Serbia | Florian Bieber

A history of Yugoslavia and Eastern Europe according to some of my students

May 26, 2010 59 Comments

Click here on a post on the recent press coverage of the text below.

A history of Eastern Europe and Yugoslavia as you might not know it. From exams 2006-2010 at the University of Kent:

The History of Yugoslavia

There have been many different countries/empires which have been huge and have had a range of different cultures but have managed to stay as one country. A very important example in term of Yugoslavia is the Ottoman Empire which oversaw some of that region. It was a huge empire with millions of servants who were of different race, religion, customs and beliefs. The empire managed to stay together regardless of this issue.

Furthermore, this can be debated as Yugoslavia never really had any enemy in ancient times…

The Creation of Yugoslavia

The formation of Yugoslavia was ‘man made’ rather than inherent and formed through the same values and cultures.

Yugoslavia ….was forced together by the Ottomens and meinteined by leaders such as Tito.

After Yugoslavia was formed three dominant groups fought for power on the left the fascist Usteche who used aggressive ethnic cleansing techniques to drive non-Serbians from the land.

Yugoslavia was formed in 1929 out of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Cheks

Communist Yugoslavia

When the Ottoman Empire collapsed, Communist leaders took and expanded the idea of a united Yugoslavia.

It is true to say that Yugoslavia was a young state, before the second WW the area consisted of several kingdoms…. After Tito removed Yugoslavia from the Soviet Union & pioneered the non-aligned movements during WW2, Yugoslavia entered relative calm.

Communist rule in Yugoslavia defind the nation until 1948 and when the region detached itself from Commuism it scrambled to find an identity.

Tito was already emerging as the glue that binds this group of autonomous provinces.

Tito was almost the puppeter of Yugoslavia pulling its strings.

In the years before Tito’s death, when he was forgetful and sported a terrible wig…

In 1980, President Tito of Yugoslavia died, having ruled the state for over 10 years…

When Tito died the emperror died with him.

There were two bodies that led Yugoslavia right before it disintegrated, Tito Braz and Slobodan Milosevic.

Tito had maintained a Yugoslavia with a federal government system: again, not a typical feature of countries…if Milosevic had succeded would have made Yugoslavia a less artificial country.

The provinces of Yugoslavia include Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, , Yugoveada and others…

It consisted of eight republics and of the eight two were provinces: Kosovo and Vojvonec.

Kosovo was 95% Algerian.

Yugoslavia had been in a terrible economic climate–following the 1930 global depression and the 1973 Yugoslavian oil crisis…

…Slovenia housed a large amount of institutions that Serbia used.

The Rise of Milosevic

When right wing Serbs were making their voices heard in Kosovo Ivan Stambolic sent Milosevic to sort out the situation. Tito would have never considered this. He would have sent an armed force and destroyed them.

Yugoslavia was powerful before Slobodan Milosevic, because it wasn’t just about Serbs but it was about other places as well such as Bosnea, Macedonia, Kosovo, Croatia, Slovenia, etc.

Milosevic attempted to mobilize the people by lighting a fire under their growing concerns for nationalism.

Milosevic attempted to keep the state as cohesived as possible by introducing the masses into politics.Unfortunately, all the masses had very strong views which was one of the factores led to its demise.

Milosevic was a gruel rotten apple.

His ambitions would not stop him from attempting to take the capital of Croatia Dubronik which as 90% Croat in which he failed.

Although Kosovo had been an independent nation for over 600 years, Serbia…had pulled the nation under Serbian rule

As both Croatia and Serbia were Orthodox believers that were majority.

While Serbia is Orthodox, Croatia and Bosnia are Muslim

War and International Intervention

The international community had viewed the situation in the Balkans as a bit of a ‘so what?’ scenario.

[In 1991] NATO was a relatively new organization and was busy with the USSR… and the UN was happy to observe the looming conflict yet unwilling to act.

