters of the big bang approach argued that the quick commitment of the EU to enlargement at the Luxembourg summit in June 1990 was necessary. The summit had made a clear promise of membership in the new European Union for every country in Europe committed to democracy and accelerated talks for integration with substantial financial assistance (formally know as PHARE, but widely dubbed ‘Europe’s Marshall Plan’). According to supporters, the quick response of the EU helped starve of the constitutional crisis in Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia and contributed to quick overthrow of the Iliescu government in Romania in August 1990 and the victory of Ante Marković in Yugoslavia’s elections in 1990.

Critiques have challenged that the possibility of a dissolution of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia always appeared remote and that the quick unification of the European continent was high on symbols, but lacked sound economic and political logic: While Spain, Portugal and Greece had waited for nearly a decade after democratizing before joining the EC, the countries of Eastern Europe only waited four years. Furthermore, by creating the large EU, Western countries were exposed to strong labor cost pressures whereas many industries in Eastern Europe had to compete with more efficient Western companies.

Questions for pupils:

  1. Image what would have happened had the European Union with 24 members not been established in 1993?
  2. Give an example on how the EC/EU Marshall Plan changed the lives of European citizens. Can you think of any personal example?

The more the merrier… parties and elections in Montenegro

It seems like the Montenegrin opposition is giving the governing parties a special gift for the parliamentary elections on 29 March. These early elections were called by the government to ostensibly get a mandate for sustained EU integration. The opposition, however, criticised government for going for quick elections before the economic crisis fully unfolds in Montenegro.

Whatever the reason, it seems like the governing DPS will not have to worry about its 54 year stint in power. Just in time for the elections, the already highly fragmented opposition split once more and two more parties are added to the list of opposition groups. Andreja Mandic, after leading the Serb List to become the leading opposition grouping now formed the more moderate New Serb Democracy, while a wing of the Movement for Changes formed the Democratic Center to joined the Liberals in a pre-election coalition. So, in short, there are now the following ten opposition parties (see report by CDT):

– Coalition for “Za drugačiju Crnu Goru” (For a different Montenegro), composed of the Liberal Party and the Democratic Center

– The People’s Coalition (“Narodnjačku koaliciju”) composed of the Peoples’ Party and the Democratic Serb Party

– The Serb national List (“Srpsku nacionalnu listu”) including the Serbian radicals, the Serb peoples party and a group of citizes.

– New Serb Democracy

-Movement for Changes

-Socialist People’s Party

and this is without the parties of minorities. Thus all possible permutations of Serb Socialist and People are running.  The opposition might not win, but at least it is likely to be represented by 10 parties. But there is always the Dark Horse candidate from the People’s Front of Judea.