The Magical Mirror in Bosnia: The Serb Republic and the Burqa

Republika Srpska steps up to a magical mirror and asks: Mirror, mirror on the wall–which is the prettiest place of them all?

The mirror answers: You have destroyed minarets where the most democratic country in Europe, Switzerland, just banned them. You are planning to ban the burqa like the most civic country in Europe, France. And you are disregarding judgments by the European Court of European Rights, just like the heart of Europe, Belgium.

This might make you not the prettiest place, but it makes you very European.

This is why Milorad Dodik is suggesting by proposing such as ban as a European standard: “Such law has been adopted in several European countries and we believe that we need to get closer to these European standards.” It is easy to dismiss this proposal as another incidiary pre-election play of Dodik’s party to polarize and mobilize, but also holds a mirror up to the rest of Europe.  It burqas are banned in Belgium and France, minarets in Switzerland, how different is the nationalist intolerance promote by Dodik and others in BiH?  While there are obvious differences between the RS and Belgium in the fact that Islam is a long-established in the latter and not in the former and that prior to 1991 a third or more of the inhabitants of the RS were Muslims. Even if burqas have not been worn and are worn only by few anywhere in Bosnia, burqas are not fundamentally alien to Bosnia. I doubt though that Dodik wants to be the Atatürk of Bosnia or that wearing burqas in the RS is both wide-spread or that it takes a ban to make wearers feel not welcome. Thus, in addition to proposing an illiberal solution to an arguably often illiberal expression of faith, it is about as provocative as a suggesting in Northern Ireland that religions involved in child abuse should be banned.

The fact that the burqa ban is getting support form such (un)expected quarters should give Sarkozy and the Belgium authorities some food for thought.

The economic crisis, Greece and the Balkans

The economic crisis has hit the Western Balkans particularly hard. The region was hit hard in absolute terms, a result of half-hearted economic reforms and the elites denial over the economic crisis reaching the region (a number of government ministers across the region predicted that their country would be spared).
The region was also hit hard psychologically as growth has been sluggish or started from such a low level that the perceived benefits by most citizens are limited. As a result the reservoir of patience is small.

Cover from the German Weekly Focus "The Cheater in the Euro Family"

Who will benefit from the crisis? There are no clear winners or loosers. However, overall populism is likely to gain ground. Good evidence of this is the media exchange between Germany and Greece with German media going for some good old Balkan stereotypes and Greek media dragging out WW2 to counter German criticism of the Greek economy. While for the German media, Greeks are cheating, stealing Balkanites (which of course bodes well for the enlargement of the region), while Greek media like to draw parallels between the EU and NAZI occupation, as in the cartoon from Kathimerini below.

EU inspectors arriving/“Just a sec!” the minister yells and tears his shirt off/Then you see him demonstratively flagellating his bare torso with a rod. Three men are standing next to him in Gestapo uniforms barking “Sehr gut!”.

From Kathimerini: EU Inspectors Arriving (and sounding/looking like the Gestapo)

In Bosnia, it seems to disadvantage the established nationalists, esp. in the Bosniak-Croat Federation, but might help new nationalist/populists, such as the tycoon Radoncic, who recently suggested that non-Bosniaks should not be working for the Federations public broadcaster. In Serbia it is likely to help the populist Progressive Party. While no elections are scheduled in the region this year except for Bosnia, governments are likely to adopt populist policies. At least at the moment, it does not appear that opportunity to clean up the act in terms of inefficient public administration is being seized upon. Unlike in Greece, the unions are mostly weak and fragmented in the region, so paralysis is unlikely to come from the streets.

Altogether the economic crisis motivates political elites to claim political successes on other fronts: Unfortunately, this is unlikely to benefit the resolution of outstanding conflicts, from the name dispute between Greece and Macedonia to the relations between Serbia and Kosovo.

In particular, the prospects of resolving the name issue between Greece and Macedonia seems as remote as ever. While the Papandreou government has been more pragmatic than its predecessor, it seems improbable that it has the courage to move a solution forward in the context of the deep economic crisis and faced with the fact that the leader of the main opposition party, New Democracy, is Antonis Samaras whose hard line over Macedonia called the downfall of the Mitsotakis government in 1993.

