Grand coalitions are not so grand anymore

October 29, 2013 Leave a comment

What do recent elections in Austria, Luxembourg and Germany mean for scholars of power-sharing in divided societies? At first glance, seemingly little. Neither is a particularly divided society, and identity politics is not a defining feature of political choices. Yet, there is a significance in the results: When Arend Lijphart and other scholars first wrote about consociationalism  in the late 1960s and 1970s, the main examples for countries governed by this form of democracy where in the Benelux, Switzerland and Austria. Lijphart observed that unlike larger countries that had alternating large parties in power, these countries had fairly stable grand coalitions governing the country, usually including socialists and christian democrats. His writings challenged the idea that consolidated stable democracies have majoritarian systems with one large parties (alone or in coalition with smaller parties) governing. Not only are these consociational systems equally viable democracies, but the scholarship on these systems argued that they provided for democracy in societies that had deep cleavages. These were less based on ethnicity or language, but on political families and elections usually did not shift power-relations profoundly.

Now times have changed since these observations. While in Belgium, grand coalitions still remain strong (but increasingly difficult, see the more than one year long coalition talks following the 2010 elections) due to the linguistic divide.The Netherlands, Lijphart’s first case study, grand coalitions have fallen out of favor by the 1990s. Austria has been governing for half of the 68 years since 1945 by grand coalitions (1945-1966, 1987-2000 and since 2007). Elections in September have led to a drop in support for both ruling parties, Social democrats and the conservative Austrian People’s Party, but both still hold a slight majority and are likely to govern together. Luxembourg had a similar experience as Austria, governed by a grand coalition for most of the post-war period (1945-1969, 1984-1999 and since 2004). Yet after elections in October, the so-called “Gambia coalition” between Socialists, Greens and Liberals seems most likely.  Grand coalitions are on the retreat in classic consociational countries. This has happened before, but earlier, this was based on the strength of one of the large parties (social democrats or conservatives), now it is based on their weakness. Furthermore, the underlying structure that propped up these grand coalitions has eroded.

Ironically, a grand coalition is most likely and also according to voters most desired in Germany that saw only few episodes of grand coalitions since 1945 (1966-1969 and 2005-2009). Thus, the elections confirm that the classic divide between larger more majoritarian and smaller consociational democracies no longer seems to be true. Of course, the fact that grand coalitions loose support and consociationalism abolishes itself might be true in some of the original cases scholars looked at, but this does not mean the same will be true in “harder cases” like Lebanon or Bosnia. However, some of the reasons why citizens turn their backs on established consociational arrangements are similar to those why dissatisfaction runs high in others. Blurring the line between countries that are governed by grand coalitions and those that are not highlights that this might be a useful temporary constellation, but in the long run, it creates dissatisfaction with citizens who feel unable to effect change.  Certainly the continuous decline of consociationalism in the original core countries of this form of democracy should give room for reflection on its challenges in divided societies around the world.

Filed under Democratization, Powersharing Tagged with , ,

Secessionist conflicts: A new book and some thoughts on inclusiveness

October 28, 2013 1 Comment

I had the pleasure to participate in a book launch last Friday at the Hungarian Institute of International Affairs, of the book “Secessionist Movements and Ethnic Conflict” by Beata Huszka. It’s nice to see this book come out after having been a member of the PhD defense at CEU where the original doctoral thesis was defended a few years ago.

This is an interesting study that makes the argument that secessionist movements have three frames in which they contextualize and mobilize for secession, an ethnic threat frame, a democracy and a prosperity frame. Depending on which frame is used, the movement is more or less inclusive. Of course, the ethnic threat frame is the most exclusive and thus not only excludes minorities, but also increases the risk of violence. As the book shows–it is based on the case study of the independence movements in Slovenia, Croatia and Montenegro–these choices are not entirely up to the secessionist movements and the context and in particular the behaviour the centre matters greatly.  As such, this book strikes a good balance in making a constructivist argument about the decision of secessionist leaders how to frame the movement and the constraints they operate in. The more oppressive the centre is  and if it seeks to encourage local minorities to resist secession, the ethnic frame is likely to dominate. While the findings are themselves not earth-shattering, it is a good book, as it not only well researched and looks at the dissolution of Yugoslavia through then lens of demands of self-determination movements, but also because it raises questions about the inclusiveness of these movements.

