Good News? Dodik a traitor!

An article in the latest issue of Pecat, “list slobodne Srbije” (The paper of free Serbia), published by an early advocate of free Serbia as close  party aide to Milosevic in the good old early 1990s, Milorad Vucelic, accuses of Milorad Dodik of selling out Serb interests.

What happened? The new poster boy of defending Serb national interests from Laktasi to “Kosovo je Srbija” events, a traitor?

The crime: On 26 January, he signed, together with the other signatories of the November 2008 Prud Agreement, HDZ and SDA a new short declaration which notes that “BiH is a decentralized state , organized on three levels of government. The middle level of government will be constituted of four territorial units, where every territorial unit rests on sharing of power at the legislative, executive and judicial level.”

While still vague and a commitment on principle rather than the specifics (which are likely to be more contested), it is the first time that a cross-community consensus on the structure of BiH might be possible. Of course, the mention of a fourth unit is in fact a third entity for the Croat community, a controversial yet not entirely illogical development considering the structure of the state.

So what is Dodik’s treachery? Instead of undermining the Dayton Agreement to move towards independence, he’s accused of undermining Dayton to replace it with a more federal state. While this is hardly the content of the new agreement, international organizations might yet find themselves in a position to defend Dodik from potential spoilers to any constitutional reform.

Another One Bites the Dust: Lajcak Leaving Post as HR

Miroslav Lajcak just announced that he’s leaving the post of High Representative for Bosnia to become the next foreign minister of Slovakia. So now the third High Representative of Bosnia who wanted to close the OHR is leaving before the job is done.

Where does this leave Bosnia?

Any transition brings with it a vacuum, so this one is certainly not helping stability in Bosnia, especially as his departure appears to be rather sudden and he’ll be gone sooner rather than later. His departure comes at a crucial time with the meeting of the PIC to discuss whether or not to close the OHR only two months away. With a closure of the OHR potentially close, Lajcak’s departure could not have come at a worse time.

However, there are also some opportunities here:

He has been unable to drag Bosnia out of the political crisis, especially in regard to the dominance of Milorad Dodik. In fact, he has to some degree inadvertently consolidated his hold own power. True, this was in part due to American disengagement and lack of a EU strategy. At the same time, his frequent emphasis that he was powerless and lacked backing in the EU capitals certainly did not help him to shore up the little power and credibility the OHR had left at that time. A new High Rep. has a few advantages: a) a new US administration; b) some tougher language coming from Brussels and c) the transition towards the EUSR. The former two might be clear, the later merits some further elaboration: Had Lajcak overseen the transition from OHR to EUSR, it would have seemed logical for his mandate to end with or shortly after the closure of the OHR. However, now there is an opportunity to have the next HR continue as EUSR for a while to make sure that the break in the institution is less of a break in personnel. This is going to be important to avoid the EUSR to become even weaker.

Going out with a bang, not a whimper.

So far there has been a clear decline in the prestige and weight of the HR. The closing strategy to nominate new HRs which have less political clout to wind down the work of the organization. It seems like now is the opportunity and the need to reverse this approach: Get a heavy weight who can make sure that Bosnia gets the attention of the EU capitals and Washington and that Bosnia gets out of the crisis before the campaign for the 2010 elections begins when nationalist rhetoric is likely to get worse again and another window of opportunity is closed. For the OHR to close down–long overdue–there is a need for a lost push: it requires more weight, more effort to get Bosnia moving again.