The EC also felt under pressure to act because of ethnic ties that they had to ‘Yugoslavians’

The Baltic States are built on blood stains, and for the UN to go in, assuming it could achieve what it set out to was naive and demonstrated it’s lack of cultural understanding.

The declaration of independence infuriated Serbia. That is why today Serbia has rejected the acknowledgement of Serbia as a nation-state, it fears for the Serbians inside Kosovo.

With Germany independently supporting Serbia and the rest of Europe condemning its actions.

Bosnians soon rose up against the Muslims …forcing them to flee.

The Baltic States have always been at least troublesome…It’s a conflict hotspot teaming with ethnic tension and racial prejudice that has built up over centuries and passed down over generations

During the 1990s Yugoslvia and most of the Baltic region witnessed some of the worst atrocities and widespread genocide the area had ever seen.

The Kosovo Rambouillet plan succeeded in invading the conflict in former Yugoslavia, but failed in the short term with the loss of lives in the war.

Communism in Eastern Europe

More than 4 centuries of Communist rule has aggravated the economic situation and the competitiveness to the West.

Eastern Europe has been under the influence of five religions, three of which are branches of Catholicism.

A case example can be seen between Afghanistan and Armenia between 1918 and 1926. Between and much throughout the interwar period, the CPSU had problems with Afghanistan.

The cold war ended in 1950 when the US and the USSR signed a treaty of peace in Yalta

The appeal of Communism was that people would no longer work for the rich, but for each other.

The richest elite in a communist society tends to be the leader. As according to Karl Marx the buorgeoisie and the ruling class in a society tend to rule and keep the state in good order.

They created what was called Goulash communism–goulash being a Hungarian dish compiled with unlikely ingredients.

Gorbachev and 1989

Gorbachev not only talked the talk but walked the walk

Gorbachev made discussions and relations to the Western states about the plan to collapse the Communist regime…The United States president then Regan also accepted his plan…

Gorbachev was the ‘golden eye’ and the hero of east Europe helping to collapse communism and began his plan since the earlier 1990s.

It seems that the madness that took hold of the people of East and Central Europe in that momentous year of 1989, was one that had been inevitable forming like a thunderous cloud on the horizon, bringing with it the winds of change.

The claim that short term …factors are key to explain Communism’s collapse in 1989 is rather reactionary and ill-judged….Long term factors are key to explaining communism collapse in 1989 as one can assess the fall of communism or its demise started from a while ago.

there was a multi-party election carried out in Romania, Czechoslovakia, East Germany and Bosnia for a more decentralized east Europe.

Countries with a single party system run the risk of slipping back into a type of authoritarian regime.

…there is still the block mentality in Eastern Europe, showing it hasn’t integrated that greatly, this is made most apparent in the Eurovision Song Contest where the East European Countries will all vote for each other. This was seen this year when the Serbian entry won, despite how crap it was, because the Eastern Europe will vote for it’s own.

What is all means for Britain

Britain now is a coalition government, the icon of the West now using democratic practices most commonly fund (found?) in Eastern Europe…

Britain looked at the whole idea [EU] of the scheme as a waste of time…under Margeret Thatcher…but [she] was eventually removed and Britain joined… after Britain had been in a huge recession and were the 3rd poorest country in Europe.

The copyright to these statements lies exclusively with the students who wrote this.

Filed under Bosnia, European Union, Russia, Serbia, UK, Western Balkans

Does Serbia really want Ganic?

March 5, 2010 3 Comments

The arrest of Ejup Ganic in the UK has already been a big success for Serbia. Judging by the fact that I just gave an interview for a Chinese news magazine on the case, the arrest of Ganic has successfully overshadowed the beginning of the Karadzic trial. The Prosecution in Serbia had opened an investigation into the Dobrovoljacka case in early 2009, but the timing of the arrest now is indicative: The case altogether seems political motivated to show to the domestic audience in Serbia that also non-Serbs are indicted for war crimes. The ICTY in The Hague had investigated the case and did not pursue it. There is furthermore a problem with Serbia indicting Ganic for an alleged war crime committed in Bosnia (which was internationally recognized at the time). While some of the victims were Serbs from Serbia, and Ganic is born in Serbia, the crime is primarily the responsibility of the Bosnian war crimes chamber.