The ability to make an inclusive case of secession is arguably not only constrained by the attitudes of the centre, but also by the need to forge a coherent and revolutionary movement. After all, seeking a new country is a risky strategy that comes at a high potential cost. If the centre behaves violently the case is more easily made and the state quo seems less sustainable, in addition, it would seem easier to convince citizens to follow such a movement, if identity is threatened rather than just promising a better life. As a result, there appears to be a trade-off between inclusiveness and passion a self-determination movement can evoke.

Filed under Croatia, Montenegro, Slovenia Tagged with ,

Europe’s racism: Blonde angles and closed borders

October 25, 2013 Leave a comment

Two events have made me ashamed of being European in recent weeks. First, more than 300 human die in the waters of the Mediterranean of Lampedusa trying to reach Europe. Poor and persecuted, woman, men and and children drown in the sea. The response of many, including Italian prime minister was  shock and recognition of the tragedy. However, the only policy response was muddled and shameful: it is about strengthening Europe’s borders. The stated goal is to also prevent people smuggling, but it is cynical to respond to the death of migrants with stronger controls.

Just a few days ago, European media, from Greece to Britain reported about a ‘blond angel’ found in a Roma camp in Greece. The immediate assumption of the many media reports was that the child, who was not biologically related to her parents, was abducted and that it must have been from Scandinavia or somewhere north due to the blonde hair and green eyes. The racist imaginary in these reports is striking on many levels. Besides (mostly unconsciously) drawing on old stereotypes about Roma abducting non-Roma children, it assumes that blonds cannot be Roma and the assumption that the child was used by the family. While European media might have been more sensitive if the case had involved Jews, Roma remain fair game for such stereotypes.

Much attention is paid when Front Nationale wins a by-election or the Freedom Party does well in Austria. However, the real worry should be elsewhere, the racism of the media that seem acceptable and the willingness of Europe to let refugees drown off its shore to protect some imaginary splendid isolation. Both events highlight that isolationism and xenophobia are no longer a national concern, but a European one and that just being European (and favoring European integration) is not enough. Europe needs a debate about racism and how we marginalize millions of Roma (and others) in our midst and we need a debate about migration and how Europe has become an immigrant society and how it needs to confront refugees risking their lives and often lots of money to get to Europe not with more border controls, but with more openness and support for those in need.

Filed under European Union, Greece Tagged with ,

When counting counts. The Bosnian Census

October 16, 2013 7 Comments

Today the Bosnian census official came to end: media from around the world (here, here and here) took this opportunity to devote some space to Bosnia that evokes little international attention as the permanent crisis of the country is no longer newsworthy.

So why the census? Formally, the results will have few immediate consequences. The quotas in the public administration for members of different “constituent people” are linked to the so called completion of Annex 7, i.e. the chapter to refugee return. These formal criteria are of course a farce. There is no significant refugee return in Bosnia for nearly a decade and while there continues to be a slow trickle, for all practical purposes this chapter is closed. Otherwise the distribution of offices is enshrined in Dayton that does not provide for any formal link between demographic distribution and power it endows group-representation. Of course, the census gives everybody something to hope for and fear of. This is probably the reason this census actually succeed despite high levels of political tension and minor irregularities . The census in Macedonia, a similarly sensitive context, had to be abandoned after a few days of counting. Neither has any particular group boycotted the census, as was the case among Albanians in South Serbia and most Serbs in Kosovo in 2011 (for an overview over the contestation in censuses see this recent article  by Gezim Visoka and Elvin Gjevori and by Dejan Jović in Političke analize).

1. The number of Bosnians

The number of Bosnians is probably the largest uncertainty. Unconfirmed numbers for the sample census suggested a high share of Bosnians (above 30%). This number seems unrealistic, at least on the Bosnian-wide level considering low levels of identification with supra-ethnonational identities in pre-war censuses and the degree of polarization after the war. Of course, a high number of Bosnians constitutes a threat to the currently dominating parties that derive their legitimacy and power from importance of the “constituent people” as the main Bosnian identifies categories. The more Bosnians, the less sustainable is the Dayton arrangement. However, two important questions emerge: First, who are the Bosnians? If most Bosnians are by background Muslim-Bosniaks, the ethnonationalist model is not equally threatened, but just among Bosniaks parties. Only if a significant number of Bosnians are also of Croat and Serb origin, can the number challenge the current arrangement. The second question is how to accommodate Bosnians in the current system. Of course, this will depend on the numbers, but this has been difficult in Yugoslav times, when in fact the authorities from the 1970s onward discouraged identification as Yugoslavs to the 1990 Bosnian election where one seat of the 7 member presidency was reserved for Yugoslavs and Others, resulting in the victory of the Muslim candidate Ejup Ganić for the post who was not particularly Yugoslav or Other. Treating Bosnians just like another ethnic group and thus replicating the system of representation for constituent people might be tempting, but is absurd. Instead, a large number of Bosnians would suggest that the levels of ethnic representation built into the system should be overall reduced.

