The Crisis Machine

November 22, 2021 Leave a comment

Over the past 15 years, every new crisis seems to be the biggest crisis since Dayton. As sure as it is that each one fades into the background, the next one will follow like clockwork. The permanent state of emergency, of crises, has become normal and everyone seems to get used to this. The crises are not the unfortunate by-product of political disputes, but the crises are the goal in themselves. As such, Bosnia and Herzegovina has become a crisis producing machine for the current political elite.
Bosnia and Herzegovina is not unique in this. Leaders in the region, think of Serbian president Aleksandar Vučić or his Montenegrin counterpart Milo Djukanović, are masters of producing crisis—and then offering to solve them. They live off the crises they produce. They do this for a number of reasons.
First, each crisis is a performance, a show on the stage. As all eyes, of citizens and international actors are on the stage, it gives time and opportunity to take care of other matters in the backstage area. These are corruption, consolidating authoritarian control over the institutions and many other little steps to make sure that those in charge privatize the state.
Second, each performance helps to build the nation, it creates a sense of threat and reinforces over and over the same story, simplistic but effective of being under threat, misunderstood and to find only protection in the community.
Third, the performance worries internationals, who hurry to meet with the leaders to “solve” the crisis. They are relieved and the leaders moderate their position, take a step back and deescalate.
Fourth, the crisis makers live of polarization. They are not seeking to build consensus or respect for other opinions. In this sense, they need to remind everybody of the dividing line, reinforce them. The crises do that, they are deepening the polarization.
These crisis performances are what is central to ethnonationalist autocrats and populists, from the AfD and FPÖ in Germany and Austria to Vučić, Dodik and other Balkan “strongmen” (and they are usually, but not always, men). These politics of emergency make normal, democratic governing impossible, as every crisis suspends normal rules of a functioning democracy, compromise, decisions based on expertise and respective for difference.
In all this, Bosnia and Herzegovina is not exceptional. What makes the country specific is how the state and its institutions have become little else than crisis producing machines. Their sole purpose and main use by elites has been to generate crises. There is no easy way out of this trap. Ironically, discussions about constitutional changes and changing the institutional set up of the country, see the latest discussions about electoral reform, are best at producing crisis, as they can be framed as threatening the community.
The best drafted constitution for Bosnia, and there is no such ideal constitution for any country, does not work, as it is the dysfunctional Annex 4 that serves elites better. So it seems like a trap. Trying to get out just triggers new crises and offers fresh opportunities for self-serving elites. Looking in the neighborhood, even a functional constitution does not offer immunity from self-serving elites and authoritarianism.
These destructive dynamics does not mean that Bosnia and Herzegovina is trapped in a destructive perpetual motion machine. Two dynamics can change this. First, external actors can change their approach. Rather than being willing helping hands in the crisis machine, they can establish clarity rather than endless appeasement and negotiations with those who use the machines to generate crisis and their own power. Sanctions, exclusion and all the tool that Dayton grant them. If the crisis makers want a Dayton Bosnia, they will have to live with all of it, including the powers of the Peace Implementation Council and the High Representative. Rather than the muddle, there should be a clear process of concluding the peace agreements obligations and restraints on Bosnia. The closure of the OHR should be linked to a consensual new constitution that provides for functional institutions and also includes a permanent internationally security guarantee for the state. Until this is achieved, the peace agreement is not implemented, and the High Representative has a role to place according to the peace agreement. Second, and more importantly, change will have to come from within. Clarity by external actors can help demystify the crisis “show”, yet the end will only come through protests, resistance, and alternatives from within. Unlike others, I don’t consider national identity a type of Marxist ‘false consciousness’ that people will realize one day being false. It is too real to just disappear, but protecting national identity does not require ethnic cleansing, segregation, and the current nationalist myths. Nationalism is, for better or worse, a powerful feature of our world and will shape Bosnia and Herzegovina. Thus, whatever joint resistance is unlikely to change this fundamental reality, but it can moderate it, supplement it with civic and cooperative dimensions that the country lacks.
Getting out of the crisis trap is far from easy and requires fortunate timing and alignment of the right ‘stars.’ The first step is pulling the curtain and realizing that it is the crises themselves are not accidental, but central to the Bosnian and Herzegovinian political system and help preserve the destructive and degenerative status quo.

This article was first published in a special supplement of Oslobodjenje on 20-21.11.2021 on online in English here.

Filed under Bosnia, Notes Tagged with ,

The False Attraction of Orban’s Europe

November 17, 2021 Leave a comment

Ahead of every EU-Balkan summit in recent years, the same struggle, Sofia in 2018, in Zagreb last year and in Brdo last week, EU member states are haggling how to call the thing that they are offering the countries of the Western Balkans, enlargement, a “European perspective“ or even less. Once more, in Brdo, the future of the region was based on a last-minute compromise, calling for a “European perspective” and the “enlargement process”, as if the process is more important than the outcome. In the end it is a semantic exercise that cannot disguise the fact that enlargement is no longer a common project of the EU member states as it was 18 years ago when EU membership was offered to the countries of the region membership at the famous summit in Thessaloniki. Today, the EU seems to be divided between the supporters of enlargement, such as Germany, Austria, Italy and Hungary and the sceptics including France and the Netherlands. However, the narrative of sceptics and supports is misleading. Some supporters have become the biggest obstacles. While Bulgaria pushed for enlargement during its presidency in 2018, it has sabotaged not just accession talks with North Macedonia (and by extension Albania), but also discredited the Commissions claim that the accession process would be merit based. By bringing in identity questions and insisting that the Macedonian government acknowledges a Bulgarian nationalist view of history, it undermines pro-EU forces in North Macedonia send the message that no matter what problems countries in the Western Balkans might solve, they can be derailed by petty nationalist positions of a member state.