The incident has already had a negative impact on relations between Bosnia and Serbia. This comes after a recent improvement following mediation by Turkey which resulted in both countries again exchanging ambassadors after relations had been managed at the level of charge d’affairs for years after Serbia rejected Bosnia’s candidates for ambassador to Serbia. It also comes after the Serbian president Tadic has reaffirmed Serbia’s support for the territorial integrity of Bosnia, which has been widely seen as an effort to reign in the nationalist statements by Milorad Dodik. Furthermore, there have been discussions in Serbia to pass a resolution in parliament to condemn the genocide in Srebrenica. Finally, the investigation and extradition request undermine the agreement on legal cooperation signed between Serbia and Bosnia just a few days ago. The argeement seeks to put an end to the ability of criminals to escape punishment by crossing the border to Serbia or Bosnia and hiding behind dual citizenship. A lot of this good will and progress created in recent months has been destroyed by the arrest.

More important might be the negative impact on Bosnia itself. The arrest and the case will be welcome ammunition in the election campaign in Bosnia–general elections are due in October: Serb politicians express their dismay at Bosnian state institutions seeking to defend Ganic, while Bosniak politicians accuse Serbia of fighting the same battles as during the war. Thus, it helps to remind of the war and incompatible political goals which will only help nationalists in the elections.

I am not certain that Serbia has the stomach or the will to really try Ganic in court. The case is weak so either he would be sentenced in a clear mischarage of justice which would undermine internationally the domestic war crimes investigations and Serbia, or he would be released which would undermine the court domestically. Thus, if he is eventually released by the UK, or ‘extradited’ to Bosnia, Serbia has won. The authorities can once more claim that non-Serbs evade justice, but that Serbia tries all it can and that it can get to them even in the UK, not unlike the governments line of argument for Kosovo.

Filed under Bosnia, ICTY, Serbia, UK

Curb your mens rea

March 1, 2010 1 Comment

After recently returning from an excellent conference at Indiana University on the Milosevic trial and watching the open statement of Radovan Karadzic at The Hague this morning, a number of issues regarding the work of the ICTY and the writing of history of the 1990s come to mind.

As a scholar, the ICTY court records have become a treasure trove of documents and evidence on the events of the 1990s. Thus, even when working on topics not related to the wars, there is much data available which is of interest, from party documents of 1990 to entire books and memoirs. Just like a real treasure trove, the data is hard to find and has to be searched by defendant (for example in the Boskovski case alone there are 1828 statements, documents, etc. available) and if one is not an avid trial watcher it is not easy to know where to find what.

However, beyond the ICTY as a source, how to approach the court as a researcher? First, the ICTY asks different questions than many of us researchers ask. We are often less interested in direct criminal responsibility than in the larger social processes. However, even if we are, the standards of evidence for historians or social scientists are different than in a court. We hardly ever have our sources cross-examined and we accept that evidence and lines of reasoning are challenged later on by colleagues (even if we might not like it) while the court seeks to render a final judgment which will send somebody to prison for years. Thus, the role of scholarship is less about judging and more about assessing. This does not mean moral ambivalence and there is no doubt that scholarship, especially when dealing with Yugoslavia’s disintegration in the 1990s, has to assess responsibility. Scholarship does not need a guilty verdict against Milosevic at the ICTY to identify him to be responsible for much of the war crimes committed in Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo. While legitimate questions remain about specific instances, the overall picture is quiet clear.