2. The number of Croats

Croats were the smallest of the three constituent peoples already in 1991 and having obtained Croatian passports (as have many non-Croats as well), many left for Croatia over the past 18 years. Thus, a considerably smaller number of Croats is expected than in 1991. If the share of Croats would fall under 10 per cent, the demand for equal treatment to Bosniaks and Serbs would be less plausible and the bargaining power of Croat parties would diminish. Of course, a small population share is also in other divided societies not an obstacle for representation and the Turkish Cypriot community held considerable influence after independence and also in peace plans since (including the 2004 Annan plan), despite constituting less than 20%. Similarly in Kosovo, the Serb community constitutes around 6% of the population and enjoys reserved seats and extensive mechanisms to ensure its input in the decision-making process. Yet, a sharp drop among Croats would confirm that Bosnia is moving towards a bi-national state.

3. The number of Bosniaks

Bosniaks are the community with the least firm identity matrix and thus some of the most pronounced „campaigning“ during the census was among Bosniak citizens. No census has so far offered the possibility to declare as a Bosniak, so we do not know yet whether citizens agree to the switch from Muslim to Bosniak identiy made during the war by intellectuals and later ratified in Dayton. In neighbouring Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro a significant share of citizens opted for the older category of Muslims over Bosniaks. While the term Bosniak might have more traction in Bosnia itself—the problem for Muslims in Serbia, Montenegro or Croatia is that Bosnia is not a kin state and the affiliation with Bosnia is less obvious—the might be a substantial number of Muslims. In addition, probably most Bosnians would be otherwise identifying as Bosniaks. In theory a large number of Muslims or Bosnians could result in a situation that Bosniaks are not the largest community in Bosnia.

4. The number of non-Serbs in RS

Before Republika Srpska was established in 1991, only around 54% of the population were Serbs, the number climbed to well above 90% by the end of the war through ethnic cleansing, mass murder and genocide. However, as refugees did return, it is unclear what the numbers are today. While the RS hopes to “ratify“ ethnic cleansing through the census and to confirm that the RS is a proto-nation state a larger share of non-Serbs would challenge this ambition.

5. The congruence of nation, language and religion

The dominant understanding of ethnonational identity is that national, religion and language identity are linked. It is thus no surprise that these questions are grouped together in Bosnia, as in most other census of the region. Of course, this presumption is by no means certain. While it is unlikely to find more than a few Croats who also identify as Muslim, there is potential for non-Bosniaks and Bosnians to speak Bosnian and being an atheist is not inherently incompatible with being a Bosniak, Croat or Serb. If we look at census in recent years across the region, there is few heterodox combinations to be found, except for Montenegro, where language and national identity do not coincide.

6. How many Bosnians are there in Bosnia?

Nobody knows how many people live in Bosnia. The numbers given suggest around 3.8 million, but these are at best estimates. As a result, one does not really know that GDP per capita and other crucial data cannot be determined without the population size. In addition, the specific numbers across the country might correct some misconceptions. Generally speaking, one would except a trend in urbanisation as a result of the war and the post-war period as poor rural areas have been abandoned. Yet the cities might have not grown as much as some expect. This was one of the big surprises of the Kosovo census when it emerged that Prishtina was not as large as observers had thought. Similarly, the general depopulation of certain regions, in particular eastern Bosnia is an important question as these areas with a large Bosniak population have suffered from depopulation through the war and poor economic conditions have made the return particularly unattractive.

While some preliminary results will be published early next year, it would be unusual based on other censuses in the region that these preliminary results would contain any data on identity. This data will take considerably longer to process, and according the International Monitoring Operation (IMO) which includes representatives from Eurostat, the European Commission Directorate-General for Enlargement, the Council of Europe (CoE), United Nations Statistics Division (UNSD), the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) and the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), the final results will be released between one and one and a half years from now. This waiting period unfortunately coincides with the next general elections meaning that leaked census results, real or made up might become a feature of next year’s electoral campaign. So the counting is over, the use and abuse of numbers has just begun.