The possibly most important aspect of the crisis is the policy of the EU. We have seen a serious erosion of solidarity among current EU members and the economic crisis in Greece is likely to disadvantage the countries of the region: Whether they are members (such as Bulgaria) and are now less likely to be admitted to the Euro-zone to countries in the Western Balkans, who are now likely to be scrutinized more extensively than they would have been before.

Three good ways to end 2009 in the Western Balkans

Shortly before Christmas and the end of 2009, three key decisions were made regarding the European perspective of the Western Balkans: a) the EU abandoned the visa requirements for citizens of Serbia, Macedonia and Montenegro; b) Serbia applied for EU membership and c) the European Court of Human Rights found the Bosnian constitution to be in breach of the European Convention of HR.

In addition to the obvious benefits of opening the borders to the EU for citizens of the three countries, the EU application of Serbia is a crucial step. It has not been supported unanimously by all EU member states, but Serbia has done well to ignore some critical voices. In fact, most EU membership applications have been met with some grumblings among member states as premature, but it is best for a future candidate to press ahead. The application has wide support in Serbia from the Serbian Progressive Party of Nikolic to the Helsinki Committee of Serbia. Using the popularity of the visa liberalization to apply for membership has helped to reinvigorate the EU accession process, not just for Serbia. The application, together with Montenegro’s a year ago creates pressure on the EU to grant the two countries candidate status and to begin accession talks with Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia. Even if Bosnia, as well as Albania and Kosovo are lagging behind, this dynamic can also increase pressure there to speed up reforms and for the EU to re-engage in the region.

An editorial in the German FAZ expresses some skepticism regarding membership negotiations with Serbia, noting that there has been no coming to terms with the past and the legacy of nationalism in Serbia. The editorial notes that there is a need for Serbia to abandon hyper-nationalism prior to accession. Besides the obvious omission that of course member state can be quiet nationalist in their policies (i.e. Greece in regard to Macedonia), it neglects to note that without an alternative perspective, such as EU membership, there is little reason to abandon nationalism.

The third important event over the past week has been a decision of the European Court of Human Rights: In a ruling that has been widely expected, it decided that Bosnia discriminates against Dervo Sejdić and Jakob Finci, members of the Roma and Jewish community in Bosnia respectively, as they are not able to run for the presidency or for the House of Peoples. The decision is important, as it increases the pressure to amend the Bosnian constitution to at least remove the aspects which openly disadvantage some of its citizens. While there is consensus among the main political parties over the need to change the constitution in this aspect, the hope of some to achieve more sweeping amendments has held up these minimal constitutional amendments for years.  Considering that general elections are due in ten months, the pressure is on to amend the constitution now to make sure that the next presidency is not elected in breach with European human rights standards. The decision is a positive sign for Bosnia, as it shows how participation in European institutional structures can reduce the rigidity of the post-war institutions (NB: which were after all drafted by US state department lawyers).

Free travel, EU membership progressing and turning up the pressure to reduce discrimination in constitutions are important steps for the region. 2010 will be the year to put these prospects into reality. So what should be on Santa’s wish list for the Western Balkans for 2010?

– visa liberalization for Bosnia, Albania and Kosovo

– candidate status for Serbia and Montenegro, begin of EU accession negotiations with Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro

– constitutional reforms in Bosnia, focusing on human rights

– improvement of relations between Kosovo and Serbia.

-resolution of the border dispute between Slovenia and Croatia and conclusion of Croatia’s accession negotiations.

Not sure how realistic this is, but it’s worth wishing for.

Fixing the Institutions will not Fix Bosnia: To Butmir or not to butt mir

Convening Bosnia’s political leaders in an EUFOR base outside of Sarajevo is not only reminiscent of Dayton where Tudjman, Izetbegovic and Milosevic were ‘impressed’ by a US air force base in Ohio, but also of an ill-fated session of the Yugoslav presidency in Spring 1991. The Yugoslav People’s Army in an effort to persuade the Yugoslav leadership to declare a state of emergency convened the meeting in an army barracks in Belgrade. However, its show of force failed and the Bosnian representative of the presidency, Bogic Bogicevic case the crucial vote against the army intervention.