Here emerges some discomfort: In the Milosevic case, the prosecution paid particular attention to the intention (mens rea), painting a picture of nationalism and commitment to Greater Serbia (a term I don’t find very helpful) to explain the acts perpetrated or ordered by Milosevic, Karadzic et al. Here there is an uneasy relationship between the work of a trial and scholarship. The prosecutor’s role has been to present a clear linear story of ideological commitment and crimes committed in accomplishing this goal. It is a narrative which nicely links motivation to acts. However, as scholar, I feel distinctly uneasy about such a linear narrative. In fact, I am reminded of a very different example from legal practice. Having provided some expert advice on asylum cases, a more experienced colleague told that in verifying the story of a refugees for its veracity key is to look out for inconsistencies and quirks in their story. These are not evidence of problems in their claims, but the opposite. If the narrative of persecution and flight is too straight forward, like it should be, alarm bells should go on. Human life is too complicated and, well, too individual to fit into the large narratives. What applies to refugees is also true for war criminals. It is less their long-hedged master plan which is convincing, but the opportunistic, short-term calculations which motivate crimes. Change and inconsistency rather than a clear strategy. Furthermore, intention itself is very unsatisfying in a context when ill intent was very wide-spread. The key is who acted on it and who did not. If we take Vuk Draskovic’s statements in 1990 and 1991 (some even earlier), then his intentions appear much more dangerous than those of Milosevic and others. The commitment towards extreme nationalism, the hate speech towards other nations left little doubt about his intentions. Still, following a short engagement of his party’s paramilitaries in Croatia, he stopped supporting the war effort and became one of its main critics (more so than for example the currently governing DS in Serbia).

The current indictment against Karadzic and the opening statement by the prosecutor are largely encouraging in this regard as it does indeed focus on the crimes and not so much on the political pre-history. In court today, Karadzic tried to turn the prosecution’s case around by constructing a narrative of mens rea of the leadership of Slovenia, Croatia, the Bosnian Muslims and Croats and taking points from the prosecutions case and turning them around to replace his name with others. While the result was often a familiar conspiracy theory and distortion of historic events, there are legitimate disputes and conflicting arguments about the motivation to establish nation states and the dissolution of Yugoslavia. The fact that Slovenia and Croatia sought to leave Yugoslavia was understandable in the context at the time and there is certainly nothing to justify the use of force, but there are serious and legitimate political disputes at the heart of the Yugoslav conflict before it turned violent to which there is often no clear cut answer of right and wrong.

Thus, while the ICTY can contribute to the writing of history by disclosing chains of command, I am much more skeptical about the larger, linear narratives of mens rea which seem to run against the subtleties which scholarship has to identify.

Filed under Bosnia, Croatia, ICTY, Kosovo, Serbia

Three good ways to end 2009 in the Western Balkans

December 23, 2009 Leave a comment

Shortly before Christmas and the end of 2009, three key decisions were made regarding the European perspective of the Western Balkans: a) the EU abandoned the visa requirements for citizens of Serbia, Macedonia and Montenegro; b) Serbia applied for EU membership and c) the European Court of Human Rights found the Bosnian constitution to be in breach of the European Convention of HR.

In addition to the obvious benefits of opening the borders to the EU for citizens of the three countries, the EU application of Serbia is a crucial step. It has not been supported unanimously by all EU member states, but Serbia has done well to ignore some critical voices. In fact, most EU membership applications have been met with some grumblings among member states as premature, but it is best for a future candidate to press ahead. The application has wide support in Serbia from the Serbian Progressive Party of Nikolic to the Helsinki Committee of Serbia. Using the popularity of the visa liberalization to apply for membership has helped to reinvigorate the EU accession process, not just for Serbia. The application, together with Montenegro’s a year ago creates pressure on the EU to grant the two countries candidate status and to begin accession talks with Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia. Even if Bosnia, as well as Albania and Kosovo are lagging behind, this dynamic can also increase pressure there to speed up reforms and for the EU to re-engage in the region.