Filed under Bosnia Tagged with

No news news from Albania

July 7, 2013 2 Comments

Sali Berisha at the celebrations in Skopje with Ali Ahmeti and Hashim Thaci in 2012 (from http://www.balkaninsight.com)

Sometimes the absence of news is the biggest news.When parliamentary elections were held ten days ago in Albania. Tim Judah remarked on Twitter that “Albania holds election. The opposition win convincingly, no one cries foul and the prime minister resigns. Er…that is it.” And of course, despite some violence on election day the fact that elections resulted in an uncontested change of government is hardly news in any democracy, except in Albania which has not only seen violence in the most recent elections, but also only experienced two changes of power since the fall of communism, one after the state and government effectively collapsed in 1997 and in 2005 when Sali Berisha returned to power.

A second ‘no news’ news from Albania is the failure of Albanian nationalism to gain ground. In a speech in Skopje in November 2012, Berisha pledged to work for the unity of Albanians and challenged the existing borders in the region. While the idea of a “natural Albania” (i.e. an Albania based on ethnic criteria to include all territories where Albanians live or used to live, e.g. the Cham region in Greece), has been promoted in extreme nationalist circles and maps of such an imaginary Albania have been for sale in Albanian and Kosovo for years, the idea of Albanian unification has never received such a high level endorsement. Berisha’s call was noted by observers, including the historian Oliver Schmitt as a change of tone and leaked US memos took a critical line towards Berisha for abandoning he previous support for existing borders. While his party back-paddled not to lose critical external support (he had to go back on an election promise to extend Albanian citizenship to ethnic Albanians elsewhere in the region), a new political party, the Red and Black Alliance fully supported this agenda. The group attracted quite a bit of attention (see here, here, here and here)in recent years for its extreme nationalist policies and its links to the strong opposition movement Vetevendosje in Kosovo. Opinion polls  in recent years have additionally been indicating that a majority of Albanians in Kosovo and Albanian would support unification of the two countries.

Picture from Red-Black Alliance Rally (from website http://www.aleancakuqezi.al/)

In the end, the Red and Black Alliance performed poorly. It only gained 10,171 votes (see here for results of the election commission), nowhere close to the 3 percent threshold with a support below one percent (only in the district of Tirana did the partydo slightly better than 1%). In brief, the party failed to break the polarized Albanian political system between Socialist and Democratic Party and nationalism seemed to not be a successful tool to achieve more than some international attention. While Berisha was not defeated for his nationalism, his efforts to evoke Albanian nationalism provided him with no electoral advantages. Dusan Reljic noted that it was economic and social issues that dominated, but still the rhetoric of Albanian unity is also evoked by the new governing party. However, the striking ‘no-news’ news remains the fact that while some romantic imagination of a unified Albanian state might exist among some, the reality of corruption and a difficult economic situation cannot be overcome with evoking the ‘national question’ as elsewhere in the region. In this sense, these ‘no-news’ are good news.

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Is Change Coming to Bosnia? Reflections on Protests and their Prospects

June 10, 2013 3 Comments

I want my ID number

When the protests in Turkey began on the 28 May, what struck me was the centrality of the Mediterranean as the focal areas of social movements in the last two years. In addition to the Arab spring (summer and winter), mass protests were held in Spain, Israel and Greece and Italy is experiencing a crisis of confidence in the established party system. While there, the democratic governments either fall or could/had to absorb the grievance of many, the dictatorships in the southern Mediterranean were not able to. While Turkey is closer to the democracies of the northern rim of the Mediterranean, the response of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has been more following the authoritarian reflex of its southern neighbors, thereby strengthening the protests.

At first, I was struck who the Balkans had been largely ‘protest-free’ in recent years, unlike neigbouring regions. However, recent protests in Bosnia suggest that the social movements against the status quo are now reaching the region as well. Of course, the protests in Sarajevo and other Bosnian cities had other causes as the protests in Turkey or other countries of the Mediterranean, but also share a number of features: the carries are young, urban, feel excluded from politics and government and see now other way to chance the status quo than by protest. What is striking is that the loss of public spaces and parks has been a key feature in small scale protests in the last years in the Balkans: Protests in Banja Luka in June of last year over a park, in Belgrade the cutting down of trees on Bulevar Revolucije earlier and in Tirana also over the destruction of a park. These protests failed to gather the momentum as in Turkey, largely because local politics and national politics had different dynamics, but they highlighted the concern not just for parks, but also for the symbolic loss of public spaces and more broadly a public good to what seems like narrow commercial (and political) interests. Thus the destruction of a park is a symbolic act that carries more significance than “just” an environmental issue, as Orhan Pamuk expressed in his reflections on the protests.