Just looked back to May 2007 when Lajcak was nominated… here’s my post from back then

EU and NATO in Bosnia

Last Friday, Gulnur Aybet, Neven Andjelic and myself organized our last workshop in the framework of our British Academy Project in Sarajevo at CIPS (a formal report to follow soon here). It was a very rewarding discussion with NATO & EU officials , representatives of Bosnian institutions and some researchers. The few politicians present arrived, chatted with each other and left soon–no surprise, even if disappointing as usual. What emerged from the discussion was that a handover from OHR to EUSR is very likely in 2009 (no surprise) and that there is as of yet no clear plan to what competences the new EU mission would have. Some countries (esp. UK, USA) favor some residual Bonn powers to be transferred to the new mission so that at least in theory it could use them if certain red lines are crossed, most EU countries appear satisfied with a weaker mandate which merely combines the head of the EC delegation and the EUSR, comparable to Macedonia. What seems most likely is an intermediate construction where the EUSR would have a stronger mandate than in Macedonia and would be able to act as a mediator if disputes arise–however how this can be accomplished without the Bonn powers (or any alternative mechanisms which are beyond some minimal role) remains unclear to me.

Unsurprisingly, some international officials take a more security focused line–the most important security issue is Brcko. Brcko is literally the “safety pin” which holds Bosnia together. As long as there is Brcko, independence for the RS without the use of force (or at least threat thereof) is impossible (even without Brcko it is doubtful how much Dodik pursues the agenda of independence in earnest). This is partly why Brcko has been at the center of many debates in Bosnia recently. Not only is the confirmation of the status in a new constitution (or in law otherwise) a condition for the closure of the OHR, the formation of government in Brcko has also been particularly controversial in recent months. Finally, it has also been one of the sticking points in the Prud agreement–whether its status should be protected by constitutional amendments or by a constitutional law (a tool that does not exist to date in BiH).

Beyond these discussions there is little strategy on how to re-energize the reform process in Bosnia and how to make use of EU integration in this regard. While it seems rather clear that good parts of the elite are not genuinely committed to EU integration–at the same time as rhetorically favoring it–there is little understanding on how to pressure elites effectively to translate words into deeds.

During one interesting workshop session the question emerged whether citizen’s support for EU integration is in fact conditional. Some analysts noted that the high number of support for EU integration (approx. 80%) would drop sharply, if linked to certain sacrifices, such as abandoning entity police forces (not an EU requirement anymore). Thus, the conditional support of BiH politicians for EU integration was in the eyes of some participants actually an adequate reflection of the citizens reservations about unconditional support for the EU. My hunch is that this might be true, but only because the largely abstract goal of EU integration is intangible, while the possible sacrifices appear to be more tangible and immediate. Here, the EU needs to explain much more specifically what the cost of non-membership are and what burden delays mean for citizens.

Oh yes, and happy holidays.

Sarajevo

Returning from a conference with the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Sarajevo a few days ago: It was a frustrating experience how much debates seems to revolve around themselves without evolving. A lot of discussion still focused on what kind of state Bosnia should be, whether or not it should have entities and that it cannot reform itself without such fundamental changes. While these are important questions, there appears so little movement and willingness to take the next step and consider the need for consensus and compromise. A major reorganization is seen by many in the civic and ‘gradjanski’ Bosnia as the way out of the deadlock the country finds itself. While I understand the frustration and the need to find a way out, this hope that the Gordian know cut be cut is simply not helpful. Bosnia will not have a Dayton 2 where the country is re-organized by benevolent international powers, second, Bosnia can only exist as a compromise this is both its weakness and its potential strength. Furthermore, this interpretation assigns to much weight on institutions and ignores that while political elites might be empowered by them they are also reflecting social trends and divisions which are not going to be undone by getting rid of entity voting or veto rights here and there. However, there seems to be little discussion about the nature of Bosnia in the future and what the many labels ‘regionalism’, ‘strong state’ etc. mean.

There is thus, as has been before a gap between the technical and sometimes technocratic debates international officials would like to conduct and the grand plans many Bosnian intellectuals advance. No trace yet of a debate.

Nema Pare: FBiH Runs Out of Money

For all those with little money on their account, don’t despire. It is likely that the Federation of BiH has less. According to Avaz, the Federation has only 434 KM left. And with a Finance minister called Bevanda, I can just recommend to kick back, relax and spend the rest of the money for one or two Sarajevsko beers per day for the rest of the year, it might just be enough.

Dubioza Kolektiv