On the other side, some critics, such as France, have now supported accession talks with Albania and North Macedonia, despite misgivings about membership. Finally, Germany under Chancellor Merkel und Commission president van der Leyen have supported enlargement, but hurt it, but not sending clearer messages to the region and its leaders when they visit the Balkans. Just recently during her visit, von der Leyen praised Vučić for „a strong focus on fundamental reforms. I commend you for the steps you have taken. This is enormous. You have done a lot of hard work. This hard work pays off. It is amazing to see the progress.” Considering developments in Serbia, this seems either insincere or misguided, either way, it sends the message that the EU will continue to provide uncritical photo opportunities for autocrats and hardly helping to keep up the pressure to take accession seriously.

The European politician, who seems to have been the steadiest supporter of enlargement in recent years is Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban. In a recent ad published in some European newspapers, Orban outlined his vision for Europe, point 7 demands that Serbia join the EU. A recent BiEPAG poll suggests that Orban is the third most popular foreign politician in Serbia after Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping, ahead of other EU leaders such as Angela Merkel or Emmanuel Macron.

Olivér Várhelyi, the EU Commissioner in charge of enlargement and Orbans candidate, turned out to be following Orbans model rather than the EU approach. A recent Politico article suggest that Várhelyi has been shaping and influencing internal EU documents to downplay problems with the rule of law in Serbia and diverging form the position of the Commission and his department.

None of this helps Serbia. Instead, Orban has become a false friend of enlargement. Nobody can more effectively bury the EU prospects for Serbia and the resto f the region then him.
Orban is promoting Serbian membership for two reasons. The first one is migration, as Orban himself stated in Bled in August 2020: “The first of these tasks is that we must unhesitatingly admit Serbia to the European Union as soon as possible, because without Serbia Europe’s security structure is not complete. There is a gap in the system. To give you a tangible example, this is also where migrants are coming through.” This reflects his focus on refugees and would shift the external border of the EU away from Hungary. More importantly Is the second reason. Serbia under Vucic is governed a lot like Hungary und Orban. A strong leader who disregards rule of law, systematically undermines media freedom and marginalises the opposition. More autocrats in his style would give him greater leverage in the EU and shelter him.


For Serbia, this vision of Orban’s Europe, run by nationalist, anti-migrant autocrats is bad news for Serbia. This vision of Europe does not require Serbia to be democratic, or based on legal certainty, as long as it guards European borders. Second, by promoting Serbia, is closing its door to the EU. Orban has some allies, such as Janez Janša and the Polish government, but mostly he is isolated. His partial ally Andrej Babiš just lost power in the Czech Republic and Janša might not last long as prime minister, his party stagnates at less than 30% support, even if it is the single largest party. The next German government is likely to be more critical of Orban and also Austrian Prime Minister Sebastian Kurz, who has the closest support among European conservative PMs next to Janša is out of office. At home, his power is also fragile, as for the first time, the opposition appears to manage to coordinate a joint candidate and polls put the united opposition slightly ahead of Fidesz, with parliamentary elections due next year. In a year from now, Orban and his close ally might be out of office.


Even if this does not happen, Orbans support is a “Medveđa usluga” a disservice, as it only reaffirms the opposition from enlargement skeptics to any country joining the EU. France and the Netherlands, two of the most skeptical countries agreed to the new methodology, yet untested, as it would allow for reversibility in the accession process and closer monitoring. Orban’s—and with it Várhelyi’s—support for Serbia is the opposite, not based on the criteria, uncritical and thus certain to trigger opposition by France and other sceptics at some point. Serbia’s future in the European Union looks more uncertain than ever with Orban has its supporter. This might suit Vučić, who has been systematically reducing support for EU membership among the population due to the anti-EU campaign by pro-regime media for years. As a result, citizens of Serbia are least convinced about joining the EU. Only 53.2% are mostly or fully in favour of joining the EU in a poll over the summer by IPSOS, commissioned by BiEPAG, whereas in the rest of the region, the numbers are between 78.5% in North Macedonia and 93.7% in Albania. The low numbers are thus not a result of the long wait or unfair treatment, North Macedonia beats Serbia on both, but due to government spin.


The combination of the false promise of Orbans path to the European Union and the anti-European spin of the Vučić government are helping to bury the prospect of enlargement, more so than the countries that are sceptical about new countries joining the EU.

The text was published in Serbian as Лажна привлачност Орбанове Европе in NIN on 14.10.2021

Filed under Democratization, European Union, Notes Tagged with , , ,