The current protests in Bosnia are not about a park, but over the lack of a decision. In a county that is more characterised by decisions not taken and with a prime minister (officially chair of the council of ministers) who claims in his government’s defense that “I think we are not the worst of the world, nor are we a country like Zimbabwe or Somalia”, it is decisions not taken that create most grief. After the constitutional court ruled in February that the current law on ID numbers is unconstitutional the government has been unable to propose a solution, resulting in newborns not being able to receive official documents. This has meant that newborns can’t get passports and are thus unable to travel. When the small baby Belmina Ibrišević needed to travel abroad for urgent medical treatment, but could not get the documents, the lack of a decision became a life or death issue and galvanized public opinion and led to protests.

The Bosnian government is notorious for not taking decisions as these are caught between competing interests of the entities and ethnopolitics where the substance of decisions is trumped by the question of who is to be in charge. Next to ID numbers, this is nowhere as obvious as the dispute in Bosnia about veterinary and sanitary inspections. As Bosnian politicians have been unable to agree on who is to implement the inspections, thousands of Bosnian farmers are likely to be unable to export their dairy products to Croatia once it joins the EU next month and more rigid controls come into effect. While here, also the economic survival of many hangs in the balance, it has not mobilized protests as the issue over ID numbers.

The response of political elites to the protests has been ugly. While some tried to ingratiate themselves with them, others dismissed the protests as either being anti-Serb or called on citizens to get off the streets and vote in next years elections. This response led Eric Gordy to comment in his blog that “[t]he national game is up. When it worked it produced a generation of politicians who believed that firing up resentment and fear would give them a permanent hold on power. It’s ringing hollow and their permanent mark is fading. They have become objects of ridicule. They’re over.”

While I wish he was right, I am more skeptical in my view. Heleen Touquet in her PhD on new social movements in Bosnia: “Escaping ethnopolis: postethnic mobilization in Bosnia-Herzegovina” (for the table of contents, see here) looked closely at groups in recent years that sought to mobilization citizens against the status quo. These efforts have largely failed, because they were unable to build a genuine cross-ethnic constituency or a country agenda that would make it difficult for existing elites to dismiss or ignore them. The new protest have this potential. There are, however, two formidable obstacles: First, how to build an agenda for change that all citizens of Bosnia can rally for. Second, how to translate this movement into a political option. While social movements can set the agenda, change has to come from the political system (unless it is overthrown in a revolution). While there are some parties (like Naša stranka) that aspire to pursue different politics than the currently dominant parties, it is at the moment hard to imagine a country-wide political movement that could be successful and transform the way decisions are taken and how the country is governed. The current political set-up encourages parties to run on mono-ethnic platforms and makes it easy of ethnonationalist parties to sow the seeds of doubt in change.

Filed under Bosnia, Democratization, Western Balkans Tagged with , ,

Why the Belgrade-Prishtina Agreement is Likely to Succeed

May 20, 2013 1 Comment

 

Here are some reflections on the agreement between Serbia and Kosovo I shared with the Bulgarian publication Capital a few days ago.

The EU-brokered agreement between Serbia and Kosovo was a great news. But do you think that it could work in practice?

The agreement does not drastically change the status quo, so from that point of view it can work in practice. It preserves much of the structures and instutions that exist in Northern Kosovo, but just switches the formal authority from Serbia to Kosovo. However, the problem is that the agreement also rests on the idea of  elected institutions in the North and here the main challenge is a potential boycott by Serbs of such elections. As a result, there would be no legitimate institutions to carry out the agreement there. It is thus no surprise that the Serbian government has been lobbying hard in the north to convince Serbs to accept the arrangement. If the Serbian Orthodox Church supports the arrangement and some leaders might be put under pressure for their criminal activities there will be not much opposition and Serbs might vote to ensure that they are not ignored, especially if they feel they cannot derail the process.

What is the stimulus for the deal to work? Is the EU membership enough stimulus for both sides?

Surprisingly, EU membership is more powerful than what we sometimes expect. It is often thought that EU accession is too distant for governments to stake their reputation on sensitive issues. However, we see a differen dynamic here. Both the Serbian and the Kosovo government

How could Belgrade persuade the Kosovo Serbs to accept the deal?