Of course, unlike the JNA in 1991, EUFOR and the EU wants to disengage, rather than engage, so the differences begin here. The sense of crisis is similar, and palpable. Observers and politicians from different background and with diverging interests keep emphasizing the crisis Bosnia finds itself in—only the depth of the crisis appears to be a matter of debate.

Many commentators mistakenly identify the institutions as the prime problem of Bosnia. The complicated institutional set-up with veto rights, ‘vital national interests’ and entity voting appears to block reform at every turn of the corner. Looking at the unwieldy reality and the frequent stalemates in Bosnia’s institutions, it is tempting to see all ills in the Dayton institutions. Nevertheless, this analysis is plain wrong. True, the institutions are flawed and cost too much. They are not the core of the political crisis. Instead, badly conceived and impatient efforts to change them have been to blame for the crisis Bosnia finds itself in.

So why are institutions not the biggest problem? No matter of how many or little veto rights there are in Bosnia, it will be impossible to impose a decision on either entity without its at least tacit consent (or agreement to disagree). Even if entity voting (the ability of each entity’s MPs to block decision in Bosnian parliament) where to be abolished, a walk out by MPs could still stop decisions from being taken. If a decision against the will of one entity were taken, this would hardly lead to its acceptance in the entity in question and would further antagonize relations. Reducing opportunities for blockage are likely to make the decision making process smoother, but it will also increase the temptation to outvote the non-dominant communities. If one were to find issue with the institutions, it is less with the details of decision making, number of MPs, but with the larger institutional set-up, which pits two entities (and the two dominant nations) in a binary zero-sum game against one another. However, this element of post-Dayton Bosnia is not on the agenda as it is too controversial and contentious to touch.

The reason the constitutional talks, first in 2006 (that ended in failure) and the Butmir talks now, have a negative impact on the political climate. The current Butmir talks convey a sense of crisis and ‘last chance’ which does not only build pressure on elites to compromise, but also reinforces a sense of ‘everything is falling apart’ which has a way to become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Opening constitutional questions in such a dramatic way also is what lager parts of the elite like—it is these big issues which lend themselves so much more to defending national interests, than everyday boring politics. Furthermore, the EU and the US have no clear carrot and stick in this process. The only carrot (for some, i.e. Dodik) is the closure of the OHR, but it is also a stick for others (SDA, SBiH). Beyond this, the EU has not been able to offer anything which would be persuasive to compromise.

All this does not suggest that Bosnia does not need constitutional reform. However, this should not be hammered out in EUFOR basis in emergency-style meetings. Constitutional change has to be a gradual process which is not understood as a short term initiative. There is little beyond the obvious violations of the European Convention of Human Rights which needs to be changed with any urgency in the constitution. More important is that some constitutional changes lead to (re-)building a basic consensus one some key features of the Bosnian state. Such a process deserves the support of the EU.

Why the European Commission was right

The decision of the EU to lift visa requirements for Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia, but not Albania, Bosnia and Kosovo last week caused quite a stir.

The Greens in the European Parliament, as well as some observers called the decision unfair, “hypocritical and morally abject”, suggesting that it is penalizing Bosnian Muslims victims of war crimes. While such talk might be tempting, it is simply wrong and does little to help either the reforms or the coming to terms with the past in Serbia or elsewhere.

Anybody who is working on and in the region has for a long time felt that the visa regime of the EU is counterproductive and certainly has hurt reforms. Thus any lifting of the visa regime should be welcome.