An editorial in the German FAZ expresses some skepticism regarding membership negotiations with Serbia, noting that there has been no coming to terms with the past and the legacy of nationalism in Serbia. The editorial notes that there is a need for Serbia to abandon hyper-nationalism prior to accession. Besides the obvious omission that of course member state can be quiet nationalist in their policies (i.e. Greece in regard to Macedonia), it neglects to note that without an alternative perspective, such as EU membership, there is little reason to abandon nationalism.

The third important event over the past week has been a decision of the European Court of Human Rights: In a ruling that has been widely expected, it decided that Bosnia discriminates against Dervo Sejdić and Jakob Finci, members of the Roma and Jewish community in Bosnia respectively, as they are not able to run for the presidency or for the House of Peoples. The decision is important, as it increases the pressure to amend the Bosnian constitution to at least remove the aspects which openly disadvantage some of its citizens. While there is consensus among the main political parties over the need to change the constitution in this aspect, the hope of some to achieve more sweeping amendments has held up these minimal constitutional amendments for years. Considering that general elections are due in ten months, the pressure is on to amend the constitution now to make sure that the next presidency is not elected in breach with European human rights standards. The decision is a positive sign for Bosnia, as it shows how participation in European institutional structures can reduce the rigidity of the post-war institutions (NB: which were after all drafted by US state department lawyers).

Free travel, EU membership progressing and turning up the pressure to reduce discrimination in constitutions are important steps for the region. 2010 will be the year to put these prospects into reality. So what should be on Santa’s wish list for the Western Balkans for 2010?

– visa liberalization for Bosnia, Albania and Kosovo

– candidate status for Serbia and Montenegro, begin of EU accession negotiations with Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro

– constitutional reforms in Bosnia, focusing on human rights

– improvement of relations between Kosovo and Serbia.

-resolution of the border dispute between Slovenia and Croatia and conclusion of Croatia’s accession negotiations.

Not sure how realistic this is, but it’s worth wishing for.

Filed under Bosnia, European Union, Serbia

Why the European Commission was right

July 21, 2009 3 Comments

The decision of the EU to lift visa requirements for Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia, but not Albania, Bosnia and Kosovo last week caused quite a stir.

The Greens in the European Parliament, as well as some observers called the decision unfair, “hypocritical and morally abject”, suggesting that it is penalizing Bosnian Muslims victims of war crimes. While such talk might be tempting, it is simply wrong and does little to help either the reforms or the coming to terms with the past in Serbia or elsewhere.

Anybody who is working on and in the region has for a long time felt that the visa regime of the EU is counterproductive and certainly has hurt reforms. Thus any lifting of the visa regime should be welcome.

Second, the EU has always set out clear technical requirements to be fulfilled for the visa obligations to be lifted. This is conditionality at its best, clear technical requirements which can be fulfilled with sufficient political will. Most governments in the region have been insincere in their claim to help their citizens to travel freely over the years. Efforts to introduce new passports and the necessary legislation and other measures have been far too slow, considering the interest of many citizens to travel without the humiliation in front of EU embassies. The EU has to insist on countries fulfilling the requirements it sets. It has been weak for some (which were arguably bad conditions), but if it relents just to be ‘nice’ to a country or to not leave anybody behind, why would any politician pass any necessary law anymore? Lowering conditions and requirements would hurt citizens across the region, not least in BiH–not in regard to visa free travel, but in regard to other reforms. Not including all countries at the same time does not mean leaving them behind. If Slovakia had not been lagging behind in the 1990s, there would have been no pressure to get rid of Vladimir Meciar and to begin serious reforms. Had been Slovakia given an easy ride early on, it probably would have been left behind at the end.