Belgrade first needs to frame this agreement as being the best deal possible and also point out that the status quo cannot continue indefinitely. The second strategy the government has used is to offer a referendum (if it does not seem realistic at the moment) to show that it is confident of popular opinion in Serbia. A popular vote in favor of the agreement would not leave Serbs in North Kosovo much space to oppose the agreement. Finally, the argument that the government is making is that after all there is no possibility of the Serb leadership in the North to oppose both Serbia and Kosovo, their numbers are too small and the letter calling on support from Russia a few days ago rather betrays their weakness. They also lack a strong ally in Belgrade, be it in the opposition. Most are aligned to Vojislav Kostunica, whose support is marginal. In parliament, some 173 of 250 MPs voted in favor, a strong majority, and protests against the agreement had a small turn-out.

 

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New Roads to Reform in Bosnia

May 17, 2013 Leave a comment

New proposals to make Bosnia’s Federation entity less dysfunctional and more democratic should not be ignored by the country’s squabbling political elites.

If Bosnia were governed by all the good ideas that have been articulated over the past decade or more on reforming Dayton, it would be one of the most innovative political systems. NGOs, think tanks, parties, experts and international organizations have produced dozens of constitutions for Bosnia, reform initiatives and ideas for making Bosnia a more functional state. It would thus be easy to dismiss the latest proposal of a working group set up by the US embassy on the Federation as just the latest in a long line of experts with good ideas and little connection to reality. However, the latest proposals that the working group of Bosnian experts put forth do merit further attention.

Instead of proposing the ideal solution for Bosnia or one of its entities, it is an encouraging document for its realism. Some 181 suggestions detail specific suggestions for reform that are based on the existing constitution and which are based on pragmatic consideration rather than on the principle “wouldn’t it be nice”. Rather than focusing on reforming the Bosnian state, they focus on the more dysfunctional of the two entities, the Federation. The Federation is an oddity, created during the war to end the war between the Bosnian Croat and the Bosnian government forces, it was a peace-settlement as much as Dayton and less concerned with its long term viability. Thus, a constitutional overhaul was not only overdue, but it constitution mirrors main feature at the state level and what works in the Federation might also work at the state level. The 181 suggestions are detailed, but can be grouped into several categories.

First, a number of suggestions focus on streamlining the entity, reducing both the administrative cost of the entity and also improving decision making. These include abolishing the president and his vice-presidents—a timely suggestion considering that the current president was recently arrested. Instead, they propose a president of parliament who would be assisted by two vice-presidents who are at the same time the presidents of each of the two chambers of parliament. While this is certainly an improvement in reducing the number of office holders, it is a bit of a strange suggestion. As the proposals transform the entity into a parliamentary system, it would make more sense to make the prime minister the undivided head of the executive who also represents the Federation.If one takes the German or Austrian Federal system, both have only prime ministers and no particular ceremonial role is given to the president of parliament.

Second, the proposals seek to recalibrate the balance between collective identities and citizens. While so for, constituent people (i.e. Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs), predominate, the proposal states that the Federation should define itself as a union of citizens who are comprised of three groups—members of the three constituent people, people who do not identify with these groups and national minorities. This suggestion is not just symbolic, but the proposals suggest that citizens who are not self-identified Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats have representation ensured at all levels (even if often less than the three nations). How that can be achieved without abuse that would just extend the arena of national competition to office-holders from this category remains unclear, however.

Third, the proposals seek to make the Federation more efficient by streamlining the division of competences between the entity and the cantons and also making decision making in the Federation easier (in the parliament and government). The proposal preserve the power-sharing system and veto rights, but define them better and also reduce the opportunities for abuse. Importantly, the proposals suggest that in the process of Euro-Atlantic integration, all authorities (entity, cantonal and municipal) implement policies of the state (of course it is telling that this needs to be stated at all, after all this is what federal units are supposed to do). This implies, however, that the distribution of competences should not be used to block the process of EU integration, which has of course been the case so far.

Finally, the proposals suggest that the current map of the Federation needs to be changed. It clearly states that the current set up of ten cantons with great variation in size is undesirable. There are few concrete suggestions for change, except to expand the canton of Sarajevo with the current Bosnian Podrinje canton that includes the city of Gorazde and is by far the smaller canton (around 30,000 inhabitants). It also suggests that a few municipalities from other neighboring cantons might join Sarajevo. The problem with redrawing cantonal boundaries further is that the next three small cantons with less than 100,000 inhabitants are all with a Croat majority (Posavina, West Herzegovina and canton 10), making the redrawing of cantonal boundaries sensitive. Instead, the working group did suggest that smaller cantons might not have all institutions than larger cantons have, less ministers and also that all cantons would not pay full salaries to the members of parliaments to save costs.