Second, the EU has always set out clear technical requirements to be fulfilled for the visa obligations to be lifted. This is conditionality at its best, clear technical requirements which can be fulfilled with sufficient political will. Most governments in the region have been insincere in their claim to help their citizens to travel freely over the years. Efforts to introduce new passports and the necessary legislation and other measures have been far too slow, considering the interest of many citizens to travel without the humiliation in front of EU embassies.  The EU has to insist on countries fulfilling the requirements it sets. It has been weak for some (which were arguably bad conditions), but if it relents just to be ‘nice’ to a country or to not leave anybody behind, why would any politician pass any necessary law anymore? Lowering conditions and requirements would hurt citizens across the region, not least in BiH–not in regard to visa free travel, but in regard to other reforms. Not including all countries at the same time does not mean leaving them behind. If Slovakia had not been lagging behind in the 1990s, there would have been no pressure to get rid of Vladimir Meciar and to begin serious reforms. Had been Slovakia given an easy ride early on, it probably would have been left behind at the end.

One argument put forth in the debate has been that it is mostly Bosniaks who would be left out from visa free travel and Croats already have Croatian passports and Serbs can or have Serbian passports. This is, however, as demagogic argument. First, Croatian passport holders are uneffected, so there is no change there. Second, there is little evidence that Bosnian Serbs have easy access to Serbian passports. According to a report in Danas, only 2,557 Bosnian citizens also have a Serbian passport. While this might be underestimating the real number of double citizens, there is little evidence to suggest that Bosnian Serbs have easy access to Serbian passports. Finally, if Serbia were to provide easy access to Bosnian Serbs, the EC could easily impose similar limitations to Serbian passport holders from Bosnia as there will be for Serbian passport holders from Kosovo.

Finally, I thus share my skepticism of the moral argument with ESI. Most importantly, I think it is important to move away from the talk of whether a country (or nation) should be ‘rewarded’ or ‘penalized’ for the war in the context of EU integration. This logic is not helpful for EU integration and runs counter the entire logic of the process. Germany was not an early participant of the integration process as a reward nor because France, Italy or Benelux were happy to integrate with a country which had barely come to terms with the past, but the logic of the integration process is to induce change through integration. Thus integration is not a ‘reward’ for having been good, but a mechanisms to prevent the reoccurred of war crimes and to reform a society so that it can come to terms with the crimes committed in its name. Translating past injustices into currency in the integration process is not only demeaning to the victims of the crimes, it also runs against the logic of EU integration. When President Kaczyński of Poland sought to increase the votes for Poland, arguing that the Poles lost in WW2 should be counted, this position was quickly criticized by all key European players as tasteless and inappropriate. What is the fundamental difference between Kaczyński‘s linking visa liberalization with war crimes? This should not be misunderstood to be a call for forgetting or ignoring the past and the crimes. However, they should not be linked to reforms and the process of EU integration.

Now it is up to Bosnian politicians to deliver, if they don’t the citizens will have an opportunity to change them in 2010…

The Wages of Fear: Western Balkans and the EU

In the 1953 classic Le salaire de la peur two trucks race towards a burning oil filed with nytroglycerine to extinguish the fire by explosion. During the journey the drivers of the trucks have to navigate a stretch of the road (the washboard) where going slower than a certain speed means the bumps get to be too intense for the cargo and the trucks risk blowing up. Thus, the trick to navigate the road is to continue at a steady speed and not to slow down.

The countries of the Western Balkans have entered the washboard. Slowing down EU integration comes at a high risk, as much of what has driven reforms over the years is predicated on progress towards the EU. Reducing the (already slow) speed of integration removes incentives for governments to pursue reforms and will simply compound the sense of being left out by citizens.

However, it seems like the EU is signalling the countries of the region to reduce their speed. The lack of progress regarding the beginning of membership negotations with Macedonia, the lack of clear strategy in Bosnia all suggest that the speed is slowing. None of the volitile materials in the trucks have exploded yet, but there is a real risk that if the slow down continues, the dangers might be greater than just a delay in EU integration.