One argument put forth in the debate has been that it is mostly Bosniaks who would be left out from visa free travel and Croats already have Croatian passports and Serbs can or have Serbian passports. This is, however, as demagogic argument. First, Croatian passport holders are uneffected, so there is no change there. Second, there is little evidence that Bosnian Serbs have easy access to Serbian passports. According to a report in Danas, only 2,557 Bosnian citizens also have a Serbian passport. While this might be underestimating the real number of double citizens, there is little evidence to suggest that Bosnian Serbs have easy access to Serbian passports. Finally, if Serbia were to provide easy access to Bosnian Serbs, the EC could easily impose similar limitations to Serbian passport holders from Bosnia as there will be for Serbian passport holders from Kosovo.

Finally, I thus share my skepticism of the moral argument with ESI. Most importantly, I think it is important to move away from the talk of whether a country (or nation) should be ‘rewarded’ or ‘penalized’ for the war in the context of EU integration. This logic is not helpful for EU integration and runs counter the entire logic of the process. Germany was not an early participant of the integration process as a reward nor because France, Italy or Benelux were happy to integrate with a country which had barely come to terms with the past, but the logic of the integration process is to induce change through integration. Thus integration is not a ‘reward’ for having been good, but a mechanisms to prevent the reoccurred of war crimes and to reform a society so that it can come to terms with the crimes committed in its name. Translating past injustices into currency in the integration process is not only demeaning to the victims of the crimes, it also runs against the logic of EU integration. When President Kaczyński of Poland sought to increase the votes for Poland, arguing that the Poles lost in WW2 should be counted, this position was quickly criticized by all key European players as tasteless and inappropriate. What is the fundamental difference between Kaczyński‘s linking visa liberalization with war crimes? This should not be misunderstood to be a call for forgetting or ignoring the past and the crimes. However, they should not be linked to reforms and the process of EU integration.

Now it is up to Bosnian politicians to deliver, if they don’t the citizens will have an opportunity to change them in 2010…

Filed under Bosnia, European Union, Serbia, Western Balkans

And nobody will be satisfied: Thoughts on the arguments at the ICJ over Kosovo

April 20, 2009 Leave a comment

A few days ago was the deadline for Serbia and Kosovo to submit their arguments in the case at the ICJ over whether the declaration of Kosovo’s independence and the subsequent recognition are illegal. Here are some thoughts I shared with Koha Ditore on the argument, published in an article today:
It is likely that Serbia will base its argument on a conventional understanding of international law, which has taken a very restrictive approach to self-determiniation. Self-determiniation in the sense of international independence has only be granted to processes of decolonization and to cases of state dissolution. The ICJ has previously ruled on the principle of uti possidetis, i.e. the ICJ decided in 1986 in a border dispute between Mali and Burkina Faso that the border at the end of the colonial rule as definitive. Thus, this means a) countries only can achieve independence by decolonization; b) state dissolution or c) mutual agreement. The argument of Serbia would likely rest on this practice with no country newly emerging since 1945 not following this pattern. Thus, Serbia is likely to emphasis that Kosovo has no right to self-determination in international law. There might be arguments about precedent or regional and global implications, but I think that these are less important at the ICJ than the international law.
There are three strategies for Kosovo, a) to argue that the massive human rights violations of Serbia in 1999 in Kosovo changed the status quo and could have given greater arguments for self-determination. This link between the state soverignty and the right to protect has been made by international lawyers, but remains contested. Thus the ICJ would significantly expand the interpretation of self-determiniation if it would follow this argument, which I think would be unlikely. b) Kosovo could argue that at the dissolution of Yugoslavia, Kosovo was one of the Federal units like the republics and had the same right to independence as the other units. While the Badinter Committee rejected this interpretation, this was not legally binding and never tested in court to my knowledge, so the argument could be made and this might be an easier way out, as it would not fundamentallly alter the global terms of self-determination. c) Kosovo could argue to claim that Kosovo’s declaration of independence was not indicating an aspiration, but an existing reality. Serbia has no authority over Kosovo and thus, Kosovo was de-facto independent before it claimed de-jure independence. This argument has its appeal, as it does not enter the question of whether independence or not it is justfied, but whether it exists of not. However, the ICJ might be reluctant to follow this argument, as other de-facto sovereign territory might make similar claims, such as Somaliland, not to mention Abkhazia or S. Ossetia.