It is unclear whether these suggestions will be put into law, but they are useful for being concrete, pragmatic and provide a clear guideline for reform that political elites will find hard to ignore. While they will not provide a way out of the many blockages that Bosnian politics has been experiencing in recent years, they make a convincing case for the pragmatic. Furthermore, many of the changes suggested for the Federation equally apply for the state. Of course, it might be hard to abolish the presidency at the state level, but the suggestion of putting citizens who do not identify with the three constituent people on equal footing with these constituent people, and many ideas in the proposal are applicable at the state level. The approach itself of identifying specific suggestions for reform might also serve as a template for Bosnia-wide reforms.

Republished from Balkan Insight (http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/new-roads-to-reform-in-bosnia)

 

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Reflections on Editing a Journal: Experiences with Nationalities Papers

April 29, 2013 1 Comment

Just a few days ago, I handed over the editorship of Nationalities Papers to Peter Rutland, who teaches at Weslyan University. It has been exciting and exhausting four years editing the journal of the Association for the Study of Nationalities. Shortly after taking on the editorship, I wrote a small piece for the Taylor and Francis Editor’s Bulletin about Nationalities Papers and now I wanted to share some thoughts on editing a journal that might be less obvious to somebody submitting articles (or at least they were to me).

Producing a journal is both a professional and a voluntary enterprise. Every journal is different, but Nationalities Papers, as most other journals, does not pay editors to run a journal. I had a budget that allowed to pay for an editorial assistant and to visit a few conference to represent the journal. Of course, much of the entire operation is not paid. The members of the editorial board who provide their advice and occasional reviews are not paid, neither are the reviewers (although we could offer them a 30% off voucher for books). They are professional in the way in which they are produced and sold and of course, all of us in a journal invest our professional energy and reputation into the process. I will certainly keep this in mind when I submit an article in the future when a review is late or something else is not going as smoothly as I hope for. In order to ensure that every two months a new issue is published with 6-8 interesting and diverse articles often means that ones own research gets put on the  back-burner.

I have had the pleasure to participate in a number of workshops over the years discussing how to get published for academics together with the editors of Ethnopolitics, Slavic Review, East European Politics, Europe-Asia Studies and other journals. Our experiences were strikingly similar, as were the questions by interested academics. One of the big obstacles in the entire enterprise is the peer-review process: it is daunting both for the author of the article and for the editor. The author is worried about harsh comments and maybe even some unfair criticisms. As editor, I worried about finding a reviewer and getting a good review in ample time (our average time between submission and the decision by the editor was just above two months). Again, reviewers are not paid and as all academics, they are often busy with teaching, grading, supervising, researching, drafting grant applications, and maybe even writing up their own research. It is thus no surprise that it is often hard to find scholars willing to commit for a review on a particular topic. I have seen articles where the first invited review took weeks to answer, the second said yes, but never managed to get in the review, the third said yes, but then couldn’t find the time and more than ten people were contacted just to review a single article. With around 100 submissions a year, it is easy to see the scale of the enterprise (luckily often also the reviewers first invited agree). However, many authors believe that a delay in the review process has something to do with the assessment of the article and answer is simply no. Of course, if the reviewers are divided in their opinions (and this happened surprisingly often with one review recommending minor revisions or accept and the other reject), a third review helps to decide. Often, the review process seems democracy in Churchill’s famous dictum: “Democracy is the worst form of government, except for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time.” While it might be good think about tinkering with the process (like having at least some reviews be public), the overall nature of the process ensures that a graduate student at a small college and a senior university professor have the same fair chance (and I have seen the former accepted and the latter rejected by the reviewers).