Notes on Eurovision

eurovision

It will come as pleasant surprise that Terry Wogan will no longer comment the Eurovision song contest on BBC, but instead Graham Norton will be his replacement. After having to hear about the Eastern Block, block voting (which one of my more gifted students at Kent used in his/her final essay as evidence of the continued divided between East and West) and the need to reinstate the Berlin Wall, things can get only better. Rather than ranting about the laziness and colonial arragoance displayed towards the small peoples of the east, I have decide this year to write a few notes for Graham Norton so that they can guide his commentary–not be accused of being an academic who only criticises after it is too late:

Fact 1

42 countries participate, 22 are former Communist countires, plus Greece, Cyprus, Turkey and Israel: Western Europe is in a minority. Thus, odds of a West European country winning are just not that that good (or to be precise: 38%)

Fact 2

There is little political voting during the Eurovision (except the ethnic voting between Cyprus and Greece). And no, Armenia and Turkey are not countries who always vote in the same ‘block,’ neither are Romania and Russia, Albania and Serbia. Studies of voting patterns indicate that there are cultural patterns, which create voting regions. If a song from Armenia sounds familiar to a listener in Greece who then votes for the song, this is not block voting.

Fact 3

Performers are trying to please their potential audiances–just that the voters are not in their own country and this leads to some very entertaining ways in which some acts think they can garner votes: Montenegro this year tries to appeal to the gay community with the George Michael cum Village People dancing background in the video. Romania’s Elena on the other hand is appealing to the Balkan ‘block’ by praising the virtues of Balkan girls with lyrics written by a true poet: ‘The Balkan girls they like to party like nobody, like nobody, For crowd delight, we’ll shine all night.’

Fact 4

Some acts are useful lessons in counterfactual history: Moldova this year shows us what Eurovision would have been like, if Communism had not fallen 20 years ago and still the countries east of the Iron Curtain were participating. According to an official bio, “Despite her youth [she is one of the oldest participant in the Eurovision song contest], Nelly is the most authoritative singer in Moldova confirmed by the VIP award, offered every six years.” This winner of the morning star award and many other honors tries to convince the world that they have never seens a dance like the hora from Moldova (which looks surprisingly familar to certain dances in Romania, Bulgaria, Serbia, Albania, Macedonia, Ukraine etc.)…

Fact 5

Eurovision is the most successful form of Euroatlantic Integration. Forget NATO and EU, where is Belrus voting for the UK? In no organization in Europe are all countries of the continent included (except the sore loosers who no longer participate like Italy and Luxembourg) and can vote like equals. Maybe this is what might make many West Europeans unconforatble, being outvoted by these ungrateful Easterners who are all of a sudden equals. And some, like the Ukraine this year, are beating Western pop divas easily. On the other hand, the ‘Eastern’ hand in Norways song surely contributes to his frontrunner status.

Fact 6

Eurovision is silly, fun and thus to be taken seriously (or the other way around). It is rare to find such a mixture of genuine fun and playfulness with true camp and musical horrors. You can love the show and hate the music, that is the beauty of Eurovision. This mix of seriousness, kitch, camp and fun is what makes this continent such a fun place.

Waiting for Godot, Bosnian style

Sometimes when something doesn’t happen, it still matters. A few weeks ago the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council met to decide on the future of the OHR in Bosnia.

However, while this meeting as widely anticipated a few months ago and maybe, possibly somehow bringing an end to the OHR. Instead, the meeting just marked the transition from one last High Rep to the next last High Rep (maybe the office should be renamed on the Office of the Last High Representative).

While the declaration lists the progress Bosnia made and thanks Lajcak for “the important contribution made … to peace implementation and Bosnia and Herzegovina’s progress towards integration into Euro-Atlantic structures,” the non-decision speaks louder than words. The OHR remains open, no change and the remaining conditions for the office closure (5+2) have only been fulfilled to a limited degree.

But the fact that it’s business as usual is a display of helpless by international actors. A new person does not mean a new strategy. The problems which the IC has had in Bosnia in recent years are not down to the personality of the High Representative alone. The PIC declaration does not display any new strategy or approach and we still don’t know about the mandate of the EUSR once the OHR will close down. It thus appears as if not only Bosnia is not yet ready for the next step, but also the international community.  So everybody is waiting, dancing around the other without knowing where the dance will take them, but probably nowhere good.