I would be surprised if the ICJ would take a clear stance in favor of one argument. I would expect it to take a decision which will make nobody entirely happy, but which will essentially state that international recognition of countries is a matter or fact and a political decision rather than of international law. Of course any unclear decision is de facto in favor of Kosovo, as Serbia could only hope stopping international recognition if it were clearly found illegal. It most likely will emphasise that while Sebria retained formal sovereignty over Kosovo, it had no effective sovereignty over the territory. I would be surprised if countries recognizing Kosovo were found breaking international law, even if the court will most certainly shy away from any decision which would establish a new precedent in the domain of self-determination.

Filed under Kosovo, Serbia

Millions for Mladic and No Money: Real Patriotism rather than Hypothetical Money?

January 23, 2009 Leave a comment

As if to explain the recent numbers of declining support for EU integration, a poll published today suggests that some 65% of Serbs would not pass on information leading to the arrest of Ratko Mladic. It seems to give an obvious answer to the reduced EU support: Why support extradition of Mladic for EU integration if you are not willing to cash in millions for giving him away? Surely the millions are better than the lofty goal of EU integration with its less concrete benefits (ask Bulgarians and Romanians or anybody else). The only reason for being for EU integration rather than millions in cash is that the former would indicate a joint support for fulfilling the necessary conditions, while the latter is an individual choice which could (hypothetically or not) lead to being ostricized.

However, there is quiet different implication these numbers hold. Both the questions over EU conditions and over whether to give up Mladic give the choice between something concrete and something hypothetical. Saying that you don’t give up Mladic is a concrete act which is promised the ‘reward’ of recognition as a patriot, it is easy to reject a hypothetical reward. Similar with the EU, it is easy to see the conditions are objectionable if the reward is untagible.

Given the choice between two real options, the number are likely to be different.

Filed under Serbia

A Troubeling Decline: EU integration is getting less popular in Serbia

January 22, 2009 1 Comment

It would seem ironic that with its most pro-European government since 2003 and most of the big issues like Kosovo not on the table, support for EU integration has dropped to 61% according to the latest opinon poll of the EU integration office of the government of Serbia. This is a drop of six percent, a very serious decline. It would seem that the conditions and the blockages esp. resulting from the Dutch veto over ICTY cooperation are the primary reason for the increasing dissatisfaction among citizens.

These numbers could be interpreted in two ways: The optimistic scenario is that these numbers are likely to go up once the conditions are fulfilled. Especially once Mladic is arrested, there is likely to be swift progress in terms of EU integration. The pessimistic scenario is that the rejection of EU ‘blackmail’ points to a deeper problem. Unlike in other enlargement countries, conditionality is not understood as part of a grand bargain which reaps benefits for the country, but as an unfair price to pay, as double standards. More so, it is unlikely that inconvenient conditions are going to go away. One day, not soon, but before Serbia joins the EU, there will be a big one–recognition of Kosovo. And whether with the current strategy of the Serbian government and the EU, it appears questionable whether the country can master EU integration.

Filed under Serbia

Giraffes for Europe

October 7, 2008 Leave a comment

Giraffes for Europe

According to Blic, one of the conditions for SPS and its partners to join government was that the Jagodina Zoo would receive some giraffes–as to advance the touristic potential of “Strawberry” aka Svetozarevo, with the goal that one day, it will be know in honor of its current mayor as Palmarevo.
If giraffes work well as EU integration incentives, I can see potential in a major import business (impex)for the entire region.

Filed under Serbia

Tod dem Fasiesten B. Tadic

June 19, 2008 1 Comment

Apparently the integration of crazy Serb nationalists in Vienna is not going as well as expected. Threatening posters should be at least proof-read by native German speakers before being put up.