From: http://www.phdcomics.com/comics/archive.php?comicid=581

A final point about open access: in recent months, the debate has been forced by what seems like a hasty effort in the UK to require the publication of government funded research (what this is exactly seems to be unclear) in open-accession publication for which commercial publishers can charge a (hefty) fee that might be covered by universities and/or grant givers. There is a risk that this might lead to all kinds of distortions in the publication process that might reinforce hierarchies of universities and within the profession. After having edited a journal with a commercial publisher and having been involved in an online journal earlier, I am convinced about the merits of both models. Open access journals, which are free for authors and readers, are a good model for future journals as printing journals is no longer necessary and thus production costs have come down. There is still an odd legacy-effect at place, where authors prefer publication with in-print journals while nobody (except the author maybe) seems to look at the printed version anymore. As a result, university- or grant-funded open access journals deserve greater space in academia, especially as an outlet for research that is generated through government grants. However, I do see space for commercial publications that are published with the support network of a commercial publisher. While I also think that subscription rates are currently too high (and open access publishing might bring them down), it is forgotten in debates that the publishers are not the only beneficiaries. In fact, the Association for the Study of Nationalities (ASN) who owns the journal relies on the income from the journal to organize a wonderful convention annually in New York.

Finally a few key points for authors I used in the ‘how to get published’ workshop:

  • Revise a draft and have a friend read it
  • Never submit the article at the same time with two journals (it happened in one case and both Nationalities Papers and the other journal rejected it)
  • Don’t plagiarize (it can ruin your career and reputation)
  • Be patient with the reviewers
  • Never respond immediately if you get negative reviews (always sleep over it). It will not just make editors less unhappy, it will also help your chances of remaining on good terms with the journal.
  • Don’t blame the editor or send insulting emails (they don’t help, believe me)
  • Most articles require revisions (often major revisions, this is not the exception, but the rule)
  • Don’t be discouraged and revise (most articles that are submitted, but not published, are due to authors not revising their articles).
  • Don’t just think about getting published, but also on getting read and cited. Just getting published does not translate into much readership considering the large volume of academic publications.

Filed under Academia

What the Belgrade-Prishtina Agreement means for Bosnia

April 27, 2013 3 Comments

The agreement between Belgrade and Prishtina, even if its implementation will surely hit some snags has repercussions beyond the two countries themselves. In particular Bosnia is going to be affected, being the other country in a continuous major political crisis.

First, the ability of the Serbian and the Kosovo government to find a compromise should put the current political elite of Bosnia to shame for not agreeing on some basic reforms, ranging from the implementation of Sejdić-Finci verdict to ensuring that Bosnian farmers can continue to export their dairy products to Croatia after it joins the EU on 1st July.

The second major consequence of the agreement will be for Republika Srpska and Milorad Dodik. Lately, he and his associates from the SNSD seem out of step with reality.When Tomislav Nikolić apologized the other day for Serbian war crimes, Dodik only commented that the interview (for BHT) was aggressive and that because he wants “good relations with Serbia and its leadership, there is no sense nor need to go into public comments and polemics“–hardly an endorsement for Nikolićs apology. Relations with Serbia have deteriorated after Dodik placed all his bets on Boris Tadić during the elections last year and thus is clearly not in favor with the current government, especially Aleksandar Vučić. The corruption investigations in Serbia that involve good “friends” of Dodik also did not help to improve relations.

Now with the deal between Serbia and Kosovo, Dodik has also lost his ability to evoke a credible alternative to Bosnia. His continuous suggestions that Republika Srpska might eventually become independent  has received a serious blow. While he never talked about the RS joining Serbia, it is clear that the RS could only leave Bosnia with Serbian support. The RS is too small and isolated to achieve this without a supportive neighbor, especially as few other countries in the region and in Europe are likely to take a favorable view. It never seemed particularly plausible that Serbia would support the RS in independence (instead of supporting it as an at least formal part of Bosnia) at the price of EU accession and worsening relations with its neighbors, but it has now become even less credible. The Serbian government has shown a degree of pragmatism and willingness to not pursue the idea of partition in Kosovo. So why would a government of Serbia “give up” on Kosovo, despite it being still part of Serbia according to its constitution and turn around and support the RS. As Dodik’s ally in Serbia, the DS also supports the agreement, Dodik seems rather isolted with his more critical view of the agreement. In fact, he is now closer to Koštunica and thus without strong allies in Serbia. Even if the DS were to return to power in Serbia (unlikely any time soon), it would be without Tadić as a friend and without the same ambiguity he displayed over the RS and Kosovo. Just a few days ago, Nebojša Radmanović, the Serbian member of the Bosnian presidency, evoked  in an interview the RS assembly resolution from 2008 that claimed if half of the UN members recognized Kosovo, the RS would also have the right to declare independence. Now, the count is over half with 98 (of 193) UN members recognizing Kosovo and a referendum on independence of the RS seems increasingly unlikely and evoking its might just start sounding a lot holler in next year’s electoral campaign.

Filed under Bosnia, Kosovo, Serbia Tagged with ,

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