Do we need to worry about the Balkans? Doom, gloom and soccer

In recent weeks a number of seasoned observers have noted the increasing deterioration of the political development in the Balkans. From the Aleksandar the Great statue building government in Macedonia and the presidential elections there to the perpetual crisis in Bosnia, things don’t look up. In his recent article in the Economist, Tim Judah even mentions the risk of violence in Bosnia.

The combination of the economic crisis hitting the region, stagnating political dynamics and an EU reluctant to help out and visibly cooling down towards any rapid enlargement in the region does not bode well. The slow nomination of the new High Rep in Bosnia was a sad spectacle and enhance the already existing vacuum (I know that vacuums cannot be increased, so forgive the metaphor).

Now there are a number of encouraging developments as well: First, Bosnia won two soccer games. All joking aside and considering that the opponent was Belgium, this is a positive development. I have long argued that nothing is as likely to make Bosnia work as success. A good soccer team can go a long way in creating some state-wide cohesion–it is always popular to support winners. On a more immediate note, one chamber of parliament (HoR) has already passed constitutional amendments incorporating the district of Brcko into the constitution. This is significant for two reasons: First, it is the first constitutional revision since the constitution was imposed at Dayton. This demonstrates that the constitution can be reformed and amended. Second, the agreement of Brcko suggests that the RS does not want to secede. The entity cannot leave Bosnia without taking control of Brcko as well, as it divides the entity in two. Thus, leaving the district in legal limbo would help the RS in making claims at some point in the future were it to declare independence. Accepting and constitutionally protecting Brcko can be seen as a sign that despite all the radical talk, there is little appetite for any radical steps. Finally, constitutional talks in Bosnia are continuing and so for they have been difficult, but the experience of Brcko is encouraging.

This development, however, should be no reason for the EU to lean back. While it is understandable for the Union to deal with its internal economic problems, the ratification of the Lisbon treaty and troublesome members first, but let’s not forget that the celebrations over the Maastricht treaty were ruined by the Yugoslav wars some 18 years ago. It is time to focus on the region once more,  but without talking of the threat of violence or war, as talking of it might help the unfolding of a self-fulfilling dynamic.

The Emporers New Clothes, Wile E. Coyote or don’t look down Mr. High Reprsentative

In a recent blog, Srecko Latal describes Miroslav Lajcak as an emperor without clothes. This is indeed a fitting metaphor which I have used to describe the OHR for a number of years. He praises Lajcak’s honesty for admitting that he is indeed without clothes during an interview and contrasts it with his previous diplomatic talk and his predecessors. However, is such openness a good thing?

To many, Lajcak has clearly expressed his frustration about the lack of backing his office has received from the EU already for quite a while.  In fact, saying that one has no powers is not always helpful. He has acted on a number of occasions (such as with the imposition of parliamentary and government voting rules in late 2007) in a manner which were bound to weaken the perceived power of the OHR. More importantly, the Bonn powers of the OHR always rested on the perception of power, much more than on their reality. Imposing laws and decisions, dismissing officials only works if those affected take it seriously. While Poplasen stayed in his presidential office in 1999 even after he was dismissed by HR Westendorp, he was no longer the president of the RS. However, this is effective if there is coercive power or at least its perception to back up the decision (which there is no longer) and if there is the perception that the decision is final and effective.  By saying that one no longer has the backing and power, the ones on the receiving end are not likely to be impressed.

In the story of H.C. Andersen, the emperor, tricked by the sellers of the imaginary cloth is confronted by the child which says “But he has nothing on at all.” What is his reaction?

“That made a deep impression upon the emperor, for it seemed to him that they were right; but he thought to himself, “Now I must bear up to the end.” And the chamberlains walked with still greater dignity, as if they carried the train which did not exist.”

Maybe it is wiser to end the procession with dignity to the end and then figure out what to do next. To use a different metaphor, Wile E. Coyote only falls down once he looks down. It is thus not (only) gravity which causes his fall, but also is recognition that laws of gravity will apply.  So before the laws of gravity also start applying to the OHR, it might be best not to look down… yet.